Yves here. I hate to be a naysayer, but at least in the US, these suits against corporate board members won’t work as constituted. Directors do not have a fiduciary duty to shareholders. They have a fiduciary duty to the company. And shareholders are only one of many corporate constituencies.
That means shareholders do not have the legal standing to sue directors. CalPERS beneficiaries have the same problem: they can’t sue board members for their horrific negligence either. That why you haven’t seen any public pension fund suits save Kentucky Retirement Systems, where despite absolutely horrific fund performance, extremely strong state fiduciary duties, and a carefully structured derivative lawsuit (more on that concept soon), the suit has been beaten back by a judiciary that is not willing to rattle the cronyistic Kentucky power structure.
The only way shareholders can sue a board is through a derivative lawsuit, where shareholders step in to act to defend the rights and interests of the company when the parties normally tasked to act in that capacity, as in executives and the board, have failed to do so).
And then the lawyers better be clever enough to argue that the company has enough of a nexus of business in New York, like having its shares listed on the NYSE, having offices in New York, and better yet, holding at least some board and/or shareholder meeting there, to bring suit in New York. This is an example of some of the weeds you get into with a derivatives suit. From a 2021 post:
Internal affairs is a common law concept. The rules that govern how a company operates are “internal affairs” and they are set in the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. New York statute and case law both confirm that New York law supersedes internal affairs provisions. The filing cites precedents from previous derivative suits, such as Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., a 1984 case that went to US Second Circuit Court of Appeals. From the ruling:
[T]he [NY] legislature has expressly decided to apply certain provisions of the state’s business law to any corporation doing business in the state, regardless of its domicile. Thus, under … §1319, a foreign corporation operating within [NY] is subject … to the provisions of the state’s own substantive law that control shareholder actions to vindicate the rights of the corporation. NYBCL §626 made applicable to foreign corporations by §1319, permits a shareholder to bring an action to redress harm to the corporation, including injury wrought by the directors[.]
Once you accept the notion that New York, by statute, overrides the internal affairs doctrines of other jurisdictions, the other standing questions are governed by New York law. A key one is demand futility. In New York, a wronged shareholder does not need to file a suit against management or directors to try to compel them to act on behalf of the company; they can show the “demand futility” by meeting any one of three tests, as this article from Freiberger Harber explains:
“Demand is futile, and excused, when the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision as to whether to bring suit.” Bansbach, 1 N.Y.3d at 9. In New York, the demand requirement is excused where a plaintiff pleads “with particularity that (1) a majority of the directors are interested in the transaction, or (2) the directors failed to inform themselves to a degree reasonably necessary about the transaction, or (3) the directors failed to exercise their business judgment in approving the transaction.” Marx, 88 N.Y.2d at 198. If any of these circumstances are met, the failure to file a pre-suit demand will be excused.
Translating that out of “the company did a stupid deal” context into “the company is not addressing climate change” is already a heavy lift. With a bad deal, there is some hope of showing that the shareholders suffered concrete economic harm. With climate change, if anything ignoring climate change imperatives helped shareholders in economic terms. So it’s hard to see how the shareholders prove losses.
In terms of the legal issues above, it would seem difficult for the shareholders to meet even the (pretty favorable) three pronged demand futility test. They would have to try to sue the board to compel them to meet their fiduciary duties (you’d have to see how those duties were defined in the jurisdiction where the company is chartered). Only if the plaintiffs won that suit and the board still failed to get religion about climate change would the executives and board as individuals potentially be able to be sued.
And I’m not sure what the point is since all the directors have big D&O policies. They wouldn’t have to pay. Their insurers would.
By Isabella Kaminski. Originally published at DeSmogBlog
I would assume that the main value of lawsuits like this is in flushing out correspondence and reports that could prove very embarrassing to the companies and potentially open them to further rounds of suits based on more solid legal precedents.
Yes, but they have to get past summary judgement/a motion to dismiss. If these cases are booted on successful challenges based on standing, they won’t get that far.
As an example of how crooked things can get, in the Kentucky Retirement Systems case, the plaintiffs had barely gotten started with discovery when the case was appealed! That is pretty much unheard of, the trial court case normally has to conclude before an appeal can be lodged.
People who can’t win elections file lawsuits. They want to substitute the judgement of that narrow social and economic class we call lawyers over the electorate. In the old days they used to be called the College of Cardinals. or the Grand Mifti.
In the US the far left (which I somtimes agree with) has traditionally thought this was a wonderful idea. Until a majority of the Justices got appointed by the right.
Sorry. Its either wrong both times or neither. I choise both because I belive in the will of that somewhat larger class we call the electorate.