Poison pill noun
a financial tactic or provision used by a company to make an unwanted takeover prohibitively expensive or less desirable-Merriam Webster
Yours truly must confess to having overlooked a critical component of Putin’s proposed peace terms, which he articulated on June 14, and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just reiterated in an exclusive interview to Newsweek, which was his position on sanctions. Admittedly, Putin included it almost as an afterthought.
First, let’s look at Lavrov’s recap, since it’s more compact than Putin’s formulation (which Putin set forth in two places in his speech, so it was not a tidy, self-contained list). From Newsweek:
On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement as follows: complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic], LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic], Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and removal of all sanctions against Russia.
Aside from Putin setting forth all these issues, including recognition of the four oblasts plus Crimea as being part of Russia, in his June 14 speech, important media outlets also stated the key points (see for instance the Anadolu Agency writeup).
We will skip over the fact that Putin warned, not long after the Istanbul talks collapses, that the longer the war went on, the harder it would become to negotiate with Russia. By implication, just by virtue of Putin’s last offer being made in June and it now being October, with Russia having made considerable breakthroughs on the ground, that Russia would insist on even tougher terms now. That is confirmed by Russia’s position that it would not negotiate with Ukraine at all as long as it has forces in Russia. And many commentators have said opinion in Russia hardened even more against Ukraine after the Kursk invasion, and more citizens wanting Russia to fully subdue Ukraine and dictate terms that before.
Currently, Western commentators are focusing on what is sure to continue to an area of no bargaining overlap: that of Ukraine neutrality and foreswearing membership in NATO. That was tentatively agreed in Istanbul in March-April 2022 because the US and NATO were allowing Ukraine the appearance of autonomy. That is no longer very much the case. NATO and other Western officials now regularly yammer that Russia has no business deciding whether any country joins NATO. Of course, a Ukraine under different management (including most Banderites dead or run out of the country) could but the US and NATO would not give any security guarantees. Some Western pundits and officials are engaging in new versions of cope, such as advocating Ukraine cede the Russian-occupied land (temporarily!) for NATO membership. Amusingly, Zelensky and the Azov types are incandescent.
The part of Putin’s proposal that I saw as particularly cheeky but got comparatively little attention in the Western press was the condition that Ukraine withdraw from all of the four contested oblasts, which goes beyond what Russia occupies and that that be recognized as Russian territory. For those who have not been paying careful attention, the Banderites have threatened Zelensky if he gives up any part of Ukraine.
From the Kremlin translation of the Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials:
Certainly, the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine must be fully protected. The new territorial realities, including the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, Kherson, and Zaporozhye regions as parts of the Russian Federation, should be acknowledged. These foundational principles need to be formalised through fundamental international agreements in the future. Naturally, this entails the removal of all Western sanctions against Russia as well.
You will see that Putin goes from agreement terms that can be granted by Ukraine alone, to ones to be granted by other countries, admittedly down the road. Even if a future Ukraine agrees to recognize the four oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia, it seems well-nigh impossible that the US and EU would ever concede that. However, most BRICS members probably would, so that would confer considerable legitimacy
It’s thus odd to see Putin, who obviously know what he is doing, toss in the idea of reversing all Collective West sanctions almost as an afterthought. These were formally imposed on a state by state basis. The US, UK, EU, Australia, Japan and South Korea all implemented sanctions packages. That included the seizure of Russian central bank assets by the EU, US, and UK, with the EU holding the bulk of the frozen lucre.
Let’s engage in some thought experiments. The EU has been desperately trying to “Trump-proof” various Ukraine arrangements. If Trump were to become President and be willing to meet Russia way more than halfway and give some sanctions relief, you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump, particularly where it has more degrees of freedom, as with the sanctions. Remember also that Ursula von der Leyen is about as hysterically anti-Russian as the Baltic states, and has filled the top ranks of the Commission with female uber-hawks. EU experts please pipe up. I assume modifying or ending the sanctions would require a unanimous EU vote, and not just a qualified majority, which amounts to na ga happen.
Mind you, I expect this implacable rejection to continue even when it became more self-destructive than now. What if things get so ugly in the Middle East that oil goes over $120 a barrel and stays there? Yes, China will be hurt, but so too would be the recessionary EU. But it seems vanishingly unlikely that they’d roll back the Russian oil sanctions, or that Germany would accept gas from the still-working one of four original Nordstream 2 pipelines.
Given all that, one has to think that Putin clearly understood that his Western potential interlocutors would reject not just some but all of his deal points with prejudice. So why make an offer that the other side is set to reject? First, Putin (as we and others have stressed) finds it important to make clear to his Global South economic partners that he’s not being the difficult party, that Russia is not the impediment to ending the war. Most of these countries are still viscerally uncomfortable with Russia invading and occupying a neighbor even if they understand why intellectually.
To put it another way, setting out terms, even if they are objectively reasonable, or at least a not-crazy opening position for talks, that the other side looks set to reject, looks like an exercise in papering the record, rather than negotiating. Lavrov underscored the idea with Newsweek: “At present, as far as we can see, restoring peace is not part of our adversary’s plan.”
So one can argue that Putin had concluded before June 14 that the only way to resolve the conflict was through a battlefield victory. His provisions were a way to make that official without saying so.
But second, this may have been Putin doing his own early Trump-proofing. Remember, he made this speech before the Biden-second-term-killing debate with Trump. Trump then looked to have good odds against Biden due among other things lack of enthusiasm for Biden dampening Democratic party fundraising. And Trump has told anyone who would listen that he can secure a peace in Ukraine in 24 hours.
So was this outline of terms a bit of Russian Trump-proofing? Recall how Putin over time found dealing with Macron’s various peace schemes to be tiresome. So he might want to short-circuit similarly pointless talks with Trump by pointing to his position and playing broken record.
It might be that at this stage, the Russians are expecting a Trump victory next month though they say the the US will still pursue the same policies, no matter which party is in office. They don’t call it the uniparty for nothing. But by putting these statements out there, they can be sure that Trump’s teams is reading them. Trump himself has the idea that if he becomes President, that he will phone Putin and demand a cease fire or else he will sanction Russia but that boat sailed a very long time go. So these public statements are really educating the Trump team what is possible and what is not.
Figaro Interview with Putin 2017
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54638
* * *
I have already spoken to three US Presidents. They come and go, but politics stay the same at all times. Do you know why? Because of the powerful bureaucracy. When a person is elected, they may have some ideas. Then people with briefcases arrive, well dressed, wearing dark suits, just like mine, except for the red tie, since they wear black or dark blue ones. These people start explaining how things are done. And instantly, everything changes. This is what happens with every administration.
I really do not think the the Russians expect much change in US policy, especially as we have seen how successful Obama was in closing the Guantanamo prison/torture site or Trump was in withdrawing troops from Syria. Given what is looking like an increasing mental decline. I don’t see Trump being able to assemble a decent foreign affairs team to do so but I am not from the USA.
It seems possible that some EU countries may be willing to break ranks with EU policy and drop sanctions. Any number of the citizenry in EU countries might be happy with the idea even if governments are not. Did not Austria just elect a new Government and the Scholz Government in Germany looks likely to implode any moment now.
I love the ties bit.
Small point but Lavrov also mentioned in the Newsweek interview that any peace treaty would still need to include “neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification”.
These were also some of the main justifications for the SMO and have not changed.
Russia’s demands seem reasonable even as facts on the ground ratchet the advantage further in her favor.
“Neutral” and “non-bloc” are code for no NATO, which is the big concern.
True but could this also indicate willingness to exclude Ukraine from the CTO, the Shanghai Cooperation, Organization and BRICS? I cannot see any of those organizations wanting Ukraine at the moment but it would be a token concession from Moscow.
Interesting point. Here Putin may have been giving a dog-whistle to China, which is big on (legitimately) haranguing the US on “bloc confrontation”.
Also, and this is an artifact of insufficiently pointed drafting, I intended to convey where Putin was setting the bar too high for the West, even if his position is actually reasonable. As samaT below and others have pointed out, he does not want to waste time or worst get caught in non-starter negotiations.
I did not focus on de-militarization or denazification because:
1. The Istanbul draft agreement had a schedule on arms limits. The bid-asked spread was very large but they were talking about it.
2. The way things have evolved, there will be no negotiation until the neo-Nazis have fled or are dead. They have made clear no way no how will they talk with Russia. So if talks ever do happen, it would be the result of de-nazification already having substantially taken place.
Bugs and Yves Smith:
Yves Smith brings up the question of unanimity about sanctions and what kind of vote must take place. That sent me into a romp in the structure of the European Union. It is worse than I thought. The Council of the EU, which is the representatives of the twenty-seven members, cannot initiate legislation. The Commission, which is where all the power lies, can.
The European Parliament can only request legislation to be submitted to it by — the Commission. Supposedly, this is because the Commission is the guardian of European Law.
According to Wikipedia, “The Commission differs from the other institutions in that it alone has legislative initiative in the EU. Only the commission can make formal proposals for legislation: they cannot originate in the legislative branches.”
Oh. Why am I getting a whiff of Albania under Enver Hoxha?
This means that sanctions cannot be eliminated because Ursula van der Leyen “filled the top ranks of the Commission with female uber-hawks,” leaving sanctions untouchable indefinitely.
This is not healthy. Bugs, does what I have written square with your knowledge of the EU works?
That written, I note in Bugs’s quote above one important missing membership: The European Union.
Reading the conditions given by Putin and elucidated by Lavrov, I’d say that they are about as good a deal as the Ukraine Project can get. (Unless, of course, the neolibs and neocons are willing to sacrifice their own kids — highly unlikely.)
Crimea is not negotiable. Donetsk and Lugansk aren’t returning to Ukraine any time soon.
At this point, the Russians would be only too happy to offload the economic disaster and swamp of corruption that is Ukraine on the EU. Ursula van der Leyen and her lady warmongers will draw Ukraine to their collective bosoms, glad to know that a source of cheap labor, surrogate mothers, buff rightwing looneys, and hours of looting can come into the EU (and cause further deterioration).
Ursula, not the sharpest knife in the drawer, may then lift the sanctions. Why not? She has saved a whole nation by wearing blue-and-yellow pantsuits!
This is super helpful! Thanks a ton!
Very 19th century European monarchies, it seems: I think, at least in the beginning, new legislation could only be initiated by the king/emperor/whoever (or, his appointees–the prime minister and the cabinet) with the Parliament only having the right to debate over it and vote up or down….
One big outcome of the last few years of turmoil is that Russia has reassumed the status of a Great Power, and is beginning to act like one.
Set the terms of agreement high and later, if necessary, climb down a bit and look like you are making big concessions out of the goodness of your heart.
One thing to remember here is that Russia is self-supporting on the oil and gas front. World crude oil prices spiking due to Middle East ‘troubles’ is to Russia’s benefit.
And which civilization will best adjust to an oil spike? Russia, China, or the US.? Get that bike! (Actually, there will be no stores to ride it to in the US.)
Also USA domestic crude producers would benefit while crying crocodile tears about higher consumer prices.
It seems obvious that many of the USA elite would be quite pleased with higher prices caused by USA military actions.
Avoiding the negotiation trap, as Medvedev would put it.
I suspect that Russia has concluded that the time for face saving endings is past and that future peace requires that the US efforts against Russia be objectively defeated. As it stands, publicly at least, the illusion apparently persists that the US can impose terms. If the US is exhausted and NATO dissolves, it may be possible at some future date for Europe to establish friendlier relations including some restoration of energy imports following war crimes tribunals and denazification.
To my knowledge it is not the Commission but the European Council (which comprises the 27 Prime Ministers + Charles Michel (President) + vDL where the decisions on sanctions are taken. Some decisions here require consensus but (i might be wrong) in the case of the revision of sanctions policy this would account as a legal act and it would require a reinforced majority (72% of the members of the European Council comprising at least 65% of the EU population) not unanimity.
Ignacio: See my comment above replying to Bugs.
The whole setup is byzantine — deliberately so. Does this mean that the Council votes a “sense of the members” and sends it to the Commission to be turned into legislation and regulations?
My guess is that vDL, who is member also in the Council, whether she likes it or not, has to proceed with the conclusions of the European Council in timely fashion and redact the correspondent Decision, Regulation, whatever name it takes. If not, It would be the end of vDL days at the Commission.
I found this all very confusing. Just watching the process, I had assumed it would be a European Council drill, since states as opposed to MEPs were deciding. But the Queen of Europe was clearly running the process and even whipping the votes, as opposed to the head of the Council.
Just a guess here, but isn’t Trump having a peace plan a laugher? His stated terms were that Russia be given the area already taken in Ukraine, plus some deal with partial sanctions relief (only some US sanctions, not EU ones). I think Putin understand this very well.
BUT, a cliff resides in the following- if Russia did not agree to these terms, Trump would bring the conflict to a whole new level! In other word, Phineas T. Bluster rides again. If he sent more munitions and even soldiers to Ukraine, he would have to talk himself out of the complaints that he couldn’t keep his word and save America from engagement. If he didn’t follow up, he’d look weak, and the Dems would ride that ceaselessly. To me, this means no resolution on any of these terms.
This is a war that must be settled with a full confrontation, and that means NATO fully engaged in battle with Russia. All this weak tea about limits is a huge hoax, and slides the neoliberals into the ultimate battle they have dreamt of for so long, a war of worlds. We’ll maybe live to see how that turns out.
No, NATO will not engage. First, there is no mechanism for doing that. NATO is a very weak alliance. It had to be to get members to join. They did not want to surrender national sovereignity to the alliance. That is why they all have their own militaries and their own (often nationally idiosyncratic) weapons. NATO cannot make members do anything. Even the vaunted Article 5 merely obligates members to think about defending an attacked fellow NATO member.
For starters, Turkiye, which has the biggest and best NATO army in theater, would never join an attack on Russia.
Second, before Russia was doing as well as it has been, Colonel Macgregor, who served a long time in Germany, said the MOST the West would be able to do would be a coalition of the willing, the US, Poland, Romania and the UK (but the UK has an itty bitty army, its participation would be symbolic). They could field 90,000 to 100,000 men absolute tops. Their supply lines and logistics (due to the distance from their bases + so many different types of equipment) would be horrible.
So please no NATO fantasies.
My understanding of the EU Sanctions is that they are decided on the basis of a qualified majority (which I think is defined as 55% of Council members (15 out of 27) representing 65% of the population. A minimum of 4 no. members are required to form a locking minority, irrespective of the percentage of population they represent. The Council members are the heads of state (or the relevant ministers if its under foreign or finance policy).
The sanctions are quite complex as they were decided under a variety of votes under different headings (and hence fall under different competencies within the Union), but I think the key ones are on a 6 month cycle, so technically they could be allowed fall by default if that was politically the most convenient way to do it.
The sanctions are enforced via a variety of Directives, which is where the Commission and Parliament can block or propose measures as appropriate. Its not quite clear to me as to what happens if the Commission wishes to block a Council decision.
As the sanctions seem to be largely driven by a passionate minority, with the majority reluctantly going along with them, the dynamics would be quite complex if the EU was presented with a Trump dilemma, as the ‘reluctant’ majority may use this as an excuse to block changes.
I think negotiations are off the table at this point, certainly until there is regime change in Kiev. Putin’s June peace plan (which he surely knew would never be accepted) preceded the Kursk incursion, which changes everything. Even the Moscow Times (which is as fond of Putin as MSNBC is of Trump) had an interesting article a few days ago quoting an (alleged) high-level Russian govt source as follows: ““Ukraine’s forces are being exhausted…… the Kremlin can carry on waging war like it is at the moment for decades.”” The article is here, and inside it is a link to the original Runet article:
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/04/putin-abandons-peace-talks-seeks-to-destroy-ukrainian-state-after-kursk-incursion-report-a86561
Russia will establish facts on the ground and then dictate terms. This might take a while; wars have a tendency to drag on for longer than people expect. And nobody seems to be in a hurry to wrap this one up, certainly not Putin.
“…If Trump were to become President and be willing to meet Russia way more than halfway and give some sanctions relief, you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump…” — Oh, I’m not so sure about that. Since 24/2/22, the USA has been the driving force behind the Russian sanctions, with the EU (which has/had far more business ties with Russia than the USA did) skittering along semi-reluctantly behind it. Behind the facade of solidarity, there is already a lot of political division within the EU re the Russian sanctions and Ukraine policy in general, and EU businesses are deeply unhappy about losing the Russian market. Just yesterday, KLM became the first EU airline to ask Brussels to address the “unfair” competition from Chinese airlines (which of course can overfly Russian airspace, as can Air India, Emirates, Turkish etc):
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-07/dutch-carrier-klm-seeks-eu-measures-to-curb-china-competition
If Trump wins and chops back on the Russian sanctions, I think the Eurocrats in Brussels will come under overwhelming pressure to follow suit.
The key is that Russia seeks a Western surrender, not Ukrainian. The handicap they face is that they have to go about extracting it without (physically) attacking the West. I’ve thought that this is impossible and that Russia will have to take the gloves off to cut off the chicken’s head when there’s a good enough rationale to do it, but, explicitly including sanctions as the starting point of talks is a subtler, more peaceful way of signaling what is required. Very Putin-esque, I suppose, although it also means that the West would not respect it in the near term as much as Russian missiles wiping out, say, RAF Waddington (this is the RAF ISR hub, so the most logical target had UK officially OK’ed Ukrainians using Storm Shadows against pre-2014 Russia).
One important consequence of insisting on sanctions being part of the negotiations is that that presupposes that the West is part of the conflict. Note that, even today, the West operates as if it is not part of the conflict–so all the pressure, supposedly, on Ukraine to negotiate while the West would not be involved. I used to joke that Russia should insist on Ukraine ceding Alaska or something, but an insistence on sanctions being part of the negotiations is a clever, practical way of “including Alaska in negotiations,” i.e. forcing the West to negotiate, and, ultimately, surrender.
The weird (but unexpected) bit about the current talk about “land for NATO” (the Duran terminology) in the Western press is that this perpetuates the myth that the conflict in Ukraine is over territory. It never was and, in fact, it was never even really between Ukraine and Russia. Russia needs the West to surrender in some fashion to wrap up the war and forcing them to officially agree to end sanctions (whether it actually happens or not) is certainly easier (and better PR) than retaking Paris (which probably won’t be enough).
In the long run whether there is a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine project or not, the sanctions-regime will deteriorate and eventually fall apart. People find ways around laws and regulations limiting economic freedom. The sanctions are absurd and cannot be maintained indefinitely. The West simply lacks the power to continue to enforce these sanctions.
As for the war in Ukraine, there is no reason why the Russians should negotiate in the short and medium-term. The war is slowly turning positive for Russia. As for Ukraine, it seems it can continue to fight as long as the West sends it sufficient money that continues to enrich the Ukrainian oligarchs. Trump, if elected, may have the mandate to move away from throwing money towards the criminals and neo-Nazis that run Ukraine but he will not end the war just, maybe, allow it to slow down enough so that realpolitik may become a thing again. If Harris wins, I’d say nothing changes since the Democratic Party is now all-neocon all the time but, eventually, a bit of realpolitik may slip past the fanatics. I don’t think Harris is a fanatical neocon so she may be more flexible than Biden who loves gangsterism for its own sake.
If there is an expansion of the war in West Asia then all bets are off and Ukraine will be dropped as an imperial project because the US/Israel will not have an easy time defeating Iran–it will cost a lot of money and be a horror show as it is now but is generally shielded by the Zionist-friendly media in the US and Europe but won’t be when real war breaks out in that region.