As Israel — with US support — continues its rampage across the Middle East, Türkiye is assessing the shifting landscape and weighing costs and opportunities, including economic and security concerns, ties with NATO on one hand and BRICS countries on the other, and its own regional aspirations.
Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus emphasized the country’s position over the weekend, saying that Türkiye follows its own “national axis” in foreign policy and rejects the idea that it must align with any power or bloc. Where is that “national axis” going to take the country as the Middle East goes up in flames and Türkiye is positioned to play a key role?
One route it appears certain not to take is concrete pposition to Israel. Despite all Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rhetoric against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and company, goods from Türkiye continue to make their way to Israel. Oil continues to flow through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan to Türkiye’s Ceyhan port where it is shipped to Haifa — constituting roughly 40 percent of Israel’s supply.
In early May, Türkiye said it was halting exports to Israel due to the “worsening humanitarian tragedy” in the Palestinian territories. Yet goods, including critical minerals and chemicals used by the Israeli military get around the export ban by simply going through third countries, such as Greece. And the US is still using Incirlik Air Base in southern Türkiye to assist Israel.
This is unsurprising as In some ways the US/Israel current rampage through the Middle East fits with Turkish goals. Here are six issues confronting the Turkish government as it decides how to proceed:
1. There are suggestions that the US and Israel are after regime change in Lebanon. Here’s the executive director of the influential neocon Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
But this is also a moment for the Biden administration to shift focus from its Sisyphean pursuit of a Gaza cease-fire to taking advantage of the opportunities presented by Israel’s seismic shock to Hezbollah.
With assertive, engaged diplomacy, the Biden administration can help engineer a new security regime that allows civilians to return to their homes along the Israel-Lebanon border and work with local and international partners to help build a new political architecture for Lebanon.
This isn’t the Saudi-Israel peace and normalization accord that the Biden administration hoped to leave as a legacy — though there might be one last bite at this apple during the presidential transition — nor even the Gaza cease-fire for which the White House has labored for months. But after a year of tragedy and sadness, this would be real progress. At the same time, it is essential for Washington to warn Tehran about the high price it will suffer if it decides to make a dash for a nuclear-weapons capability. By building on Israel’s killing of Nasrallah, President Biden has the opportunity to leave the Middle East better today than it was on Oct. 8, which is no small achievement.
Türkiye would support such a goal as it is no fan of Hezbollah, and any weakening of the latter’s influence in Syria, could allow Türkiye to increase its footprint.
“If it translates into a longer-term weakening of Iran and allied Shiite groups, including Hezbollah, that will really pave the way for Türkiye to play a more dominant role” in Syria and Iraq, said Gönül Tol, Türkiye director for the Middle East Institute, a research center in Washington.
During the Syrian Civil War, Türkiye and Hezbollah fought on opposing sides. Hezbollah supports the Assad government, while Türkiye supported Syrian opposition groups like the Free Syrian Army seeking to overthrow Assad — although it now focuses primarily on fighting (US-backed) Kurdish groups in Syria and has sought to improve ties with Assad at the behest of Moscow and Tehran. Progress has been slow, however.
While the Turkish government offers statements of support for the Lebanese people, pro-government media in Türkiye lambast Hezbollah:
On a program aired by A Haber, retired Colonel and security pundit Coşkun Başbuğ claimed that Nasrallah was working for Mossad and that Hezbollah’s leadership was “sold out.” Başbuğ argued that Hezbollah could have turned the Israeli border into a “hell” but did not due to its compromised leadership. Başbuğ stated that Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders were discarded by those who used them. Additionally, he referred to Hezbollah’s missile attacks as mere “firework displays.”
Yeni Şafak columnist and a former Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Aydın Ünal said the assassination of Nasrallah was met with joy and excitement by the oppressed Syrians. Ünal said that Nasrallah, following orders from Iran, had brutally and mercilessly carried out massacres of Muslims.
There are now growing calls in Türkiye for the country to abandon its more conciliatory approach of the past few years and return to one of trying to expand its influence by whatever means necessary. Those efforts mostly ended in disaster and left Türkiye more isolated, but memories are short when opportunity comes calling. Dr. Samir Salha, the founding dean of the Law Faculty at Gaziantep University in Türkiye and a professor of law and international relations there, argues that “the region’s escalating violence contradicts Ankara’s strategy of resolving disputes with neighboring countries.”
Not sure how that makes sense, but it is representative of a popular rationale among the more interventionist faction of the Turkish elite.
There are now reports (although not the most reliable) that Ankara is planning “limited” ground operations in Northwestern Syria. To what end is unclear. Türkiye’s military presence in Idlib is now mostly observation posts, support for the area’s Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and an entente with Russia. Any operation would likely be to close off borders or reinforce HTS — although the latter option could bring Türkiye into direct conflict with Russia.
The Erdogan government, however, is facing increasing calls to do something because of our next point.
2. Syrian and Now Lebanese Refugee Crisis.
Türkiye is already struggling with inflation and economic stagnation, and it could face additional economic shocks if the conflicts intensify disrupting energy supplies and trade routes.
Türkiye is also currently hosting millions of Syrian refugees. Many more are likely to be on the way soon.
Since Israel began its destruction of Lebanon in earnest, roughly 220,000 people have fled into Syria (many are Syrians who had left during the country’s conflicts). That number is expected to grow considerably should the bombing campaign continue and many will attempt to make their way to Türkiye.
The refugee situation along with the economy were the two biggest issues in the presidential and parliamentary elections last year — a vote Erdogan barely survived. Nationalists arguing for the expulsion of Syrian refugees were some of the biggest winners. A major influx of new refugees is going to be problematic for the Erdogan government, and he faces pressure to secure the country’s borders, particularly given the economic situation.
3. Conflict Spillover into Syria.
The Syrian War never officially ended. It’s just slowed to a simmer, but that looks to be changing. Israeli airstrikes in Syria, refugees from Lebanon, and Iran and Hezbollah’s focus on Israel, could all contribute to the destabilization of the fragile ceasefires in various parts of country. Here’s current lay of land:
Israel has carried out regular airstrikes on Syria in recent years, but they are now ratcheting up in frequency and severity — including two this week alone on Damascus.
Now the US/Israel is saying they’re trying to stop the flow of weapons from Iran through Syria to Lebanon.
Israeli military alleges Hizbullah smuggling arms from Syria through al-Masna’a crossing, “urges” Lebanese authorities to inspect cargoes and turn back trucks with arms, otherwise threatens Israeli action.
This is the main crossing through which civilians have fled to Syria. https://t.co/7QtYiGm26y
— Sam Heller | سام هيلر (@AbuJamajem) October 3, 2024
Then they bombed the alleged smuggling tunnel. The damage now means refugees now must largely trek into Syria on foot.
Early on Friday morning, Israel bombed the Masnaa border crossing between Lebanon and Syria, along with its vicinity, forcing the closure of the international highway.
The Israeli army claims it struck a 3.5 kilometer underground tunnel crossing from Lebanon into Syria.… pic.twitter.com/Ee09WyIgOy
— The Cradle (@TheCradleMedia) October 4, 2024
According to some reports, Hezbollah has withdrawn many of its fighters from Syria in order to join the conflict in Lebanon. A reduced Iranian and Hezbollah presence potentially opens the door for Sunni extremist groups in the region, which Türkiye and the US often support in an effort to bring down Assad.
4. ISIS Being Prepped for a Comeback Tour?
Here’s the Middle East Institute on the group’s resurgence:
In an unusual public statement late on July 16, United States Armed Forces’ Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. According to CENTCOM, ISIS has so far conducted 153 attacks across both countries from January through June, noting that “the increase in attacks indicates ISIS is attempting to reconstitute following several years of decreased capability.” CENTCOM’s commander, Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, insisted that achieving an enduring defeat of ISIS still relies on the “combined efforts of the Coalition and partners”
4. Multiple US Proxies Versus Russia in Syria?
Among recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria was likely one that targeted an ammunition warehouse near the largest Russian air base in Syria.
BREAKING:
🇮🇱🇷🇺 Israel strikes a Russian weapons depot in Syria.
Israel has finally poked the Bear.
The Israeli military is targeting sites in western Syria coastal cities
Large scale airstrikes in the Syrian city of Jableh, near Russia’s Hmeimim Airbase in western Syria on… pic.twitter.com/QELX8vjzcG
— Megatron (@Megatron_ron) October 3, 2024
Russia successfully protected Syria during the Western-instigated “civil war” led by its jihadist fanatics. Are we about to get another round with additional players? The US’s favorite neo-Nazis from Ukraine mixing it up with Turkish-backed Islamisists with support from the genocidal Israel Defense Forces ? What could go wrong?
Here’s where things get interesting regarding Türkiye. Moscow is alleging that Kiev and Washington are training militants from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS – the group in Idlib along Türkiye’s border with Turkish support). Here’s Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov last week:
“Vladimir Zelensky’s regime, in coordination with the Americans, is training terrorists from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, using new UAV production technologies for combat operations against Russian forces in the republic.”
A September 9 report in the Turkish newspaper Aydinlik backs up Lavrov’s claim. It reported that Ukraine is offering drones and training in return for individuals in HTS prisons to fight Russia. Earlier in September Ukrainian special forces allegedly launched an attack on a Russian military facility on the outskirts of Aleppo. From Military Watch:
According to Western sources, the attack saw powerful explosion followed by secondary detonations causing serious damage to the site. Aleppo has long been on the frontier of attacks from jihadist groups due to its close proximity to the Turkish border, with Türkiye being the primary state sponsor of Islamist anti government militants in the country and placing the Syrian governate of Idlib, currently run by the Al Qaeda affiliated Al Nusra Front, under its protection. Ukraine has escalated efforts to provide armaments and training to Islamist groups targeting Russian forces, and alongside Türkiye has for several months deployed special forces to northwestern Syria specifically to support militant groups based there.
Moscow is also now warning that the US and UK are planning to use Ukraine to unleash a chemical weapons false flag provocation in Syria — although this could also be being released by Russia in order to justify coming operations in Northwestern Syria to root out Ukrainian and HTS operations there.
What role will Türkiye play?
6. The US and the Kurds
In many areas, Türkiye and Russia have been increasingly cooperating in Syria while Türkiye and the US frequently come close to direct conflict. Importantly, Turkish and Iranian interests have also aligned:
Iranian and Turkish interests seem to be increasingly aligning, particularly in their united front against Israel’s actions toward Hamas and in opposing the resurgence of a U.S.-led regional order. However, their historical competition for strategic dominance in areas like Iraq and Syria, coupled with the distinct forms of revisionism that the AKP and Iranian leadership champion on the global stage, suggests that any emerging alliance between them might remain tenuous and susceptible to strains in the mid to long term.
The question is if Türkiye’s calculus changes due to the potential weakening of Hezbollah and Iranian positions in Syria. There exists the possibility that Türkiye might trade its support for Islamists in Northwestern Syria for a green light from Russia to go on the offensive against Kurds in Northeastern Syria, but we’ll see.
Elsewhere Turkish ties with both Russia and China have been steadily improving, which is helping Erdogan slowly rebuild the Turkish economy. Would he potentially throw away that progress on another chance to increase Turkish influence in Syria? At the same time, Turkiye’s economic ties with the West — primarily the EU of which it is a member of the customs union — still dwarf those of Russia and China. And we know loads of economic pressure is constantly on Ankara to toe the NATO line, as evidenced by the increasing number of US sanctions on Turkish entities.
One last consideration for Ankara is the prospect of an increasingly powerful Russian-Iranian presence surrounding Türkiye should the US/Israel be soundly defeated in the current conflicts and the Americans booted from many of their Middle East outposts.
While Türkiye is wholeheartedly opposed to US support for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, it has also long tried to balance Russia and the US off one another in the region. Either one with an overwhelming advantage is cause for concern in Ankara, which might help explain the recent talk of Türkiye potentially handing over its Russian S-400s to the US and assisting US/Israel efforts in the region.
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I know institutions that would grade that essay at Beta-Gamma. It says nothing. Erdogan is not exactly popular and the Street is angered at Israeli behaviour and also in Northern Cyprus where Turks are being displaced by Israelis.
Erdogan has enriched his family but the combines make their money in construction and beer inside Russia. Without the Russian market Turkey dies.
Erdogan may well be End Of Life like Hussain in Jordan. Qatar may have to watch itself having played with US and Iran investing in U.K. and Germany yet funding iSIS
I could not agree more on the proposed grading of this essay, it is obvious that the author does not have a deep understanding of the Turkish dynamics. Erdogan is an arch-pragmatist (and of course corrupt) president who has attempted a balance between the two sides (the West and Russia, Iran, China) for many years, and he will very much understand that placing any Russian advanced military technology under US command will be very highly destructive of his relations with Russia. He also understands that he cannot trust the US after the attempted coup, he most probably learned at least part of the lesson that the head of Belarus learned – as with Gaddafi, the West will not stop until they have a truly compliant vassal or a destroyed nation.
His problem is like that of many leaders in the Middle East, being completely out of step with the general population that is very much anti-Israel and has to deal with the minority Kurds. While being under huge pressure from the West to be a dutiful vassal, and Russia to repay its ongoing support (such as the US$20 billion funding of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and the deferment of US$20 billion is gas payments). The Turkish opposition has already reached out to Russia, and Russia has reciprocated, showing its unhappiness with Erdogan. In such a shaky position he will most probably not risk any failed adventures in Syria or anywhere else.
With the probable Russian victory in Ukraine, the increasingly positive relations of Russia and Iran with other MENA sand Caucasus states (excluding Armenia and of course Israel), and the growing ascendancy of China, Erdogan has to tread very carefully. The West could end up bringing him down only for him to be replaced with the Russia-friendly opposition.
A quite good in depth analysis of the Turkey-Russia relations from the Carnegie Endowment:
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/07/turkiye-russia-fragile-partnership?lang=en
You have completely discredited yourself in citing US propaganda as informed.
I very rarely ever use references from such outfits, as of course their tendency is toward propaganda. But even such outfits do now and again produce relatively balanced analyses, which I can validate through other sources. I find the same with RAND, which a number of times details the US elite mindset, and the nature of the challenges to its hegemony, quite well. I am an academic, I judge analyses on their merits – with of course much more care with propagandist type outfits. Its your site, if you want analyses from such organizations completely banished that’s your prerogative.
Thank you for conceding the point about propaganda. Our readers are knowledgeable. If you want to preserve your credibility here, it would behoove you to include a prophylactic warning as to your use of a generally questionable source, as the site writers here typically do.
Roger, I’m having a difficult time following you as your comment is full of contradictions and vague notions.
You’re at least right that Erdogan is a pragmatist who is trying to balance both sides. But you do realize that requires, you know, balance?
That’s why Turkey sends weapons to Ukraine even as it accepts help from Russia on its nuclear power plant.
That’s why it signs LNG deals with the US while getting sweetheart deals from Moscow on pipeline gas.
That’s why Erdogan releases Azov prisoners back to Ukraine despite promising Russia he wouldn’t. Does Russia trust Erdogan? No, but it works with him because it wants to keep sending gas to Turkey, it wants the Turkish straits to remain closed to NATO warships, it wants to use Turkey to get goods into and out of the EU customs union of which Turkey is a member, etc
Erdogan might not trust the US and the EU (who would?) but he needs that. And he needs to worry about US sanctions which are hurting Turkey, especially its defense industry.
What exactly is your point?
When you say things like Erdogan “ has to deal with the minority Kurds.” What does that mean? Win them over? Exterminate them? Or that he’s “In such a shaky position he will most probably not risk any failed adventures in Syria or anywhere else.”
Are you familiar at all with Erdogan’s history? Take a look at the map in the piece maybe — those Turkish outposts in Syria are not the result of cartographer error? Erdogan is in a shaky position ahead of an election four years away because the opposition , which is a party that primarily represents EU-longing bourgeoisie performed some outreach to Moscow? Which is probably damage control after running an anti-Russia campaign last year in a country that increasingly favors strong ties with Russia.
I appreciate the skepticism and the fact that you read a Carnegie Endowment piece but if you’re going to criticize, try to bring a little more to the table and actually engage with the questions and arguments presented in the piece. It’d be a more valuable use of your, mine and other readers time.
My core response is in the last paragraph, the geopolitical contest between the West and Russia/Iran/China is making Erdogan’s balancing act more and more difficult. The West has a habit of pushing such “fence sitters” too hard (e.g. Belarus) and that pressure will increase even further as the reality of Russian victory in Ukraine, and the fallout from that victory is internally digested by Western elites. Made probably worse by a Georgian Dream re-election which will facilitate a Georgia/Russia rapprochement, and the improving ties between Azerbaijan and Russia and Iran.
In such circumstances, a very rational Erdogan will not want to start any foreign adventures that exacerbate his strategic dilemma. One that the Israeli genocide and now widespread bombing and invasion of Lebanon simply heightens given the widespread support for the Palestinian cause in Turkey. The Kurds who represent about 1/5th of the Turkish population are always going to be a wildcard that can be manipulated by the West against Erdogan, this just makes his domestic and international balancing act that much harder.
The other point I was making is that the internal political dynamics of Turkey are being rent by the Erdogan’s intensifying strategic dilemma. The close run presidential election and the regional segmentation of the parliamentary elections of 2023 (Peoples Alliance of AKP/MHP/BBP/YRP is spread across the country, while the Nations Alliance with a CHP/IYI/DEVA/GP pro-European core is much more in the west and south, and the Labour & Freedom Alliance of the YSL/pro-Kurdish HDP/TIP?EMEP etc. is only in the east of the country) point to the possibility of regional fragmentation, possibly aided by outside interference (colour revolution or another Yugoslavia?).
With respect to Ozel, it is apparent that he is trying to setup the same balancing act as Erdogan while actually trying to get an EU membership (Turkey is already within NATO), which will not be offered unless Ozel accepts a Western vassalage which he cannot provide given the internal political dynamics. That leaves the West with the option of accepting the fence sitting status quo, or going for active destabilization. The latter has generally been where it ends up, most recently with some blowback consequences or a failed state (which would perhaps be preferable to Israel and Western with respect to regional dominance).
PS. I am an academic who specializes in geopolitics so I do a little more than just reading pieces by the Carnegie Endowment. I am happy to have a further discussion, but perhaps outside the Naked Capitalism comments section.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/about-carnegie-russia-eurasia-center?lang=en
The Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin is home to the world’s leading experts on Russia and the wider region. The center’s scholars and digital media platform, Carnegie Politika, deliver independent analysis and strategic insight that are not available anywhere else. The Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center focuses on major policy challenges across the entire region in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
LOL. They actually have “Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine” on their about page. That’s how you know that the in-depth independent analysis are quite good. Those world’s leading experts on Russia know all the ins and outs of getting paid.
Absolutely agree, the Carnegie Endowment is overwhelmingly a Western propaganda outfit. But now and again they do publish some useful articles, like many other Western propaganda outfits – such as Foreign Policy, RAND etc.
With all due respect, your excuse-making (in the face of Jester’s very appropriate and expertly delivered snark – well done, Jester!) demonstrates a lack of respect for the subject matter. The hilariously blatant way the source wears its bias on its sleeve should trigger a disgust reflex, if “geopolitical expertise” worthy of the name is your goal.
Shagggz thanks for pointing me here. More people that actually want to speak. These institutions make a joke out of “analysis” while blatantly carrying water for the empire. It’s not even subtle. Take Carnegie—calling Russia’s actions “unprovoked” while ignoring NATO expansion and the U.S. meddling in Ukraine for years? Please. It’s this kind of one-sided “expertise” that just broadcasts their agenda loud and clear. Yet, somehow, they expect people to swallow it like it’s gospel.
What’s truly laughable is that they pretend Türkiye is some pawn in all this, like Erdoğan hasn’t mastered the game of playing all sides against the middle. He’ll sell drones to Ukraine while still making sweetheart energy deals with Russia, and these think tanks act like they’ve discovered something profound. But of course, pointing out the obvious contradictions doesn’t fit their narrative. They need Erdoğan to be stuck in some ideological box to make their “geopolitical forecasts” sound halfway coherent. No one has clean hands here.
It’s like they’re missing the fact that Türkiye isn’t just playing along—it’s actively recalibrating its alliances depending on who can offer the most. Whether it’s the Akkuyu nuclear deal with Russia or those LNG contracts with the U.S., it’s all part of Erdoğan’s balancing act. They’ll keep pushing their propaganda, but anyone paying attention can see how Türkiye’s threading the needle between East and West to its advantage.
My pleasure, glad to see you make it over! After weeks of my fruitlessly attempting to break through the groupthink hivemind over at Brin’s blog, you’re the only one to demonstrate genuine curiosity. Loudly proclaiming one’s commitment to “transparency” and “Enlightenment values” while doing the opposite is on full display with Carnegie’s echo chamber style of “analysis.” This is how you end up with “political experts” genuinely lacking in a theory of mind for autonomous actors, such as Erdogan.
Perhaps you should read my response to Conor above before jumping to conclusions about my respect or not for the subject matter.
I am a total layman on this subject and not even amateur. My pure intuition suggests to me that Erdogan so much loves being a player and the center of attention as well as a TürkOttoman Irredentist within the limits of the achievable that he will support all possible chaos within Syria in order to expand “Türkuppied”
territory within Syria, continue protecting the Cannibal Liver Eating Jihadis still hiding and sheltering in Idlib, etc.
Erdogan must be in a quandary. He doesn’t want to cut the oil as Turkiye needs to establish a reputation as a reliable supplier. He would like to establish himself the leader of the Islamic leader of this region but can’t do that when people see that Russia is siding with Lebanon and he is doing zip except making bank selling vital materials to Israel who is warring on fellow Muslims. He would also like to carve off chunks of Syria to add to Turkiye, including Aleppo, but if he tries to do that, then he can kiss Turkiye’s chances of joining the BRICS goodbye which would shut him out of all those Asian markets. There is another factor that he may not have considered. Israel seems to be working to the 1% principle in that if there is a 1% chance of an attack coming from a regional country, then it must be destroyed. Thus it will only be a matter of time before Israel’s sights start to set on Turkiye. The Kurds are already a force that could be used as a battering ram against Turkiye like the Ukraine has been used against Russia. And if the Turks go asking for help from Washington about Israel undermining them, she should already know which country will be prioritized first and it ain’t Turkiye.
I am not sure why you think Erdogan wants parts of Syria. Hatay is a part of Christian Syria that French PM Leon Blum gave to Muslim Turkey in 1936 – it was unfortunate that Blum did that as a Jew and it proved his undoing in pre-war France.
Erdogan‘s problem is that 20-30% population in Turkey is Kurdish and they aim to take a slice of Syria with US help and merge it into US Kurdistan in Iraq and become a nation like Israel. Another British promise for the Ottoman territories that was not honoured after oil was found in Kirkuk
Erdogan fears US plans break up of Turkey to get its own puppet state and cut Turkey into slices. There are some who consider Erdogan not to be Turkish since he originated in Batumi and his family comes from Georgia
I really think Erdogan has been boxed in.
SDF and KRG are politically irreconcilable entities. They’re both Kurdish, but they do not even speak the same dialect (as someone who knows one of them at the level of a 3rd grader, I do not understand the other at all), and are politically diametric opposites – SDF being ‘Democratic confederalists’ (one of an endless series of meaningless socialist permutations taken up by PKK and their affiliates) and KRG being a Barzani-led opportunistic and deeply corrupt regime that regularly attacks SDF positions. SDF are not yielding any land to a singular Iraqi Kurdish tribe (Barzani).
Al-Julani, the head of HTS, is a brutal terrorist with a $10 million bounty on his head from the United States government, but surprisingly, Washington wants him to replace Assad.
https://syria360.wordpress.com/2023/02/26/idlib-earthquake-aid-hijacked-by-terrorists/
How does Turkiye think it fits into the plans of a “Greater Israel”?
Since Abraham roamed in and about the current Türkiye’s southwest, the chosen ones naturally inherited that piece of land too.
On a serious note, Türkiye will be the next target because of the water resources it controls if and when Israel is done with Iran.