Does the “Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act” Apply to American Independent or Alternative Media?

By Lambert Strether of Corrente.

Spoiler alert: Yes, it may, owing to what would charitably be called ambiguity in the drafting, and yes, it does, because powers granted to the Act’s “Global Engagement Center” apply to U.S. citizens on US soil who work in media. To be fair, the sponsors of the “Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act” (the Act) say differently, so let’s hear from them first. The Act was written by Rob Portman (R-OH) and co-sponsored by Chris Murphy (D-CT). From Portman’s press release on the Act:

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Rob Portman (R-OH) and Chris Murphy (D-CT) today announced that their Countering Disinformation and Propaganda Act – legislation designed to help American allies counter foreign government propaganda from Russia, China, and other nations – has passed the Senate as part of the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Conference Report. The bipartisan bill, which was introduced by Senators Portman and Murphy in March, will improve the ability of the United States to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation by establishing an interagency center housed at the State Department to coordinate and synchronize counter-propaganda efforts throughout the U.S. government. To support these efforts, the bill also creates a grant program for NGOs, think tanks, civil society and other experts outside government who are engaged in counter-propaganda related work. This will better leverage existing expertise and empower local communities to defend themselves from foreign manipulation.

And, a week after the Act was passed and the ruckus kicked up on “numerous small web outlets,” Chris Murphy:

U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., said Tuesday that passage last week of a bipartisan measure he co-sponsored will strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to track and combat disinformation and propaganda overseas, especially by Russia.

The legislation puts the State Department in the business of funding overseas news sites in hopes that could counter fake news propagated in their countries, such as a false story that President-elect Donald J. Trump hung up on the presidents of the Baltic nations.

“The United States wouldn’t be picking the messaging. The United States wouldn’t be censoring anyone’s newspaper or web site,” Murphy said. “We simply would be offering to help other countries’ in their efforts to produce more independent journalism to counter this Russian propaganda narrative.”

So, the Global Engagement Center will have no domestic effects at all. It’s all about other countries. That’s what Portman and Murphy say. But what does the Act say? Let’s take a look. Portman’s original, standalone bill (S.3274 – Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act bill) was folded into S.2943 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, signed by Obama on December 23, at SEC. 1287. Global Engagement Center.

Drafting Ambiguities in the Purpose of the Global Engagement Center

Section 1287(2) of the Act establishes the Center’s purpose:

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Center shall be to lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.

There are two ambiguities here. The first and most obvious: Does the adjective “foreign” apply (a) only to “state propaganda,” or (b) to “state and non-state propaganda? Some readers chose (b), but my reading was (a), probably because I took “foreign state” for a noun phrase, and so don’t distribute the adjective “foreign” over both “state and non-state.” In other words, if the statute were to mean “foreign state and [foreign] non-state propaganda,” I feel that the drafters would have written “foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda.” And fortunately, in my quest for the meaning of “non-state actor” (which we’ll get to in a moment) I found an example where drafters did exactly that. From H.R.4681 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015:

Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the threat posed by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025, including threats from foreign countries and foreign non-state actors.

That is, because the drafters meant “foreign countries and foreign non-state actors,” they did not write “foreign countries and non-state actors,” as did the drafters of the Act.

So, if “non-state progaganda” can be produced by domestic entities, then clearly the Act does not apply only in “other countries,” as Senator Murphy would have it, and, contra Snopes, could very well apply to “American independent or alternative media.”

The second ambiguity is the source of the propaganda which, after all, has to come from somewhere. The origin of state propaganda is clear: The state. But what is the origin of non-state propaganda? There must be an agent somewhere, and in an attempt to discover that agent, I searched legislation (both proposed and enacted) for the usage of the phrase “non-state actor.”

In most cases, non-state actor is never defined. In the context of nuclear proliferation, “non-state actors” are presumbly the sort of “terrorist” (or “international terrorist”) organization that would wish to acquire a nuclear weapon. In the context of the Israeli-Palestian conflict, non-state actors are organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah; in Syria, non-state actors can be “vetted.” Non-state actors can also be “international criminal groups,” and “paramilitary groups.” Besides “recognized terrorist groups,” non-state actors can also be “individuals, mobs, vigilante groups, anti-government insurgents, [and] militant organizations.”

Clearly, the meaning of “non-state actor” is elastic. I found the following three definitions. (There are others, but it seems to me that the definitions that matter when consturing the law of the United States come from the law of the United States.) From an early version of the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act:

(11) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means a nonsovereign entity that— “(A) exercises significant political power and territorial control; “(B) is outside the control of a sovereign government; and “(C) often employs violence in pursuit of its objectives.”;

Since none of those “numerous small web outlets” control any territory, they are clearly not “non-state actors,” hence are not within the scope of the Act.

The second, from a less restrictive version of the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act:

“(11) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means a non-sovereign entity that exercises significant political power and is able to exert influence at a national or international level but does not belong to or ally itself to any particular country and often employs illegal violence in pursuit of its objectives.”;

This definition probably does not apply to any of those numerous small web outlets, depending on the meaning of “significant” political power. (It might apply to WikiLeaks, though.)

And the third definition, from H.R.1323 – Shahbaz Bhatti International Religious Freedom Act of 2015:

“(14) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means any entity outside of government, including an extremist group or terrorist organization.”.

This definition, the least restructive, clearly does apply to, for example, Naked Capitalism, since NC is “any entity outside of goverment (i.e., the whole of civil society).

At this point, it’s worth noting that some legislation requires the President to list non-state actors formally. S.3117 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017

(e) Designation of non-state actors.—The President shall, concurrent with the annual foreign country review required by section 402(b)(1) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)(1)), review and identify any non-state actors in such countries that have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and designate, in a manner consistent with such Act, each such group as a non-state actor of particular concern for religious freedom operating in such reviewed country or surrounding region: Provided, That whenever the President designates such a non-state actor under this subsection, the President shall, as soon as practicable after the designation is made, submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing the reasons for such designation.

The Act does no such thing.

So, summarizing, we can certainly build a case that the Act applies domestically to “alternative media.” First, there is a colorable claim that the Act is intended to apply to “non-state actors” whether foreign or not; and second, there is a colorable claim that the alternative media, as entities within civil society, are non-state actors.[1]

Domestic Data Collection and Domestic Funding by the Global Engagement Center

Let’s look at the functions of the Global Engagement Center. From the Act:

(b) Functions.—The Center shall carry out the following functions:

(1) Integrate interagency and international efforts to track and evaluate counterfactual narratives abroad that threaten the national security interests of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

Regardless of whether maintaining a “Chinese Wall” between “counter-factual narratives abroad” and counterfactual narratives that reach the shores of the United States — for example, that “the British government has learned” of yellowcake uranium in the Iraq WMDs disinformation campaign — note that “narratives abroad” is qualified with “abroad.” I would argue that means that functionality not so qualified can be performed domestically.

(2) Analyze relevant information, data, analysis, and analytics from United States Government agencies, United States allies and partner nations, think tanks, academic institutions, civil society groups, and other nongovernmental organizations.

Since “relevant information, data, analysis, and analytics” is not qualified with “foreign” or “abroad,” that means the information can be American, including American media. (Which makes sense if you want to track information propagation, or counter it, but gives the lie to the assertion that the Act “does not apply to American independent or alternative media.”)

(3) As needed, support the development and dissemination of fact-based narratives and analysis to counter propaganda and disinformation directed at the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

The argument above applies here.

(10) Maintain, collect, use, and disseminate records (as such term is defined in section 552a(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code) for research and data analysis of foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts and communications related to public diplomacy efforts intended for foreign audiences. Such research and data analysis shall be reasonably tailored to meet the purposes of this paragraph and shall be carried out with due regard for privacy and civil liberties guidance and oversight.

Here is 5 U.S. Code § 552a – Records maintained on individuals:

(4) the term “record” means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph;

Readers, I’ll leave you to imagine what the Global Engagement Center is going to do with your financial records, and what “reasonably tailored” and “due regard” might mean. But I’ll again point out that this function gives the lie to the assertion that the Act “does not apply to American independent or alternative media.”)

Now let’s follow the money. There is an “Information Access Fund”:

(1) AUTHORITY FOR GRANTS.—The Center is authorized to provide grants or contracts of financial support to civil society groups, media content providers, nongovernmental organizations, federally funded research and development centers, private companies, or academic institutions for the following purposes:

Note again there’s no “foreign” or “abroad” qualifier. So even if one grants that the purpose of the Act applies to foreign non-state actors as well as foreign states (which I regard as at best not proven), nothing says that money can’t go to domestic non-state actors to study foreign propaganda[2]. Indeed, “federally funded research and development centers” says as much. Therefore, the Act dangles the pleasant prospect before American “media content providers” — the Times, for example, or even Jeff Bezos’s vanity project — of being funded for the purposes listed.[3]

(A) To support local independent media who are best placed to refute foreign disinformation and manipulation in their own communities.

Note there’s no “foreign” or “abroad” qualifier on “local.”

(B) To collect and store examples in print, online, and social media, disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda directed at the United States and its allies and partners.

Note again the lack of a qualifier. The Center could store every post from every outlet on PropOrNot’s defamatory list, and get Federal funding for it.

(D) To support efforts by the Center to counter efforts by foreign entities to use disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda to influence the policies and social and political stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

Counter how? The origin of the information might be foreign, but the “counter” might well be domestic. I suspect Obama’s head of the OMB, Cass Sunstein, would have some suggestions: See his paper on “cognitive infiltration” here, and Glenn Greenwald’s commentary. Obviously, if small web outlets with comments sections were cognitively infiltrated by paid trolls, that could have a severe impact on the quality of their communities and sucking up management time that would be better spent delivering product, with both factors combining to decrease profitability, and making it even harder for independent media to survive. This, too, would give the lie to the assertion that the Act “does not apply to American independent or alternative media.”)

Conclusion

A careful reading of the “Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act” shows there is good reason to fear an impact on American independent or alternative media. As these numerous small web outlets are “non-state actors,” the Act can be colorably construed to apply to them, and many of the Act’s functions and funding opportunities impact them.

Maintaining Records on US Citizens

NOTES

[1] Snopes writes: “Numerous small web outlets inaccurately asserted that President Obama signed a “Christmas bill” criminalizing alternative media in December 2016. The provision is aimed at countering foreign sources of disinformation and does not apply to American independent or alternative media.” Snopes, at least as far as what’s on the page goes, did not check the wording of the statute; it relied only claims from the authors of the bill.

[2] Had Clinton won the election, the Act might well have been entitled “The Correct the Record Rice Bowl Act of 2016.”

[3] One can imagine more defamatory stories like the Post’s on PropOrNot being funded under the aegis of counting false narratives. The mind reels, as will the “numerous small web outlets” being given the Post’s treatment, again giving the lie to the assertion that the Act “does not apply to American independent or alternative media.”)

APPENDIX I: “State Actors” in the Law

To try to get a sense of what legislators meant by “non-state actor,” I ran a search on that string at Congress.gov for legislation going back to the 104th Congress in 1994-95 (that is, before the state of the “War on Terror.” These are the results (though not all hits contained the string, oddly). Bills that became Law are bold. I’ve underlined “non-state actor” throughout. Some of the bills are introduced several times, so there are duplicate entries.

1. H.Res.59 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States remains committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
   

   Whereas such challenges to NATO Allied interests and values include the  potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe; rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery; transnational terrorism  and disruption of the flow of vital resources; and conflicts outside the  treaty area stemming from unresolved historical disputes and the actions of undemocratic governments and sub-state actors who reject the peaceful settlement of disputes;

2. H.R.4205 – Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
   

   1) the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude EMP threats to the United States from all potentially hostile states or non-state actors that have or could acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles enabling them to perform a high-altitude EMP attack against the United States within the next 15 years;

3. H.R.5408 – Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
   

   the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude EMP threats to the United States from all potentially hostile states or non-state actors that have or could acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles enabling them to perform a high- altitude EMP attack against the United States within the next 15 years;

4. H.Res.468 – Transatlantic Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002
   

   risks from rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery;

5. S.15 – Project BioShield Act of 2004
   

   “(1) Threat assessment capabilities.–For the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary for terror threat assessment under the security countermeasures program, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2006, for the hiring of professional personnel within the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, who shall be analysts responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat assessment (including but not limited to analysis of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [[Page 118 STAT. 853]]   agents, the means by which such agents could be weaponized or used in a terrorist attack, and the capabilities, plans, and intentions of terrorists and other non-state actors who may have or acquire such agents).

6. H.R.2122 – Export Administration Renewal Act of 2011
   

   (3) Statutory authority to conduct investigations overseas, as well as undercover authority, is necessary for the Office of Export Enforcement of the Department of Commerce to combat increasingly complex international proliferation activities involving Iran and other hostile state and non-state actors.

7. H.R.2122 – Project BioShield Act of 2003
   

   (1) Threat assessment capabilities.–For the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary for terror threat assessment under the security countermeasures program, there are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003, and such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2006, for the hiring of professional personnel within the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, who shall be analysts responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat assessment (including but not limited to analysis of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents, the means by which such agents could be weaponized or used in a terrorist attack, and the capabilities, plans, and intentions of terrorists and other non-state actors who may have or acquire such agents). All such analysts shall meet the applicable standards and qualifications for the performance of intelligence activities promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947.

8. S.Con.Res.81 – A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
   

   Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that “all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery”;

9. H.Con.Res.330 – International Human Rights Equality Resolution
   

   (8) The fundamental human right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life is violated when lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals (hereafter referred to as “LGBT individuals”) are victims of extra judicial, summary, and arbitrary executions for consensual adult same sex relations by state and non-state actors with impunity in countries such as Guatemala, Chile, Honduras and El Salvador.

10. S.1903 – North Korean Freedom Act of 2003
    

    have the primary responsibility of receiving voluntary information about weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems, materials, and technologies and the intent or actions of countries to export such items or knowledge to other countries or non-state actors;

11. H.Con.Res.398 – A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
    

    Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that “all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery”;

12. H.R.2601 – Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007
    

    The national security interests of the United States would be enhanced by the rapid implementation by all Member States of the United Nations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which prohibits all Member States from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and requiring all Member States to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective domestic laws criminalizing such acts.

13. S.1949 – Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2005
    

    “(c) Cooperative agreements.—In order to promote cooperation regarding the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and delivery systems, the President is authorized to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with other countries to facilitate effective measures to prevent the transportation of such items to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

14. S.2566 – Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2006
    

    “(c) Cooperative agreements.—In order to promote cooperation regarding the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and delivery systems, the President is authorized to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with other countries to facilitate effective measures to prevent the transportation of such items to non-state actors and states of proliferation concern.

15. H.R.5333 – Shoulder-fired Missile Threat Reduction Act of 2006
    

    (4) A description and evaluation of the access of terrorists, non-state actors, and state sponsors of terrorism to MANPADS, their methods to acquire MANPADS, and a strategy for disrupting future access to MANPADS.

16. H.R.5918 – To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers.
    

    (2) Many enemies of freedom, whether state or non-state actors, persecute individuals and groups who stand up for democracy’s ideals.

17. H.R.6060 – Department of State Authorities Act of 2006
    

    “(c) Cooperative Agreements.–In order to promote cooperationregarding the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and delivery systems, the President is authorized to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with other countries to facilitate effective measures to prevent the transportation of such items to non-state actors and states of proliferation concern.

18. H.R.6419 – Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2006
    

    (5) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) reaffirms the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts and directs that all countries, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce effective laws that prohibit any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and to prohibit attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, or assist or finance them.

19. S.4103 – Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2006
    

    (7) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) reaffirms the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts and directs that all countries, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce effective laws that prohibit any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and to prohibit attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, or assist or finance them.

20. S.4 – Improving America’s Security Act of 2007
    

    (2) the Secretary of State should continue the effective and successful use of case studies and practical workshops addressing potential challenges, and work with non-state actors, including nongovernmental organizations that support democratic principles, practices, and values.

21. S.1138 – Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007
    

    (6) The 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change found that creating incentives for countries to forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential, and that such suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a real chance to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by states or non-state actors, and that such proposals “should be put into effect without delay”.

22. H.R.2254 – Ending Nuclear Trafficking Act
    

    “2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

23. H.R.2265 – Responsibility to Iraqi Refugees Act of 2007
    

    (3) Other religious, ethnic, social, or minority groups, including gay and lesbian Iraqis, subject to violence, intimidation, or discrimination by state or non-state actors.

24. H.R.3650 – North Korean Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act
    

    (4) President George W. Bush stated in November 2006 that: “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action. . . . It is vital that the nations of this region send a message to North Korea that the proliferation of nuclear technology to hostile regimes or terrorist networks will not be tolerated.”.

25. S.Res.399 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met before certain restrictions against the Government of North Korea are lifted, and that the United States Government should not provide any financial assistance to North Korea until the Secretary of State makes certain certifications regarding the submission of applications for refugee status.
    

    Whereas President George W. Bush stated in November 2006 that: “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action. … It is vital that the nations of this region send a message to North Korea that the proliferation of nuclear technology to hostile regimes or terrorist networks will not be tolerated.”;

26. S.Res.470 – A resolution calling on the relevant governments, multilateral bodies, and non-state actors in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan to devote ample political commitment and material resources towards the achievement and implementation of a negotiated resolution to the national and regional conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Darfur, Sudan.
    

    Calling on the relevant governments, multilateral bodies, and non-state actors in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan to devote ample political commitment and material resources towards the achievement and implementation of a negotiated resolution to the national and regional conflicts in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Darfur, Sudan.

27. H.R.5658 – Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
    

    (4) the United States should assess the security risks associated with existing stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and should assess the risks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons being developed, acquired, or utilized by other countries, particularly rogue states, and by terrorists and other non-state actors; and

28. H.R.5916 – Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008
    

    the term “qualitative military edge” means the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.

29. S.3001 – Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
    

    (4) the United States should assess the security risks associated with existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and should assess the risks of nuclear weapons being developed, acquired, or utilized by other countries, particularly rogue states, and by terrorists and other non-state actors; and

30. S.3563 – Security Assistance Act of 2008
    

    (6) The 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change found that creating incentives for countries to forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential, and that such suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a real chance to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by states or non-state actors, and that such proposals “should be put into effect without delay”.

31. H.Res.1505 – Recognizing the United States-Bahamas Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement.
    

    Whereas this agreement will promote the goal of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) goal to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern;

32. 42. H.R.7177 – Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008
    

    “(2) Qualitative military edge defined.–In this subsection, the term `qualitative military edge’ means the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.”.

33. H.Res.152 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States remains committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
    

    Whereas such challenges to NATO Allied interests and values include the potential for the re-emergence of unresolved historical disputes confronting Europe, rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their means of delivery, transnational terrorism and disruption of the flow of energy resources, and conflicts outside the treaty area that affect vital security interests;

34. S.891 – Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009
    

    (1) The Democratic Republic of Congo was devastated by a civil war carried out in 1996 and 1997 and a war that began in 1998 and ended in 2003, which resulted in widespread human rights violations and the intervention of multiple armed forces or armed non-state actors from other countries in the region.

35. S.Res.176 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on United States policy during the political transition in Zimbabwe, and for other purposes.
    

    Whereas the Global Political Agreement, as written, included provisions to restore the rule of law and economic stability and growth, establish a new constitution, end violence by state and non-state actors, and promote freedom of assembly, association, expression, and communication;

36. H.R.2845 – Protect the Homeland from North Korean and Iranian Ballistic Missiles Act
    

    (3) realizes missile delivery technology and warheads could be passed along to state and non-state actors; and

37. S.1438 – Fostering a Global Response to Cyber Attacks Act
    

    (4) A growing array of state and non-state actors, such as terrorists and international criminal groups, are targeting United States citizens, United States commerce, and the information infrastructure of the United States, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries, to steal, exploit, and potentially disrupt or destroy information.

38. H.R.3244 – Nuclear Trafficking Prevention Act
    

    “2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

39. S.1464 – Nuclear Trafficking Prevention Act
    

    “2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

40. S.1494 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
    

    (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to assessing the threat from biological weapons from state, non-state, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; and

41. S.1528 – Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act
    

    (10) On February 12, 2009, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that “I’d say the most significant gaps are the areas that are not traditional State threats, that we have not figured out the right way to collect information and we have not grown the analysts to do it. … We’re not as good with non-state actors.”.

42. S.1966 – Global Child Survival Act of 2009
    

    (24) According to the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) 2009 Annual Threat Assessment, widespread poor maternal and child health and malnutrition has the potential to weaken central governments and empower non-state actors, including terrorist and paramilitary groups.

43. H.R.4128 – Conflict Minerals Trade Act
    

    (1) The Democratic Republic of the Congo was devastated by a civil war in 1996 and 1997 and a war that began in 1998 and ended in 2003, which resulted in widespread human rights violations and the intervention of multiple armed forces and armed non-state actors from other countries in the region.

44. H.R.5136 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
    

    (1) The ballistic missile threat, including electromagnetic pulse attacks, against which the homeland defense elements are intended to defend, including mobile or fixed threats that might arise from non-state actors and accidental or unauthorized launches.

45. H.R.5268 – Improvements in Global MOMS Act
    

    (22) According to the Director of National Intelligence’s 2009 Annual Threat Assessment, widespread poor maternal and child health and malnutrition has the potential to weaken central governments and empower non-state actors, including terrorist and paramilitary groups.

46. H.R.5327 – United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act
    

    (3) The United States remains committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, including its advantage over non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which boast increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

47. United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act
    

    (3) The United States remains committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, including its advantage over non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which boast increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

48. S.3451 – H.R.6297 – International Biosecurity Act of 2010
    

    (5) Biological risks extend beyond biological weapons developed or used by foreign countries and also include intentional release of harmful biological agents by non-state groups or individuals, harmful outcomes through unintentional release or unforeseen consequences of biological research and experimental biological agents, and natural disease outbreaks. (11) The changing geopolitical climate in which a number of countries and non-state actors are seeking or have acquired weapons of mass destruction indicates that the United States will require specialized nonproliferation experts in addition to experts in regional security.

49. S.3920 – A bill to address national security threats and vulnerabilities that could undermine economic recovery and financial markets.
    

    (A) potential threats to financial markets and economic recovery from state actors and non-state actors;

50. H.R.1540 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
    

    disrupt the ability of terrorists, non-state actors, and state sponsors of terrorism to acquire such man-portable air-defense systems.

51. S.1867 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
    

    (III) disrupt the ability of terrorists, non-state actors, and state sponsors of terrorism to acquire such man-portable air-defense systems.

52. H.R.4229 – Iron Dome Support Act
    

    (2) The United States remains committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, including its advantage over non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which boast increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

53. H.R.4310 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
    

    (2) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability.

54. S.2325 – Iron Dome Support Act
    

    (2) The United States Government remains committed to ensuring the Government of Israel’s qualitative military edge, including maintaining its advantage over non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas who possess increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

55. S.3254 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
    

    (1) An assessment of the likely internal and regional security environment for Afghanistan over the next decade, including challenges and threats to the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan from state and non-state actors.

56. H.R.6644 – Global Partnerships Act of 2012
    

    (b) Qualitative military edge defined.—In this section, the term “qualitative military edge” means the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.

57. H.R.938 – United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014
    

    (i) the range of cyber and asymmetric threats posed to Israel by state and non-state actors; and

58. H.R.1793 – Global Partnerships Act of 2013
    

    (b) Qualitative military edge defined.—In this section, the term “qualitative military edge” means the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.

59. H.R.1992 – Israel QME Enhancement Act
    

    (A) the range of cyber and asymmetric threats posed to Israel by state and non-state actors; and

60. H.R.2701 – United States-Israel Missile Defense Cooperation Act of 2013
    

    (3) The United States remains committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, including its advantage over non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which boast increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

61. H.R.2717 – United States-Israel Missile Defense Cooperation Act of 2013
    

    (3) The United States remains committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, including its advantage over non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which boast increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons as a result of support from Iran, Syria, and other state actors.

62. S.J.Res.21 – Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons
    

    (4) prevent the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state actors within Syria of any weapons of mass destruction.

63. S.Res.219 – A resolution calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and others to be tried before the International Criminal Court for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
    

    Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) prohibits all United Nations member states, including Syria, from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, possess, transfer, or use chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and it reaffirms that weapon of mass destruction proliferation “constitutes a threat to international peace and security”;

64. H.R.3292 – United States-Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act
    

    (B) Deter Iran’s development of nuclear weapons in order to protect the national security interests of the United States and to protect United States allies and partners against the development and transfer of such weapons to rogue regimes and non-state actors.

65. H.R.4495 – Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act
    

    (7) The United States continues to work with these and other regional countries on a range of transnational security and humanitarian issues, including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, encouraging the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, responding to and mitigating humanitarian disasters, halting the illicit trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons, coordinating to monitor and combat the risk of pandemic disease, and fighting the disruptive activities of state and non-state actors for the betterment of regional stability and prosperity.

66. H.R.4681 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
    

    Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactmentof this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the threat posed by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025, including threats from foreign countries and foreign non-state actors.

67. H.Amdt.775 to H.R.4681
    

    (a) Report.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the   enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence   shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and   the Committees on Armed Services of the House of   Representatives and the Senate a report on the threat posed   by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States   interests through 2025, including threats from foreign   countries and foreign non-state actors.

68. S.2588 – Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014
    

    (2) A list and an assessment of the countries and non-state actors that are the primary threats of carrying out a cybersecurity threat, including a cyber attack, theft, or data breach, against the United States and which threaten the United States national security, economy, and intellectual property.

69. H.Con.Res.107 – A concurrent resolution denouncing the use of civilians as human shields by Hamas and other terrorist organizations.
    

    Whereas the United States and Israel have cooperated on missile defense projects, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Arrow Anti-Missile System, projects designed to thwart a diverse range of threats, including short-range missiles and rockets fired by non-state actors, such as Hamas;

70. H.R.5649 – United Nations Human Rights Council Accountability Act
    

    (5) The United Nations Human Rights Council’s agenda contains a permanent item for criticism of the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any other state or non-state actor.

71. H.R.5862 – Improvements in Global MOMS Act
    

    (32) According to the Director of National Intelligence’s 2009 Annual Threat Assessment, widespread poor maternal and child health and malnutrition has the potential to weaken central governments and empower non-state actors, including terrorist and paramilitary groups.

72. H.R.5878 – Shahbaz Bhatti International Religious Freedom Act of 2014
    

    (A) by striking the second and third sentences and inserting the following: “More than 76 percent of the world’s population live in countries in which religion is restricted in significant ways, either by the government or by societal non-state actors. These limitations severely restrict or prohibit the freedom of people to study, believe, observe, and freely practice the religious faith of their choice.”; and “(7) In addition to governments, non-state actors severely violate freedom of religion or belief. These actors include individuals, mobs, vigilante groups, anti-government insurgents, militant organizations, and recognized terrorist groups. In those cases in which governments’ legal systems promote intolerance, non-state actors often act unilaterally to enforce these biased measures.

73. S.3019 – War Powers Against non-state actors Act of 2014
    

    “(a) Termination of use of United States armed forces; exceptions.—In the event that a report submitted by the President to Congress consistent with the requirements of section 4 relates to the use of the United States Armed Forces against a non-state organization or entity—

74. H.R.1150 – Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act
    

    “(11) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means a nonsovereign entity that— “(A) exercises significant political power and territorial control; “(B) is outside the control of a sovereign government; and “(C) often employs violence in pursuit of its objectives.”;

75. H.R.1323 – Shahbaz Bhatti International Religious Freedom Act of 2015
    

    “(14) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means any entity outside of government, including an extremist group or terrorist organization.”.

76. H.R.1560 – Protecting Cyber Networks Act
    

    (Sec. 108) Directs the DNI, in a report to Congress regarding cyber threats, attacks, theft, and data breaches, to: (1) assess current U.S. intelligence sharing and cooperation relationships with other countries regarding cybersecurity threats to U.S. national security interests, the economy, and intellectual property; (2) list countries and non-state actors that are primary threats; (3) describe U.S. response and prevention capabilities; and (4) assess additional technologies that would enhance U.S. capabilities, including private sector technologies that could be rapidly fielded to assist the intelligence community.

77. H.R.1649 – Partnering to Detect and Defeat Tunnels Act
    

    (c) Lead intelligence officer.—The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a senior intelligence officer to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and non-state actors.

78. H.R.1735 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    Not later than seven days after the Secretary determines that there is reasonable grounds to believe that the Russian Federation has tested, initially deployed, or sold or transferred to another state or non-state actor the Club-K cruise missile system, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification of such determination.

79. H.R.2029 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016
    

    Provided further, That funds appropriated in this Act which are used to establish a national one-stop career center system, or which are used to support the national activities of the Federal-State unemployment insurance, employment service, or immigration programs, may be obligated in contracts, grants, or agreements with States and non-State entities:

80. S.1356 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    (Sec. 1248) Requires the annual report on military matters and security developments involving Russia to include: (1) an assessment of the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed in the Arctic region, Kaliningrad, and Crimea; (2) an assessment of the Russian military strategy and objectives in the Arctic region; and (3) a description of the status of testing, production, deployment, and sale or transfer to other states or non-state actors of the Club-K cruise missile system by the Russian Federation.

81. S.1376 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    (3) The United States is facing an increased threat from both state and non-state actors. (2) The rise of committed, non-state forces and near peer competitors has introduced destabilizing pressures around the globe.

82. H.R.2596 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    (d) Reports on nuclear aspirations of non-state entities.—Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.

83. S.1705 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    (2) transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or sell, the Club-K container missile system to another state or non-state actor.

84. S.1798 – United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2015
    

    “(ii) non-state actorS.—The President shall designate each non-state actor that has engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom as entities of particular concern for religious freedom.”.

85. H.R.3194 – FIRST Freedom Act
    

    (16) The United States Government has limited tools to hold accountable the perpetrators of religious freedom violations. Section 604 of IRFA added section 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)), which made foreign government officials who commit particularly severe violations of religious freedom inadmissible to the United States, but it has only been applied once, to deny entry to Narendra Modi, who was Chief Minister of Gujarat, India. In its 2015 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends that the State Department: “Make greater efforts to ensure foreign government officials are denied entry into the United States due to their inadmissibility under U.S. law for their responsibility for religious freedom violations abroad.”. The effectiveness of this law is also limited because it does not apply to non-state actors, such as international terrorists, and it can only be used to deny entry to a perpetrator who has not yet arrived in the United States, not to deport a perpetrator who has already entered the country.

86. S.1860 – A bill to protect and promote international religious freedom.
    

    (16) The United States Government has limited tools to hold accountable the perpetrators of religious freedom violations. Section 604 of IRFA added section 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)), which made foreign government officials who commit particularly severe violations of religious freedom inadmissible to the United States, but it has only been applied once, to deny entry to Narendra Modi, who was Chief Minister of Gujarat, India. In its 2015 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends that the State Department: “Make greater efforts to ensure foreign government officials are denied entry into the United States due to their inadmissibility under U.S. law for their responsibility for religious freedom violations abroad.”. The effectiveness of this law is also limited because it does not apply to non-state actors, such as international terrorists, and it can only be used to deny entry to a perpetrator who has not yet arrived in the United States, not to deport a perpetrator who has already entered the country.

87. H.R.4127 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
    

    (2) transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or sell, the Club–K container missile system to another state or non-state actor.

88. H.Res.600 – Reaffirming the right for the United States to use all available options, including the use of military force, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
    

    (4) makes clear its unwavering support for Israel’s right to ensure its survival and to defend itself from nations and non-state actors that wish to do it harm;

89. S.2551 – Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2016
    

    (1) The nature of genocide and mass atrocities, including crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes, committed globally includes shocking acts of violence perpetrated by governments and non-state actors, which have killed millions of civilians and other innocent individuals.

90. H.R.4909 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
    

    a) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on policies, doctrine, procedures, and authorities governing Department of Defense activities in response to malicious cyber activities carried out against the United States or United States persons by foreign states or non-state actors.

91. S.2878 – Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act
    

    “(11) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means a nonsovereign entity that exercises significant political power and is able to exert influence at a national or international level but does not belong to or ally itself to any particular country and often employs illegal violence in pursuit of its objectives.”;

92. H.Res.729 – Expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel.
    

    Whereas, on October 15, 2008, the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 was signed into law (Public Law 110–429) and defined Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors”;

93. S.3017 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
    

    (a) Foreign intelligence entity defined.—In this section, the term “foreign intelligence entity” means any intelligence or security entity of a foreign country, an international organization, a non-state actor, or a sub-state actor.

94. S.Res.508 – A resolution expressing support for the expeditious consideration and finalization of a new, robust, and long-term Memorandum of Understanding on military assistance to Israel between the United States Government and the Government of Israel.
    

    Whereas, on October 15, 2008, the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 was signed into law (Public Law 110–429), defining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors”;

95. S.3117 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017
    

    (2) PROTECTION AND INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS.—Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading “Economic Support Fund”, not less than $10,000,000 shall be made available for programs to protect vulnerable and persecuted religious minorities: Provided, That a portion of such funds shall be made available for programs to investigate the persecution of such minorities by governments and non-state actors and for the public dissemination of information collected on such persecution, including on the Department of State Web site.

    (e) Designation of non-state actors.—The President shall, concurrent with the annual foreign country review required by section 402(b)(1) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)(1)), review and identify any non-state actors in such countries that have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and designate, in a manner consistent with such Act, each such group as a non-state actor of particular concern for religious freedom operating in such reviewed country or surrounding region: Provided, That whenever the President designates such a non-state actor under this subsection, the President shall, as soon as practicable after the designation is made, submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing the reasons for such designation.

96. H.R.5732 – Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2016
    

    (C) the potential for contributions from other countries and vetted non-state actor partners to establish and maintain one or more safe zones in Syria.

97. H.R.5912 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017
    

    (2) PROTECTION AND INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS.—Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading “Economic Support Fund” shall be made available for programs to protect vulnerable and persecuted religious minorities: Provided, That a portion of such funds shall be made available for programs to investigate the persecution of such minorities by governments and non-state actors and for the public dissemination of information collected on such persecution, including on the Department of State Web site.

98. H.R.6482 – Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act
    

    (11) non-state actor.—The term ‘non-state actor‘ means a nonsovereign entity that— “(A) exercises significant political power and territorial control; “(B) is outside the control of a sovereign government; and  “(C) often employs violence in pursuit of its objectives.”;

99. S.3536 – Preventing Destabilization of Iraq and Syria Act of 2016
    

    (C) the potential for contributions from other countries and vetted non-state actor partners to establish and maintain one or more safe zones in Syria; and