Türkiye Shows Renewed Interest in Joining BRICS

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was in China on June 3 and mentioned the possibility of Türkiye joining the BRICS, the economic alliance acronymically named after its founding members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Fidan added that BRICS could offer Türkiye a “good alternative” to the European Union to boost its economic prospects.

Türkiye’s interest was also apparently a topic of discussion at the BRICS foreign ministers meeting, chaired by Russia, on Monday and Tuesday in Nizhny Novgorod. Fidan was in attendance there, met with Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Sergey Shoigu, and he had a separate meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday in which Putin said Russia supports Turkiye’s interest in BRICS.

A bit of a muddled story in Middle East Eye over the weekend quoted anonymous Turkish officials, and the story announces that Türkiye “has made a strategic move to join the Brics economic bloc” – although the quotes in the piece don’t really back up that claim. Here are what officials said:

“We don’t see Brics as an alternative to Nato or the EU,” the official said. “However, the stalled accession process to the European Union encourages us to explore other economic platforms.”

The official added that Türkiye’s “on-paper allies” often overlook Ankara’s security concerns and deny it advanced weaponry. “We would like to be part of every multilateral platform, even if there is only a slight chance of benefit to us,” the official explained.

And another official:

“We don’t have significant trade with Brics countries, except for China,” the official said…”Brics could be more meaningful in the future if it becomes politically more important and gains resonance with international public opinion.”

I haven’t seen confirmation elsewhere that Türkiye has applied or has concrete plans to apply for BRICS membership anytime soon. What is clear, however, is that Türkiye is expressing interest that looks to go beyond previous talk, and Beijing and Moscow are fully supporting it. It would be a major strategic coup for Moscow and Beijing to eventually bring aboard the most strategically important member of NATO (and the country with the alliance’s second-largest standing army). Additionally, on a purchasing power parity basis, Türkiye currently ranks 11th in GDP, just behind France. Less clear is how a country like India would feel about a potential Turkish bid as the two countries are usually on opposite ends of regional conflicts, including Kashmir.

Why Would Türkiye Join BRICS and What Would the Fallout Be? 

Türkiye wants to build bridges to both sides of the New Cold War so as to better help its ailing economy, and joining BRICS could help spur bilateral trade agreements and investments.The problem is that’s easier said than done. US and European officials have largely adopted the Bush-era with-us-or-against-us attitude. Given that Türkiye has been talking about joining BRICS for years, the recent talk should be taken with a grain of salt, but it will likely cause concern in Washington.

Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, it would be a major embarrassment for the US if Ankara took such a step during the new Cold War and would likely be viewed as “switching sides” by the West. Türkiye doesn’t usually make such a move unless it knows who’s going to come out on top.  In 1941, Türkiye and Germany signed a nonaggression pact, and Ankara raked in economic and military aid from both Axis and Allies trying to woo Türkiye to their side. As the tide changed in WWII, however, Türkiye wisely bet on the eventual victors, moving increasingly to the Allied side. In 1944 Türkiye stopped exporting chromite to Germany, a key ingredient in the manufacture of stainless steel, and later that year severed diplomatic relations with Germany. In 1945 Türkiye declared war on Germany – two months before its defeat.

What would the Collective West do if Türkiye went ahead and tried to join BRICS? Well, it would probably be the opposite of a calm, measured response. The Duran’s Alexander Mercouris and Alex Cristoforou discussed this possibility on one of their episodes last year and mentioned how, should Türkiye take such a major new step in its straddling between East and West, it would be a bit reminiscent of Ukraine pre-2014, which was being pulled in both directions. We know how that turned out.

It’s interesting to note that new legislation in Türkiye is attempting to crack down on “foreign interests.” According to Turkish Minute, that would apply to “anyone who carries out or orders research on (Turkish) citizens and institutions with the aim of acting against the security or the political, internal or external interests of the state, on the orders or in the strategic interests of a foreign organization or state.” Those convicted would face three to seven years in prison. These types of laws are increasingly being considered by states that say they fear Western meddling in their country, oftentimes with the aim of instigating color revolutions.

Things between the US and Türkiye have been eerily quiet since the beginning of May when Ankara announced that it was cutting off all trade with Israel – although it continues to transit oil from Azerbaijan – and Turkish President Recept Tayyip Erdogan’s trip to Washington was canceled.

Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS membership would mark a fundamental shift in the country, which has been positioning itself to become part of “the West” for decades, but in many ways the public in Türkiye has already turned its back on the EU and the US and looks more favorably to the East.

While the government likely isn’t ready to take any drastic step just yet, Türkiye’s talks with the BRICS countries highlight the ongoing frustration with its relationship with the West. The latest is an ongoing hangup over modernization of the Customs Union Treaty between the bloc and Ankara.The process is being slowed by the EU’s insistence that Türkiye take action to prevent the circumvention of the EU restrictions on trade with Russia. From the Centre for Eastern Studies:

Türkiye’s current customs agreement with the EU has been in force since 1995. It covers only industrial goods & processed agricultural products and excludes the services sector, while its scope is much more limited than the EU’s comprehensive trade agreements with its other global partners. Türkiye believes that this limitation constrains its economic potential. In addition, this agreement does not allow it to freely trade goods with third countries that do not have a free trade agreement with the EU. It is estimated that an expanded customs union could generate an additional 1.84%–1.95%[10] of GDP growth for Türkiye.[11] This is the primary reason why Ankara has been consistently seeking to update this agreement for more than a decade. The EU for its part is not interested in further talks on this matter because of Türkiye’s failure to comply with the terms of the current agreement: namely its selective implementation of tariffs on goods from the EU, and its trade agreements with third countries. Türkiye has vehemently rejected these arguments. In its view, the only purpose of the EU’s stance on this issue is to politicise the negotiations and ultimately cause them to fail.

Still, the EU is by far Türkiye’s top trading partner, accounting for almost one third of its trade while Türkiye is the EU’s seventh trading partner, making for 3.6 percent of total EU trade.

Moving Closer to Moscow and Beijing

Meanwhile Ankara’s economic ties with Moscow and Beijing continue to grow. Türkiye receives nearly half of its natural gas from Russia and a quarter of its oil. The two nations also cooperate on nuclear energy with Russia financing and building the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, helping Türkiye join the club of countries with nuclear energy.

Türkiye also plays a key role in facilitating trade between Russia and other countries to get around sanctions. It could also soon play a similar part for China. For example, Türkiye is in advanced discussions with Chinese electric car makers BYD and Chery Automobile for factory investments in the country as the European Commission slaps extra tariffs on electric cars manufactured in China.

Türkiye is also eager for more Chinese investment. Part of Turkish foreign minister Fidan’s mission on his recent trip to Beijing was to urge more Chinese investment in Türkiye, especially in key infrastructure projects as there has been a slowdown in recent years, as well as to address Türkiye’s huge trade deficit with China.

Türkiye appears willing to drop any participation in efforts to stir up trouble in China’s western regions in order to advance economic ties between the two countries. According to a Chinese statement, Fidan told Chinese Vice President Han Zheng that Türkiye adhered to the one-China principle and “will not allow activities in Türkiye that undermine China’s territorial integrity”.

That cements a major shift for Türkiye, which used to call Xinjiang “East Turkistan” and allege Chinese “genocide” against Uyghurs. The change in Türkiye’s stance likely causes consternation in Washington, but it will likely mean good news for the Turkish economy.

Ankara would like China to narrow this deficit by buying more Turkish agricultural, food and other products. It would also like more Chinese tourists to visit Türkiye. It looks like Beijing will oblige. Fidan’s Chinese counterpart Wang Yi said that China will expand imports of agricultural products and enhance cooperation in culture, education, and tourism.

It’s not just in the economic sphere that Türkiye and China are increasingly seeing eye to eye.

As I’ve written, actions by the US over a number of years (sanctions, lack of weapons transfers, possible involvement in 2016 coup attempt, the Kurdish issue, etc.), especially the backing of the genocide in Gaza have made it very difficult politically for Erdogan at home. The economy and the widespread belief the government was doing enough to stop the genocide in Gaza were the biggest reasons Erdogan suffered one of the biggest setbacks of his political career in recent elections. Here, too, Russia, China, and Türkiye see eye to eye. While in China, Fidan said the following:

“At this point, we appreciate China’s international stance. It is extremely important for China to support a two-state solution, to support a ceasefire, and to support humanitarian aid. In this regard, I believe China is truly playing a good role, it is playing a constructive role.”

Contrast that with what he recently said about the US role:

“In the Gaza issue, in the Palestinian issue, it is not possible for Israel to act with such audacity, verging on genocide, without the unconditional military and political support of the US. The US makes this possible.”

Long term, like most countries, it would be more beneficial for Türkiye not to have to choose a side in a world split between competing blocks.

Imports from China doubled from 2019 to 2022 (only Russia sends more), while EU exports have seen a corresponding spike, leading some to argue Turkiye is trying to save its economy by buying half-finished goods cheap from China, finishing them domestically, then selling them to the EU.

Elsewhere, Ali Baba is planning to invest $2 billion in Turkiye. The Chinese lithium-ion power batteries company Farisis started production at a plant near Istanbul last year. Ankara is also in separate talks with Chinese EV makers SAIC Motor Corp. and Great Wall Motor Co for investments in factories in Türkiye.

For China, one of the most attractive parts of producing EVs in Türkiye is that it could provide better access to the European market due to Ankara’s customs union agreement. That’s not an arrangement Türkiye would want to put at risk by jumping into BRICS.

So the relationship between Türkiye and the West has for now settled into an icy acceptance due to the economic necessity on both sides, but it’s an arrangement that could go off the rails relatively easily. If Türkiye’s increased interest in the BRICS, for example, is met with a heavy handed response by Washington/Brussels it could mean a spiraling of ties that results in a definitive break. Or if the EU pushes too far in its attempt to use its standing as top trade partner with Türkiye to pressure Ankara on Russia. Not only would that prove problematic for Türkiye because if they cave once, the EU would surely be back for more on, say, China or Iran, but if Ankara torpedoes relations with Moscow, it would blow up their economic model, which includes exports to the EU.

In fact, Türkiye in many ways is emulating Germany’s previous model of turning cheap energy imports from Russia into manufacturing prowess for exports. As even War on the Rocks points out:

As cliched as the platitude about Turkiye being a bridge between East and West is, it helps to describe trade flows: Turkiye imports energy from Russia and goods from China to cover domestic demand, and local factories assemble components for Europe. Turkiye’s greatest trade surpluses are close to home — with countries like Azerbaijan and Iraq — but it is the European market that allows Turkiye to maintain an export-oriented manufacturing sector of scale.

As the EU deindustrializes and considers a trade war with China at America’s behest, there’s an argument to be made that it will soon need Türkiye more than Türkiye needs the EU. Then again, Brussels isn’t opposed to shooting itself in the foot these days.