Yves here. This post covers so many autonomous/separatist movements that someone not familiar with the terrain is left with questions. For instance, the Basque fared far better in the post-2008 crisis period than the rest of Spain. Catalonia is similarly the wealthiest region in Spain, and was explicit in its separatist effort in 2017 that it resented effectively subsidizing the rest of Spain. Are these areas seeking more autonomy generally wealthier? The flip side is yours truly was not keen about the Catalonia independence effort due to signs of insufficient seriousness, like not having thought through their demands or their bargaining strategy. See here for an early take: https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/10/catalonia-blinks-in-secession-staredown.html. Also, alternative media tended to depict the separatists as leftists, when they were in fact neoliberals.
The point here is that even a case we followed very attentively at the time was very complex, and important elements were often not well covered by either the MSM or smaller outlets (we benefitted considerably in our Catalonia coverage in 2017 by discussion, sometimes heated, among our informed commentariat).
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
Spanish officials reassuringly heralded a “new era” for the country after May 2024 elections. Catalonian pro-independence parties had lost the parliamentary majority that had enabled them to govern their region since 2015, and for the first time in decades, had failed to secure a majority of seats in regional parliament. Spain’s ruling Socialists meanwhile managed to emerge as Catalonia’s largest party.
Madrid’s political focus on Catalonia has intensified since 2017. After holding what was deemed by Spanish authorities an illegal independence referendum, Catalonia’s president and other officials fled to Belgium, prompting a diplomatic crisis. Spain then imposed direct rule over the region, with the EU backing the decision and citing the need for constitutional approval for referendums. In the aftermath, local support for Catalonia’s independence declined, offering Madrid a way in.
Spain’s separatist and autonomous movements are among Europe’s most well-known, and its management of them is watched closely across the continent. Many other European nations, particularly in larger countries, have autonomous movements seeking devolution, self-government, or outright independence. The perceived failure of the EU, international diplomacy, and integration efforts to resolve these issues has led countries to maintain their own policies. Although few movements are considered serious threats, attempts to assert themselves often provoke direct interventions by national governments—when these governments have the capacity to do so.
Many of Europe’s once-distinct regional identities have only waned in recent times. The rise of nationalism in Europe in the 1800s led to unitary states that integrated peripheral regions with the capitals, a trend known as “capital magnetism.” Additionally, increasing urbanization in other large cities weakened traditional ties to local communities and support systems.
Integration and assimilation pressure was also exerted on regional identities to create more national identities. At the time of Italy’s unification in 1861, for example, less than 10 percent of Italians spoke the Tuscan dialect which began to be promoted as standard Italian. Steadily, its use in public and administrative life, mass media, and other methods led to a decline in the use of other regional dialects and languages. Similarly, French policies promoted the Parisian dialect as standard French, and the German Empire promoted High German.
Modern EU states face greater limitations on language suppression. The framework provided by the EU’s “post-sovereign” system implores member states to uphold minority language protections and other rights. Nonetheless, national governments have modernized their approaches to establishing national uniformity. Proficiency in majority languages is often a prerequisite for education, media, and employment opportunities, while immigration favors majority language learners. As a result, dozens of minority European languages are on the brink of extinction.
Nonetheless, autonomous movements in Europe do wield political power. Political networks like the European Free Alliance, a group of pro-independence political parties, operate in the EU parliament and serve as political outlets for separatist movements, using democratic processes.
Italy is constantly attempting to more effectively tie to itself its autonomous regions of Sicily, Sardinia, and several northern regions. The transformation of the regional political party Lega Nord into a national one, Lega in 2018, demonstrated some success. The autonomy movements, however, are similarly adaptive. Other northern Italian parties recently rallied to vote to approve legislation approving them greater autonomy in June 2024. South Tyrol, Italy’s German-speaking region, brings the added challenge of receiving support from Austria. Austrian leaders have repeatedly proposed granting Austrian passports to German speakers, and, in January 2024, voiced support for further autonomy reforms, drawing a reflexive rebuke from Rome.
Hungary’s disputes with its neighbors are even more notable. The 1920 breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left significant Hungarian communities across Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Today, the Hungarian government supports these communities by funding cultural institutions, providing financial aid, and fostering solidarity, which has sparked tensions with these countries. However, as a smaller nation, Hungary struggles to exert significant influence, especially in EU member states like Romania and Slovakia, and has also found limited success in Ukraine.
Nonetheless, EU countries generally tend to avoid interfering in others’ separatist movements. This has helped France to consolidate its rule over its mainland territory. However, it hasn’t yet done so over the Mediterranean island of Corsica, purchased by the French in 1768. The rollback of the French Empire after World War II reignited historical tensions, further inflamed by the arrival of many French people and Europeans in Algeria to Corsica in the 1960s. Though violence largely subsided in Corsica after the 1970s, a ceasefire was not reached until 2014, and pro-separatist riots in 2022 show the situation remains tense.
Following the unrest, French President Macron raised the possibility of granting Corsica greater autonomy. Previously, in 2017, as tensions were building in neighboring Spain over Basque separatism, France raised the administrative autonomy of its own Basque territory by granting it single community status, unifying several local councils under one regional authority. Contrastingly, the merger of the region of Alsace in 2016 with two other French areas reduced its autonomy and integrated it more into the national apparatus. The different approaches demonstrate the diverse policies used by national governments to manage their regions.
Germany, the most populous country in the EU, administers several regions with aspirations for greater autonomy. However, its federal system, which grants states greater authority over areas such as education and language, has helped temper separatist sentiment and reduced the need for management from Berlin.
A federal system has not resolved the challenges faced by Belgium. The country’s Flemish-speaking and French-speaking regions have sought greater autonomy, with some advocating for unification with a greater Dutch or French-speaking state. While increasing regional autonomy has been part of the solution, the regions remain interconnected through the capital, Brussels, and its wider role as the capital of the EU.
That has not deterred breakup advocates from proposing a similar “Velvet Divorce” between Belgium’s regions, like the peaceful split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. Polls indicated a victory in June 2024 for Vlaams Belang, a party whose leader ran on reaching an agreement to dissolve the country or declaring Flanders’s independence. But their shock defeat ensured Belgium’s continuity and thus the stability of the EU.
Outside the EU, Europe’s autonomy issues are also in flux. In the late 1990s, the UK granted greater autonomy to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. Scottish independence efforts were then disrupted after a failed 2014 referendum and the UK’s subsequent EU departure two years later. The Scottish National Party established a Brussels office to maintain EU connections, as did the European Friends of Scotland Group, founded in 2020. The Scottish Independence Convention plans to hold a convention in Edinburgh in October 2024 featuring more than a dozen European groups to coordinate their independence initiatives, though the participation of separatist movements within EU countries may limit the extent of EU involvement.
Brexit also reignited secessionist sentiment across the UK, particularly in Northern Ireland, but also in Wales. Even in England, regional parties like CumbriaFirst, the East Devon Alliance, and Mebyon Kernow advocate for their own regions’ autonomy, and devolution within England has been increasingly discussed in recent years. While London has struggled to counter these movements since Brexit, it has succeeded in preventing a resurgence in paramilitary activity since it ended it in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.
Western Europe’s relative success in reducing armed conflicts over the last few decades contrasts with its resurgence in Eastern Europe. The region’s fragile borders and the emergence of weak states in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have seen separatist movements gain increasing power.
The EU and NATO played a pivotal role in the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states, often at the expense of Serbia. In response, ethnic Serbian separatism has surged across Bosnia and Kosovo, with supporters citing the EU’s and NATO’s support for separatist movements in the 1990s as justification for their actions.
Russia has also inflamed separatism in parts of the former Yugoslaviaand the former Soviet Union to counter EU and NATO expansion or to incorporate these regions into it. Beyond supporting Serbian interests in the Balkans, Russia has utilized, to varying degrees, separatist movements in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to advance its interests.
Russia has long performed outreach to separatist movements in the West, including inviting representatives to conferences like the Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia, though largely consisting of fringe groups. Russia itself has its own separatist and autonomy movements, however, including in Chechnya, Tatarstan, and elsewhere. These have found support from Western actors, including through the launch of the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. Turkey has also supported Russian separatist movements, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meanwhile recently celebrated the 50-year anniversary of the Turkish invasion of EU member state Cyprus in 1974 in support of local Turkish separatists.
Most separatist movements in Europe lack the infrastructure to become independent states without external support, but persist in their pursuit of independence, nonetheless. And European countries with territories outside of Europe, such as France with New Caledoniaor Denmark with Greenland, must manage their burgeoning independence movements. Access to the EU may be influential in convincing them to remain, but external factors, such as Azerbaijan’s recent support for New Caledonia’s independence, could potentially play a stronger role.
A new concern for national governments may emerge closer to home. In the Baltic States, the tension between Russian minorities and national governments remains evident, and the situation faces uncertainty amid the war in Ukraine. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland political party in East Germany has in turn highlighted the enduring divides within the country less than 40 years after reunification, and how new political entities can emerge to exploit such sentiments.
Yet the most pressing issue appears to be emerging in Western Europe’s major cities. French President Emmanuel Macron, aiming to address concerns over what French authorities describe as “parallel societies” of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, proposed a law in 2023 to disrupt the education, finances, and propaganda networks of radical Islam, often from foreign countries. Macron labeled this phenomenon as “separatism.” He was referring to marginalized communities on the outskirts of major French cities in the famed banlieues, which are increasingly beyond state control and driven by domestic grievances and dissatisfaction with French foreign policy. While France’s situation appears the most severe, such sentiment is common across Western Europe.
The EU’s handling of autonomous and separatist movements has frequently faced criticism from nationalist governments, and balancing separatism with nationalism remains a sensitive challenge. However, major countries like Germany and smaller ones like Denmark demonstrate it is possible to manage these issues within national frameworks. Switzerland, a non-EU state, shows similar success in keeping itself together. Clearly, despite nationalist policies, centuries-old communities are resilient and difficult to absorb and erase, even without outside support. Managing these long-standing issues, as well as emerging movements, will require continual adaptation.
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Divide and Rule.
I look back at the larger goals of (largely) labor movements in the second half of the 19th century up to WW1 with their focus on transnational organizing — international solidarity as a path to confronting capital — and I can’t help feel we’ve lost the plot.
Not believing in coincidence I can’t help connect the social & media barrage emphasizing hyper-specific concepts of personal identity (often coupled with an easy availability of consumable identity markers) with what the tendency toward ‘citizens’ focusing increasingly on ethno- or religious identities as an ideal means of creating ever-smaller States regardless of (as the article above says) the natural or financial resources to support themselves.
Considering the transnational freedom of the approx 1.5% hoarding global wealth, while the rest of us are (often willingly) subject to a vast network of sophisticated surveillance systems, it seems like just another way the larger populations are ceding ground.
While believing in the importance of retaining cultural and linguistic diversity, “No borders, no boundaries,” seems like a pretty good organizing principle to me.
Lots of counties like those mentioned here have parts of them belonging to a ethnically different group that likely became a part of the greater nation through either conquest (e.g. Corsica) or protection against neighbouring enemies (e.g. Alsace). Having said this, I thought a long time ago that the strains that countries will feel through climate change and resource depletion may lead to these regions pushing for more autonomy so as to be able to manage their survival better. In France for example, I could easily see future governments prioritizing the Paris region to the cost of the different provinces as that is where the French elites are based. So the different regions like Normandy and Brittany may once more push their separate identity simply so that they can better survive. And the same applies to many different regions across Europe alone.
Keen or not keen… ?
Aiee, fixing. I edit on the fly and often mess up, as in here.
Scotland is an exception but not really. It is poorer than England, with Glasgow having the worst life expectancy in all of the UK, but should be considerably richer due to the North Sea oil. As such, it has the strongest claim to independence since it suffers from London mismanagement.
I wish we lived in a world where Craig Murray and George Galloway could be bitter rivals because of their conflicting stance on Scottish independence but, unfortunately, much worse, more important things mean that they are close allies.
Gorgeous George is peculiar in that Scotland is just about the only country he refuses to recognise as a colony.
The autonomous movement (though not sentiment) has been pretty well subdued by the nominal party of independence on behalf of the uk.
Their time is up as they are increasingly unprofessional and managerially incompetent but they do not care,as they have been rewarded well beyond their worth.
Let‘s review SNP achievements since Devolution in Health and Education. No doubt things have much improved ?
In practice, it is not the EU, but the states that handles regions. The EU is a conserving force in that the old mothercountry can wield its veto on accension for new states. Spain has loudly declared that it would veto an accension for Catalonia, or for Scotland if Scotland leaves without Britains permission. Facing an existence outside the EU puts a damper on entusiasm in most places.
In real terms, I would say Catalonia, Scotland, Basque country and Corsica are the real contenders for new statehoods. North Ireland could leave Britain for Ireland but is unlikely to become independent. The rest are on a scale from a guy with a blog to a general dissatisfaction which could be directed towards statehood, or towards something else (like immigrants, including from rest of Europe).
To answer Yves question, among the real contenders I think only Catalonia can claim to be richer in GDP per capita terms. Scotland would probably be richer if they got to keep the oil and gas. I think “they are robbing us blind” is an argument wheter or not your province is wealthy or poor. But it is more about directing the miscontent towards the capital.
The ongoing economic policies of the EU – most notable in the Commission and the ECB – feeds into this general discontent, so it might in the future be more national movements. But for the moment the discontent is mostly handled by having far right parties that blame it on the immigrants and centre-right or centre-left parties that threatens the population with the far right unless they shut up.
Wouldn’t the Basque country in Spain not in France) and Flanders also be wealthier than the united or rump country?
As the principle of subsidiarity seems to have fallen out of favour with the governing bodies and the bureaucrats running the European Project, the more sovereignty each European state hands over to the EU, the more likely that separatist movements will demand it’s return, not to the state, but to an autonomous entity within or without the state.
The pattern which seems to be emerging is that the EU project will break up because of external pressure (stupid proxy wars, dumb sanctions, incompetent political élites and unelected officials incapable of picking the right enemies), the most important element will be the demand for greater autonomy or independence on the part of the regions, different language groups, the great cities, religious minorities, etc, simply because of the unwillingness and the incapacity of national politicians to govern the nation state effectively and in the interests of it’s people, and the de-skilling and downsizing of those parts of it’s civil service managing the central elements of politics, unemployment, upskilling of the labour force, industrial and regional development, water supply and quality, public health, corruption, &c, and the greater the nations state’s reliance on lies, violence, lawfare and the criminalisation of imputed thought to keep order.
The notion of a politically united Europe will be over in the blink of an eye because people have too many problems which need to be solved and they’re beginning to work out that it is up to them to solve cooperatively with people with whom their share common interests, language and/or religion, &c. And that is the way of things.
not one word about the idiots that made this mess, woodrew wilson, then bill clinton.
the forever idiot bill clinton was warned that the forced breakup of the rump yugoslavia would ignite separatists movements all over the world.
including the U.S.A.
the morons usual blubbering response was about a 21st century world.
the problem with all free trader morons is that watch out what you wish for. history has a way of spinning out of control.
so the divide and conquer free trading morons, it may not turn out as planned.
How much does the disastrous economic policies feed into this?
When times are good, resentments over relative pieces of the pie is less.
Which is why the boot will remain on the neck.
“If you give them what they want,who knows what the ingrates will do next?”
In 2007, the UK economy was good and Salmond and the SNP first had the majority in the Scottish Parliament.
Personally, as a firm believer in the Declaration of Independence, I am generally in favor of separatist groups gaining independence. (Nazi, Fundamentalist, and similar racist groups are out.)
Devolution was John Smith‘s hobbyhorse totally perverted by Blair. England was denied national identity for fear it might like Yeltsin take the RFSSR out of the Union and England would stop paying for the fringe regions in Wales and Scotland and N Ireland
Only London gets the same per capita public spending as the Celtic Fringe – most of England gets much less. Even Public transport London gets much much more per capita than rest of England
England is held hostage by the rest and politicians suppress Englsnd as a concept yet England hosts 90% immigrants in 56% U.K. land mass
As a socialist and a Catalan separatist, I resent our characterization as “neoliberals”. There are three major (that is, with parliamentary representation) political parties for self-determination: Junts (neolibs), ERC (social democrats) and CUP (socialist). The first two have around 35% of the total votes, with the latter hanging around 5%. The last regional election saw the unfortunate appearance of the far-right Aliança with 4%, which aren’t considered part of the movement by most people.
To anyone capable of objective analysis, Catalan separatism is clearly a transversal movement, well within western European parameters regarding ideological spectrum. If anything, it has more radical left presence than many other situations, as for a while CUP was the only socialist (as in, anti-capitalist) party with deputies in the Spanish Congress.
Your comment is off base and your ire unwarranted. The post referred to the 2017 campaign, which eventually resulted in the flight of Carles Puigdemont. Then ERC (and we explained in our posts then why we saw ERC as neoliberals based on their policy positions) and Junts got over 43% of the vote, v. 4.5% for the CUP. The CUP role in the separatist movement at its peak power was marginal and our characterization of the movement as neoliberal was accurate based on the weight of power.
This article is over egging the UK situation, the split in the UK at the moment is actually all about immigration, and this crosses the nationalist boundaries. There has always been areas of the UK seeking autonomy and who can blame them given the politicians in Westminster. If you asked the people of England if they favoured Scottish independence, Scotland would be independent years ago. Tory Brexiteers want Northern Ireland dumped, so they can have a pure Brexit. UKIP (the UK Independence party) dominated some of Essex, and the Essex Right wing have said for sometime (and are correct) that Essex is more than self-sufficient. We also have a standing joke about the Peoples Republic of North Yorkshire.
Yes, I did a double take to see the East Devon Alliance! I am a Devon nationalist (although in practice I would accept a Greater Cornwall) and I had never heard of it.
Wikipedia tells me that it contested district and county council seats in the late 2010’s as a protest against corruption among the mainstream parties in local government, it won twelve seats then never stood in the 2020’s, has no councillors and the website is a dead link.
I hope the rest of the article is more grounded in reality and today.
The UK needs to restore powers and revenue raising to local government, which is the nursery of democracy. Creating new national governments is only going to change the elected dictators.
Not sure what Denmark is supposed to be an example of in the above, perhaps others can enlighten me.
Historically, Denmark and Germany fought countless wars, re-drawn the borders many times along whatever creek (no features like the Rhine or the Pyrenees here) with minorities being left behind on whatever was the other side of the border. As part of the WWI settlement, the two countries agreed to fix the border via referendum, though it would still result in left-behind minorities. The Danish minority in Germany and the German one in Denmark were given significant rights, including schooling in their respective languages and political representation.
So is the lesson, we need to have had interminable wars, the settlement needs to be imposed or that language rights/representation will fix everything? IIRC the wars were longer ago between France and Spain, nobody else imposed a settlement, but the modern language/political rights seem not to have worked too well in Catalonia.
Finally, there are few lessons to be had from Denmark’s way of dealing with its guest workers and asylum seekers since the 1960s.
It says in the text Denmark has handled the movement for Greenland autonomy quite well. So I’d say Denmark is supposed to be an example of how to handle movements for autonomy, or even sovereignty.
Greenland did not want to give its fishing grounds to European dragnet fishers as U.K. did. Denmark had to join EEC when U.K. did as it was highly dependent on U.K. market
German federalism is fake. 16 so-called states which include cities like Berlin or Hamburg or Bremen or places like Saarland with 900,000 people. The only areas they control are Education and Police/Justice but can be overruled by Berlin as they were during COVID.
3 Länder subsidise the rest by transfer payments – ie Bayern, B-W, and Hessen. Universities are state-owned and staff are civil servants. School leaving exams are not of a uniform standard across Länder nor is medical or legal training. Bayern and Sachsen have better quality schools than the rest
They are glorified County Councils with bureaucracy to buy off party members with jobs. Each Lsnd has its own TV station politically loyal.
Some regions privatised their hospitals to save costs of investment in upgrading so large hospital chains like Asklepios or Fresenius dominate and gouge the insurers of which there are 180-250 different Kassen
The whole chaos means you might have to refile paperwork galore just by moving out of a Kreisfreie Stadt into the Umgebung 5km away
It is a Bureaucratic Hell of inertia and stagnation
Not as fake as US federalism. Vermont has a much smaller population than Saarland.