Yves here. Louis Proyect has written previously about operational issues involved in reintroducing the drachma (see here and here for examples). Here he focuses on the political economy interpretations of the course of action that Syriza took.
By Louis Proyect, who has written for Sozialismus (Germany), Science and Society, New Politics, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Organization and Environment, Cultural Logic, Dark Night Field Notes, Revolutionary History (Great Britain), New Interventions (Great Britain), Canadian Dimension, Revolution Magazine (New Zealand), Swans and Green Left Weekly (Australia). Originally published at Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist
Like Akira Kurosawa’s “Rashomon”, the story of Syriza is also one about a rape told from different, self-serving and contradictory perspectives. For both the sectarian “Leninists” and the anarchists, Tsipras’s failure was ultimately a failure to smash the state and proceed rapidly toward the construction of communism. For post-Keynesians like Jamie Galbraith and Mark Weisbrot, there was a strong identification with Syriza’s general program and approach. When Tsipras finally signed an accord with the bankers that was even more austere than the demands put upon Greece in the beginnings of the negotiations, his supporters blamed the bankers rather then Tsipras for essentially taking the nation hostage. As for the capitalist ideologues at the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal, you get more or less the inverse interpretation of the ultraleft. Where they would have seen a plus, the neoliberals instead saw a minus: Greece was a tragedy caused by Tsipras’s anticapitalist hubris.
Since the last version of what happened is so patently absurd, there is no point commenting on it. It is the clash between the first two that interests me especially since they both strike me as undertheorized. Probably the best presentation of the Marxist analysis can be found on Michael Roberts’s blog in an article titled “Greece: Keynes or Marx?” that was written before the infamous deal that amounted to a new round of debt and austerity. Referring to an interview that Sebastian Budgen conducted with Costas Lapavitsas, he finds fault with Lapavitsas’s confession that he remains committed to Keynesianism despite being a sharp critic of Alex Tsipras: “Let me come clean on this. Keynes and Keynesianism, unfortunately, remain the most powerful tools we’ve got, even as Marxists, for dealing with issues of policy in the here and now.”
Roberts concludes his article thusly: “The issue for Syriza and the Greek labour movement in June is not whether to break with the euro as such, but to break with capitalist policies and implement socialist measures to reverse austerity and launch a pan-European campaign for change.” I want to return to this question of implementing “socialist measures” later on but for now would dwell at length on a matter that came up in Roberts’s article that has preoccupied me for some time, namely whether repudiating the debt owed to Western banks would have broken the back of austerity, a view shared by Marxists and post-Keynesians alike.
In a way, the question of the Greek debt reminded me of the problems faced by an old friend who was forced to run up tens of thousands of dollars in credit card debt because illness prevented him from going back to work after he retired. Social security did not leave him enough to pay the rent and medical bills for Parkinson’s treatments, a disease that actually kept him unemployable. His strategy was to go to bankruptcy court and appeal to have the debts written off. This might have offered temporary relief but in the long run he would have run into another financial crunch. It would seem to me that Greece has the same sorts of problems with a chronically backward economy amounting to its Parkinson’s.
As an example of how debt relief can become a kind of panacea for the left, there is Eric Toussaint’s article in CounterPunch titled “Greece: an Alternative”. He writes that a “popular government” would do the following:
Suspend debt payment, organize an audit and radically reduce the debt and its repayment by an act of repudiation (which will necessarily be unilateral), adopt discriminatory measures to protect the people’s savings invested in debt.
This measure and others recommended in a laundry list of radical reforms would be the first stage in establishing 21st century socialism in Greece, one that was inspired by Venezuela’s demonstration that “it is entirely possible to resist the capitalist offensive.” Since his words come from a 2012 speech, we can certainly fault Toussaint for being a flawed seer but more egregiously for being unable to theorize Venezuela properly. It was not socialism that was being built but something owing more to John Kenneth Galbraith as Hugo Chavez would have been the first to admit.
As many of you know, Syriza’s economists were very interested in the Argentine solution to austerity that was facilitated by a kind of debt repudiation in 2001. This matter is taken up in Roberts’s article, where he quotes Lapavitsas on the supposed success of Argentine debt restructuring and peso devaluation: “I hasten to add that in the case of Argentina (though by no means would I suggest that Argentina is a shining beacon for the Left), it is much-maligned and much-misunderstood. What was obtained in that country after default and exit was vastly better than what held before and vastly better than what would have happened had the country continued along the same path, for working people.”
Roberts challenges this assumption:
The breathing space created for Argentina by breaking the dollar peg [an Argexit, in effect] does not seem to have restored the Argentine economy to stable growth. After a few years of a commodity-export led boom, the Argentine economy is back in crisis, despite Keynesian policies adopted by the government. There has been a 6% fall in per capita GDP since 2011.
There’s a lot more to be said about what happened in Argentina in 2001 especially if it is going to be used as a model for a Grexit and debt repudiation. Long before I began writing about Greece, I tried to analyze Argentina’s long-standing economic ills that like my old friend’s Parkinson’s is of a rather chronic nature going back to the British colonization of the 19th century.
To start with, it is important to note that although Argentina defaulted on bond payments in 2002, it eventually agreed upon a debt restructuring that was acceptable to the IMF and major banks in the USA and Europe. Despite a hefty “haircut”, most investors saw them as an opportunity to make a handsome profit especially since interest rates had plummeted to historic laws in “safer” bond markets.
In fact Wall Street banks made a killing in the bond restructuring deals. Goldman Sachs made millions of dollars in fees, as did other blue chip firms. Even if the working class suffered from the devaluation that went along with the 2001 Argexit, the bourgeoisie could toast itself with champagne over the profits that could be enjoyed.
Furthermore, at the very time the terms of the restructuring had been nailed down, Argentina’s economy began to improve dramatically. In September 2005, the nation enjoyed its 37th consecutive month of positive growth. What accounts for this? Notwithstanding the devaluation of the peso in 2001, agricultural exports remained pricey and a rising demand for soybeans and other essential crops lifted the economy. With a government committed to financial austerity, the balance sheets continued to tend more to the black.
Within four years, Argentina appeared to be on top of the world again as the FT reported on July 18, 2005:
The Argentine government this week made a triumphant return to the dollar-denominated debt market, only three and a half years after staging the largest default in world history and less than two months after restarting payments on its private debt.
In the first issue in foreign currency since the default at the end of 2001, investors, led by foreign investment banks, oversubscribed the $500m offer by more than three times. The government set a cut-off point of 7.99 per cent interest on the 2012 bonds, barely more than the price being paid by neighbours Brazil and Uruguay – neither of which have Argentina’s recent history of missed payments.
Argentina has managed to attract so much foreign interest that the treasury expects to make a similar issue in coming months.
All this was taking place when Nestor Kirchner was president. While nobody could possibly confuse this veteran Peronist as an advocate of 21st century socialism, he certainly was seen as part of Latin America’s Pink Tide, so much so that Mark Weisbrot could regard him as having “made an enormous contribution in helping to move Argentina and the region in a progressive direction” shortly after his death.
Like Venezuela, Argentina is no longer considered to be on the front lines of anti-imperialism. Falling commodity prices have made both nations vulnerable to external pressure from lending institutions.
But even if the consequences of debt repudiation were short-lived, why wouldn’t Greece consider similar measures if for no other reason that like my old friend going to bankruptcy court, it would at least spell some relief even if not permanent. Perhaps such a solution might seem worthwhile as long as you ignore the immediate consequences following the devaluation of the peso in 2001. In a 2002 article in the New Left Review titled “Racking Argentina”, David Rock described the calamity that befell the country:
Of Argentina’s population of 37 million, 52 per cent—some 19 million people—now fell below the official poverty line, while 20 per cent, 7.5 million, could no longer afford sufficient food. There were reports of children starving in the impoverished rural province of Tucumán. Unemployment soared to 23 per cent of the workforce, with a further 22 per cent ‘under-employed’—in part-time jobs and seeking further work. Public services disintegrated: hospitals could no longer treat the sick; schools closed, or gave up any attempt to teach. State pensions and public-sector workers’ salaries went unpaid. The construction industry came to a halt. Faced with declining revenues, the federal government had started to issue ‘Lecop’ bonds in lieu of wages. The provinces followed suit, led by Buenos Aires with its patacones, and by early 2002 there were some 4 billion pesos’ worth of local bonds in circulation.
Advocates of a Grexit refer to the short-term suffering that might accompany the devaluation that would attend adoption of a new currency but can they project a recovery based on an uptick in commodity exports? One Greek is skeptical. In a May 16, 2012 blog post titled “Weisbrot and Krugman are Wrong: Greece cannot pull off an Argentina”, Yanis Varoufakis wrote:
While it is quite true that Argentina’s export performance in 2001 was by no means better than Greece’s today, it is crucial to note that Argentina’s export potential in 2001 was vastly superior to that of Greece’s in 2012. By export potential I mean the degree of underutilisation of productive resources whose employment can, potentially, produce goods and services for which there is effective demand. In 2001, Argentina’s farms were woefully underproducing primary commodities that were, at that time, seeing their demand skyrocket. In sharp contrast, idle productive resources in Greece cannot produce much for which there is increasing demand.
Take for instance shipping and tourism, mentioned by Paul Krugman as two potential sources of Greek export growth: Both are in speedy decline! Additionally, whereas in the case of Argentina, its next door neighbour (Brazil) was entering a period of rapid growth, Greece’s neighbours are showing no such signs of vitality. Indeed, our traditional trading partners are also buffeted by recession (pushing down the demand for Greek tourism) while non-EU countries (such as Russia) cannot, and will not, make up the difference to any appreciable degree.
These are the hard facts that all leftists have to deal with, no matter what version of “Rashomon” they put forward. If Argentina was not a suitable model for Greece, could Cuba or the Soviet Union be to one’s liking? For the anarchists and Alex Callnicos, these would be just as unsuitable since nothing could come close to their communist ideal their imagination summoned up. Most Marxists are more inclined to accept the dialectical realities that Marx described in the Critique of the Gotha Program: “What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.”
If we are ready to accept a communist society stamped with such birthmarks, does that mean that a communist Greece would have met our expectations? For those of us who had a chance to see Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, we would have gladly accepted a new Greece, warts and all.
Unfortunately, there were a couple of obstacles in our way, starting most importantly with the consciousness of the Greek masses. No matter how desirous readers of the Marxist press were for the abolition of capitalism in Greece, there were worrisome signs that the average Greek was not up to our lofty standards. Leaving aside the polling results on leaving the Eurozone, there were indications that parties standing for communism were simply not that popular no matter how many general strikes or mass demonstrations had taken place on the streets of Athens. Votes for Antarsya and the KKE were minimal at best. This leads one to consider the possibility that our anger might be better directed at the taxi driver or barber shop owner who was foolish enough to vote for Tsipras than Tsipras himself.
If by some miracle, the KKE had been voted into office, what would be the outlook for a communist society plus warts (and under such a grotesquely Stalinist sect, they would be plentiful.)
This leads me to an article by William I. Robinson that appeared in Truthout today. I first came across Robinson’s writings in the late 1980s when he was reporting from Nicaragua with his writing partner Kent Norworthy in the Guardian newsweekly in the USA, a newspaper that is sorely missed. Robinson now teaches sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara and is a specialist on globalization. His “Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity” is a good starting place for those trying to theorize the struggle against capitalism in a world in which capital has taken wings to fly around the world in a ceaseless quest for profits. Unlike the period that began in Marx’s age and came to a conclusion in the post-Bretton Woods period, today’s bourgeoisie could care less about the “health” of its body politic. If American bridges and railways are falling apart, why should it matter to a hedge fund manager? His only obligation is to his investors and himself.
Robinson’s article is a critique of Thomas Piketty, who is one of those thinkers that is for social justice while rejecting Marx, a problematic stance to say the least. He makes an essential point about the conditions we face today:
Transnationally oriented elites and capitalists captured governments around the world and used states to undertake sweeping restructuring and integration into a new globalized production and financial system. The “neoliberal counterrevolution” opened up vast new opportunities for accumulation. Free trade agreements and financial liberalization lifted state restrictions on cross-border trade and capital flows. Privatization turned over everything from public industries, to educational and health systems, mail service, highways and ports to transnational corporations and provided an investment bonanza to the transnational capitalist class as it concentrated wealth as never before. Labor market reform led to the erosion of regulated labor markets. As workers became “flexible,” they joined the ranks of a new global “precariat” of proletarians who labor under part-time, temporary, informalized, non-unionized, contract and other forms of precarious work.
For those of us trying to build revolutionary parties, it is essential to keep in mind the social and economic realities we face. In the 1970s the American Trotskyist movement made a fatal decision to base its strategies on the supposition that a repeat of the 1930s was in the offing. When reality interfered with that strategy, the party rejected reality and continued on its futile path until it lost 90 percent of its membership.
As opposed to the SWP leadership and virtually all the other sects, Lenin was a master of getting to the heart of underlying socio-economic dynamics. In the early 1900s leading up to the “What is to be Done” conference, he tried to explain that “Economism” was a reflection of the more primitive, handicrafts phase of Russian capitalism when shops were smaller and more isolated. He noticed the great concentration of large factories in major cosmopolitan centers and concluded that a more professional and more generalized approach was needed in line with the changed circumstances.
Economism belonged to Russia’s past; orthodox Marxism was the way forward. He saw modern social democracy as corresponding to the highly complex and specialized nature of modern mass production. He saw socialist parties as the working-class equivalent of large-scale industrial plants. A centrally-managed, large-scale division of labor was needed to move the struggle forward, just as it was necessary to construct steam locomotives. Lenin was no enemy of capitalist technology and mechanization. Rather he sought to appropriate its positive features whenever necessary.
Isn’t it about time that Marxists began to explore the organizational forms and strategies that correspond to the world that William Robinson describes? If large-scale industrial plants (Fordism, in other words) is the forms appropriate to the party that Lenin built, should we not be thinking of post-Fordist methods of struggle that use the Internet in the same way that Lenin used Iskra? These are points I have been making for the past twenty years or so and please excuse me in advance for making them as long as I have breath to make them.
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With Syriza it wasn’t alas a case of “Greece: Keynes or Marx?” but more like “Greece: Keynes or Marx Brothers?”.
I can’t help thinking its more Seven Samurai than Rashomon – the depleted warriors and protectors of the weak, having fought off the raiders said ‘we lose again, the farmers always win’.
isn’t that the last line in “The Magnificent Seven” as well?
Anyway doesn’t seem like a win for greek farmers, although if you browse the yogurt aisle at the grocery you’d think the greeks are making a killing, it’s all greek yogurt all the time now. The problem with revolutionary policies in greece is that they’ve lost sovereignty to brussells, and the problem with giving workers a share in industrial production is that greece, (as is stated in contrast to argentina) doesn’t have much there there. In the final block quote, I think from Robinson related to Picketty? this is the overarching problem facing globalisation, capital is free but people are not, mexicans can come to the us and work but I can’t go to mexico except as a tourist, right? H1b’s, H2b’s can come to the u.s. and work but not be true immigrants until they’ve “made it” and get wealthy, even then they may be sacrificing rights for money, not personally very clear on that point, but they can be gotten rid of if it seems necessary. Lamberts rules of neoliberalism 1 and 2, greece could go along or starve, and the bankers proved it, right? So I guess if bankers are in a sense farmers then they won, and socialism is a cost they don’t have to bear.
Magnificent Seven is a direct adaptation of Sev. Sam.
thanks
Well, its not a great analogy, I agree, although the point in the end of Seven Samurai I think was that the warrior class couldn’t win – even in victory, someone else (the settled farmers) got the spoil. They are expendable.
The scene is here (much more downbeat than the ending of Magnificent Seven of course).
Sev. Sam. was more a lamentation on the heinou bunri, the permanent separation of the warrior class from the rest of the population, a social firewalling of sorts that prevented samurai from acting in solidarity with peasant populations. It’s what led to the caste-like system of the Edo Period.
I think there’s also a lesson here in Akutagawa’s “Rashomon” story, from which the frame devise for Kurosawa’s film comes. The old woman justifies picking through dead bodies because of her need to survive, so the disgraced warrior reduces her to the status of a corpse (he doesn’t exactly kill her), so the same logic applies to himself. The lesson being, for the Greeks, everyone is going to do what’s in their own most selfish interests, even if means reducing Greece to a husk of a nation state.
Perhaps such a solution might seem worthwhile as long as you ignore the immediate consequences following the devaluation of the peso in 2001.
Extremely dubious interpretation. Unemployment peaked at something like 24% in mid-2002 after a climb beginning in 1998. The Argentine government continued to defend the 1-1 currency peg throughout 2001. Only in January 2002 was the convertibility law repealed and the currency floated. Recovery begins in 2002. Call me crazy but I like my causality to go forward in time, so if currency peg precedes recession and mass unemployment which precedes devaluation which precedes recovery, I don’t blame the mass unemployment and poverty on devaluation, I blame it on the currency peg.
I thought the quote from William Robinson was very apt as is the term precariat.
Combining anti-austerity and climate action is a way to re-orient wealth concentration to more productive uses and to provide more real security (necessities) to more people.
——-
Alive in the Sunshine
“”Addressing environmental problems will entail significant and widespread changes, yet without a commitment to unconditional social provision, talk of resilience, flexibility, and adaptation are all too easily collapsed into justifications of perpetual precarity.””
Thanks for this thoughtful and wide ranging piece.
The accord Tsipras signed with the bankers was more austerian than the one he rejected after the referendum because there was little or no choice, Syriza was going down. Mistakes of course were made, they always are when action is taken; that is the problem with governing instead of sniping from the cover of the oppostition.
The bankers and the Troika were set on destroying the emergence of a popular anti-austerian government that resisted lining up for the big squeeze; this was of paramount importance to the TPTB as disruptions in the force were rippling through the event horizon of southern EU states. Any leftist government acting in character with leftist goals and ideals was doomed. This is the reading that seems most closely alloyed with the reality I was observing.
But as the Rashomon analogy suggests, events and their cause and effect are illusory particularly when human exigencies are woven in, as Galbraith railed against procrustean, meta-doctrines, “economic activity is a complex product of the cultural and political milieu in which it occurs.” In the case of Syriza and Greece the need to produce an immediate solution to placate the socio political dilemma in which Greece was entrapped was a fool’s errand. It just so happened that the opportunity for the left to grasp the levers of power came at the wrong moment but then it usually does. Maybe we have choices but we usually can’t choose our circumstances. Certainly they weren’t the same as Argentina’s.
But is the process over? Podemos and other leftist parties are still in play as is the punishing economic climate that continues to threaten the poor and the soon to be poor, middle class; growth, the doubtful trump card of prosperity as it is dealt from the stacked deck held by the Bilderbergers is occurring only in their already overflowing folios . Another point Galbraith disputed with the conventional wisdom of modern capitalism, that “increasing material production is a sign of economic and societal health.” It may be too early to categorize Syriza as a failure as the drama in Europe is far from over.
As to the internet as a source of the spark needed to ignite the revolution, I have doubts in that new technology is usually first creative, it is then co-opted and turned to the purposes of TPTB. The web once seemed a garden of free flowing knowledge now it is a polluted and dangerous landscape. My usually ignored question is why when Syriza was center world stage and in need of solidarity was there such an anemic response from the European left, the OWS movement and others? Where and to what purpose and effect was social media engaged at that moment? I recall twitter or social media conjured flash crowds, snowball fights, and flash theater like dancers at Grand Central, people riding the NYC subway without trousers. Those were the cutting edge techno driven events promoted in mass media, there were no doubt others but nothing viral. All nice enough but not the required spark .
NC is a lovely sparkler in a very long dark night. Also it is solstice and time to hope for the return of the light.
This is a pretty heavy lament. I don’t think socialism is any deader than capitalism… as Orlov might say: dead, deader, deadest. And this piece reminds us that socialism/communism is born from capitalism because communism does not spread aggressively like capitalism, it reacts to it. I think there is a big omission in this post – it is not looking at the natural limits to capitalism, especially to international capitalism. But that is in fact what we are witnessing real time. So of course we need to all get on the internet and look for the best ways forward. Someone made the essential point a few days ago here that we no longer live in a world of scarcity, but just the opposite. Whereas our politics is still stuck in cold war think which itself was based on the century before. So I agree with the optimism of the last paragraph. We need to plant our politix in the here and now and reassess ourselves. We have already learned that “Globalism” is a mirage.
Syriza’s performance in office is no more complex than that of so many other governments backed by unions and social movements who were quickly forced to abandon their programs as a condition of governing a capitalist economy. Syriza’s was a more dramatic fall given the depth of the crisis in Greece, the high hopes it’s electoral victory engendered, and its subsequent flight from the renewed anti-austerity mandate handed to it in the referendum, but it’s record was not so extraordinary and difficult to understand as your contributor suggests.
The Syriza leadership, including Yanis Varoufakis, acted on the assumption that it could widen what it saw as an incipient split within the eurozone – on the one side, the French and Italians who considered that austerity had reached its limits, and on the other, the Germans and their allies who made aid conditional on the completion of structural reforms in labour and product markets. This was a disastrous strategic miscalculation which turned Syriza away from continued mobilization and education of its own anti-austerity base in favour of futile and dispiriting cap in hand appeals for relief from the German-led creditors’ troika.
The more realistic approach – suggested by many commentators, and not only on the left – would have been to admit the possibility of failure and, if it came to that, to try to negotiate an orderly exit from the eurozone. Wolfgang Schauble, in particular, was unhappy about throwing good money after bad, and was encouraging a Greek “suspension” from the Eurozone. This would necessarily have been an orderly exit since it was and is not in the interest of the US and Europeans to starve and destabilize Greece to the point it becomes a failed state at a strategic global crossroads.
It became clear early on that the truly utopian notion was that the Germans, in concert with the IMF and ECB, would agree to substantial debt relief without Syriza implementing the deregulation, fiscal discipline, privatization, and other measures that previous Greek governments and other eurozone debtors had accepted. The troika was as conscious of the “demonstration effect” of the Greek negotiations throughout Europe as the hopeful European left which hoped to emulate a Syriza victory in Spain and elsewhere.
Short of being able to negotiate an orderly and viable Grexit, it would have been better for the Syriza government to have resigned and continued to patiently organize and educate from opposition rather than sign on to the harshest austerity package to date. If Syriza’s accession to office last January was marked by enthusiasm and hope, it’s post-capitulation re-election in September was characterized by resigned support for the party as a “lesser evil” and an illusionary hope born of desperation that it could still mitigate the worst effects of the new agreement.
It confuses cause and effect to blame the ostensibly more “conservative” Greek and European masses for the government’s behaviour. It never tried to give a lead to the active sectors of the growing anti-austerity sentiment sweeping Europe, and its swift and unprincipled capitulation in defiance of the July referendum vote confused, demoralized, and split those who had once looked to the party for inspiration. The net effect of the Syriza experience, as has been the case with all left-centre governments administering a capitalist state, was to halt the forward movement of the mass of the population yearning for change.
If the fear is that more radical measures will inevitably produce a confrontation with the big powers and catastrophic results in a small country with a weak and undeveloped economy, then the question must be asked: Why form or elect parties like Syriza which promise sweeping social change in the first place? Arguably, the Greek people would not have been exposed to the same economic subversion and hardship perpetrated by the troika had they not had the temerity to reject its favoured parties, PASOK and New Democracy, in favour of one which sought to tear up the austerity memoranda they had signed.
Could not agree more with Mr. Gandall’s analysis.
Perhaps, but the data processing implications of converting from the Euro to the Drachma (or whatever) would have been quite daunting, as has been discussed here at Naked Capitalism from time to time.
Rashomon is relevant to a wide variety of complex events. We often become angry because others can’t understand how obviously correct our viewpoint is, and the other people are just as angry because we can’t see how obviously correct their point of view is. It reminds me of the famous cover of the book Godel, Escher, Bach, which is really a rather simple image, but the image is completely different when the light is shifted.
Example image: http://www.riverrundesign.com/art-of-the-day-godel-escher-bach/
It is one of the perversities of politics that genuine reformers tend only to be elected during times of stress and difficulty, when almost by definition it is harder to build something new. Sometimes they can be lucky, such as in the immediate post war years when the destruction of existing structures allowed aggressive social democratic governments to build social protection systems almost overnight, as those who would fight them were so weakened – the obvious example being the Labour government in the UK, essentially creating the NHS out of nothing, even with a war damaged economy.
However, it is always easier to break things than build them, so radical right wing governments can almost by definition be more successful in their aims than left wing ones. Privatisation, repealing regulations, etc., is an easy thing to do in times of chaos (as Naomi Klein has written about). To actually build a new system, especially in a country like Greece with a wretchedly weak social and administrative infrastructure, is incredibly difficult and arguably only really possible in a country with an existing tradition of social solidarity and strong administrative structures. The NHS was built by a bureaucracy designed to rule an empire. This is one reason I think why radical governments in Latin America have so often had to fall back on authoritarianism in usually failed attempts to defend their progressive policies.
Syriza of course proved themselves unworthy of their citizens trust. But in reality, they were dealt a very weak hand – much weaker than they themselves seem to have realised.
“a country with an existing tradition of social solidarity and strong administrative structures.”
I think that’s a very important point.
From Ingham, ‘The Nature of Money’
“Any successful extension of ‘infrastructural’ power by means of credit-money can only take place within a legitimate institutional framework based on an acceptable and workable settlement between creditors and debtors.”
—–
Ingham paints an interesting picture of how the Bank of England integrated the two main sources of capitalist credit-money that had originated in Italian banking, public debt in the form of state bonds and private debt in the form of bills of exchange. And most importantly they were introduced into an existing sovereign monetary space.
I think one of the main takeaways is that there needs to be a balance of power between the private and public debt structures. Right now private banking is too powerful.
The sovereign monetary space was first given stability by a gold/sterling standard but it was realized that the true stability was the social acceptance of a money of account. A sovereign monetary space implies a willingness to cooperate socially which includes the ability to enforce laws including taxation which gives value to money.
“a country with an existing tradition of social solidarity and strong administrative structures.”
I think that’s a very important point.
From Ingham, ‘The Nature of Money’
“Any successful extension of ‘infrastructural’ power by means of credit-money can only take place within a legitimate institutional framework based on an acceptable and workable settlement between creditors and debtors.”
—–
Ingham paints an interesting picture of how the Bank of England integrated the two main sources of capitalist credit-money that had originated in Italian banking, public debt in the form of state bonds and private debt in the form of bills of exchange. And most importantly they were introduced into an existing sovereign monetary space.
I think one of the main takeaways is that there needs to be a balance of power between the private and public debt structures. Right now private banking is too powerful.
The sovereign monetary space was first given stability by a gold/sterling standard but it was realized that the true stability was the social acceptance of a money of account. A sovereign monetary space implies a willingness to cooperate socially which includes the ability to enforce laws including taxation which gives value to money.
Discussion of Argentina regrettably omits that the agricultural commodity / economic “miracl3e” was due to monoculture of GMO soybeans thanks to the sweetheart relationship of Monsanto with the Kircheners. A short-term economic mirage was created, but what goes unspoken is the devastation of local agriculture, the degredation of soil, and the healthcare disaster resulting from widespread increased exposure to harmful herbicides/pesticides in the soybean farming areas–this public health disaster affecting the poorest and those with the weakest political voice.
It is a big mistake to look just at financial numbers (e.g., the big increase in the financial value of Argentina’s soybean exports–happy days) without looking at the who is paying the price, both short-term and long-term: the Argentinian environment and those who work the land and are exposed to the chemicals being used.
Quite a teaser. Yes, I am aware that LP has written lots, but IMHO he is too afraid of repeating himself. Where I wanted more detail, he got shy about repeating himself. I don’t know about Lenin and Iskra (which I assume means “spark”?), and Mr. Proyect, you missed a chance to inform me now. I shall be looking for more in the future–and I appreciate the recommended reading by WI Robinson. But, as a reader, I would have liked to hear more details here-and-now. The sketchiness of the closing bit makes the whole thing obscure. A couple of lines (even merely a couple of lines) explaining the reference to Lenin and Iskra would have been welcome.