Yves here. In the unlikely event that the Trump Administration decides to shrink the number of US bases a tad, even if more to placate MAGA backers or to free up troops so as to be able to deploy more elective forces, it will face issues similar to the ones France is contending with in Africa. Note that some of these, erm, withdrawals, were not voluntary. What happens when the US is eventually faced with similarly uppity hosts?
By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité. Originally published at The Conversation
Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.
These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.
What advantages could France lose by withdrawing its troops from African countries?
France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.
Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.
For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.
Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).
In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.
On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.
What impact could military withdrawal have on France’s political and diplomatic influence in its former African colonies?
The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.
This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.
It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).
The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.
Could this withdrawal reduce France’s influence in managing security crises in Africa?
As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.
Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.
This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.
The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.
In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.
In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.
How will the reduction in military presence affect France’s ability to protect its economic interests, particularly in the mining and energy sectors?
In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.
France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.
Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.
https://africasacountry.com/2023/09/nothing-good-comes-of-france
September 22, 2023
Nothing good comes of France
By Mbaye Bashir Lo
France is not a new problem for Africa. Since the 19th century, it has stood in the way of the continent’s self-determination.
Nearly half of the African Union’s 54 member states are former French colonies. In 20 countries south of the Sahara the French language and France’s economic interests still dominate. An unsettling fact emerges when examining the economic landscape: none of the 10 largest African economies are French-speaking. Yet, six of the poorest 10 nations on the continent are predominantly Francophone. Eleven out of the 14 countries that use the currencies of the CFA franc, * which France backs, are listed among the least developed by the United Nations.
France is indeed a problem for Africa. This is not new; the “French concern” also preoccupied many 19th-century West African leaders. France initially enriched itself through four centuries of involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. As this trade in African subjects waned in the early 19th century, the French empire builders embarked on a new era of colonial conquests in Africa. They assumed a prominent role in organizing the West Africa Conference, commonly called the Berlin Conference, which effectively led to the partitioning of African territories among various European powers…
* Coopération Financière en Afrique centrale
Mbaye Bashir Lo is associate professor of the practice of Asian and Middle Eastern studies and international comparative studies at Duke University.
Let’s not forget that France along with other european powers were the biggest losers in the Second World War. The results of that conflict have shaped and is still shaping the international politics: the old europeans superpoweres were reduced to the role of vassal states at the service of new superpowers in the post-war world order.
The focus of all the post-war conflicts were Europe and Asia. Africa was not a priority for the post-war new superpowers. France and UK were therefore allowed to manage Africa on behalf of the USA.
It was just matter of time for that arrangement to be challenged. The emergence of China as new economic superpower made that arrangement increasingly untenable.
France is just facing the truth: it is a mere vassal state of the USA, and as such it is no longer able today to play the role it used to play in the post-war international politics.
Thank you. The article skirts these so fully–not even mentioning NATO!–that, other than to note that France may now find a reason to write off any historical obligation to such places (still full of treasure, which it is getting expelled from), I don’t find much value in the article. In your comment, which thankfully posting it elicited, yes!
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1DdTO
August 4, 2014
Real per capita Gross Domestic Product for United Kingdom, France, Nigeria and Cameroon, 1977-2023
(Indexed to 1977)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1DdVb
August 4, 2014
Real per capita Gross Domestic Product for China, Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon, 1977-2023
(Indexed to 1977)
Or to put it another way, France got 15% of its supply of strategic minerals and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply from Africa, but in money it was only 1.9% of its trade.
Top two in monetary value, presumably.
So one can see it as France getting useful raw materials cheaply from their former colonies (unlike the former UK colonies, where France needs to pay), which would mean that the economic consequences of losing those useful raw materials would be large.
Looking mainly at monetary value means not looking at streams of goods and raw materials taken at none or little payment, but those streams has huge effects for prosperity. The point of colonialism and neocoloonialism is unequal exchange.
This omits the key adjective ‘sub sahara’. Afaik, France has considerably moretrade with north Africa than it does with the sub sahara .
Yes, correct. I missed that. Thanks for pointing it out.
Still, the general point stands, something for (almost) nothing is a good deal for the one getting something. If counted in the (almost) nothing it will have low value.
Alf Hornborg has some interesting calculations of trade in tons. Unsurprising more goods and raw materials move from poor countries to rich than vice versa. In money, most of those trades are balanced.
I wonder what the economic – financial – consequences of the pullout will be. Michael Hudson has written of the role that the US overseas bases played in the balance of payments situation, and I wonder if a similar situation will arise for France and the African countries that use the CFA franc. It is not exactly a global currency but still. Any opinions from the commentariat?
The Belt and Road program now includes 53 of 54 African countries. South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria have become BRICS member countries with Uganda an observer. France could become a Belt and Road country, and even apply to join BRICS. The market gain for a France newly considered by developing countries would be a significant mutual gain.
France join BRICS? Good luck with that……Van der Lyin would have apoplexy.
https://english.news.cn/20240821/9852c074af964eccbed8172d4cd9a7bb/c.html
August 21, 2024
BRI cooperation boosts “Made in Africa”
Among industrial zones of various types in African countries, many were built and operated by Chinese enterprises. Through these zones, African countries can participate more effectively in the global production chain and promote the internationalization of local brands.
NAIROBI — From Uganda to Egypt, and from Senegal to Nigeria, Chinese-operated industrial parks and zones are thriving across Africa, helping the continent better integrate into the global production chain and promote new African brands.
Driven by the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s involvement in African industry is also fostering the ecological and sustainable development of local manufacturing, thereby enhancing its competitiveness in the global market. As this fruitful cooperation continues, “Made in Africa” sees promising prospects.
“MADE IN AFRICA” BOOMING …
As you might expect, this is a very old story, and I’ve personally witnessed agonising over French bases in Africa on and off over at least the last twenty years. There was a reduction in the French military presence in Africa under Sarkozy, but an attempt to close them entirely fell foul of everything from internal French Army politics to opposition from local leaders. But everyone I spoke to was clear that the bases were a historical anomaly, and that something else had to by done. The problem was what. The political will to intervene in Africa fell off sharply after the peak of the Cote d’Ivoire crisis in 2002-3, when it became clear that the African tail was increasingly wagging the French dog. (Interestingly, the book that really laid all this out, Smith and Glazer’s Comment la France a perdu l’Afrique, was published twenty years ago.) Then, of course, the crisis in Mali erupted and the Islamic State almost came visiting Bamako, and suddenly withdrawal of French troops didn’t seem so urgent.
It’s a typical post-colonial problem without a solution. The former French colonies, bar one or two, are too weak and corrupt to protect themselves and their citizens from internal and external threats. Their political systems are based on elite competitive predation and the systematic neutering of any middle class that might challenge the rentier systems. Thus, the people hate the elites, and the elites encourage this hatred to be turned against the ex-imperial power, even while their children attend the Sorbonne and they come to France for medical treatment and stay in one of their numerous apartments. The Donald Trump-like biovating we have been seeing is based to some extent on a sense of humiliation at having to rely on foreigners, even if it’s the UN, for protection, but is of course also the standard response of any government in trouble.
These things go in cycles and in the next security criss, local elites and their friends in the French media will push the French to intervene again as they did in Mali because of their “colonial responsibility.” It’s clear that neither the Russians nor the Chinese can take the place of the French as security providers, even if the will was there. But my impression is that opinion in France is increasingly turning against Africa, and just wants to be rid of the whole thing. The international agenda is less focused on Africa than it was, the French military are less controlled by the Africa lobby than they used to be, and increasingly people are asking what the point of all this is.
Whenever we are treated to an article with a broad theme centred around reclamation of sovereignty, in whatever form, by former African colonies from their former colonizers, your go-to response has been to sniff at the article, its premise and/or its author’s credentials. You then reframe the argument to cast the former colonizers as benevolent actors whose nobel attempts at stabilizing these powder kegs of political unrest are frustrated by uncooperative, corrupt local elites (who by the way have, until recently, maintained a long tradition of walking hand in hand down the aisle with Paris to serve her interests, often at the expense of ordinary citizens in these countries). I’ve watched you do this for years, and while i deeply respect your commentary on many issues, i can’t help but think your analysis of post colonial Africa is coloured by your view of it through an overly inferential lens (inferring from anecdotes accumulated from, let’s face it, your diplomatic perch, which means you opine on these matters from a narrow, some might say disconnected perspective)
No, I don’t think I regard the French as benevolent actors, to the extent that such categories are absolute, and I didn’t say that they were. They are pursuing their national interests, but for some time now there has been a real debate in Paris about whether those interests should include retaining the position they had in Africa for so long, or whether (as I think many believe) it’s long past its sell-by date. As I pointed out, various political factors prevented the French from doing what would have been sensible in 2008, and closing the bases then. To this extent, I somewhat disagree with Vircoulin’s argument, because I think French disengagement from Africa can be done without wider political damage, but on the whole I think he’s right.
Nor am I especially critical of African politicians, who are in general no worse than ours. They simply have to abide by the rules of the game, as all politicians do, if they want to survive and proposer. The average African politician is, I would have thought, no more corrupt than the average western politician.
I should point out, I suppose, that I’m not and never have been a diplomat, though like anyone who worked for government I was roped into representative work from time to time. But I never had such a job involving Africa, and over thirty years my experience was at least as much with NGOs, academia, liberation movements and the like as with government contacts. I think, and I occasionally made myself unloved by saying so in the past, that many western governments (and NGOs for that matter) have an ignorant and patronising attitude to the continent and its people. And I would include the French in that.
What about significance for French raw material riches, like the infamous Niger example which became better known last year after the “coup”: the correlation between much gold/uranium, and things like that low domestic literacy or high child labour rates. Or was Niger an exception in its significance for France? (re: the above 15% of French strategic minerals – I assume gold/uranium are “strategic minerals”.)
This was German TELEPOLIS news site 2023
“(…)
After the upheaval in Niamey, questions of respect and dependence arise. And about historical and lingering colonialism. A guest commentary.
There is not a single active gold mine in France. Yet this (formerly) criminal colonial state has the fourth largest gold reserves in the world, at 2,436 tons.
The (former) French colony of Mali has exactly 0.0 tons of gold, although it has several dozen mines (including 14 official ones) in the country, where a full 70 tons of it are mined per year. Of the revenue from nearly 60 tons of gold mined by (an estimated) 600,000 children in the (former) French colony of Burkina Faso, only ten percent goes to the country, but 90 percent goes to multinational gold mining corporations.
France closed the last of its 210 uranium mines in 2001. Since then, all the problems associated with uranium mining, which is harmful to the environment and health, including the dangers of radioactive contamination, have been exported elsewhere as a precaution. The West African country of Niger accounts for about a quarter of Europe’s uranium imports and a third of France’s. With 56 nuclear power plants, France is one of the world’s leading exporters of nuclear power (with room for improvement).
(…)
The (former) French colony of Niger has the highest-grade uranium ores in Africa and is the seventh-largest uranium producer in the world, but according to the World Bank, 81.4 percent of its citizens are not even connected to the electricity grid.
40 percent live below the poverty line, one-third of children are underweight, and the illiteracy rate is 63 percent.
Only half of the inhabitants have access to clean drinking water, and only 16 percent are connected to adequate sanitation.
The total state budget of Niger, a country three times the size of the Federal Republic of Germany, is about 4.5 billion euros, no more than the annual turnover of the French nuclear corporation. Despite its uranium and gold deposits, Niger recently ranked 189th out of 191 countries in the Development Index.
The fourteen CFA states are not only chained to the euro by a fixed exchange rate determined solely by the descendants of French colonial messieurs (which earned them a 50 percent devaluation in 1994), but have also lost all access to 85 percent of their currency reserves, which they are forced to deposit with Agence France Trésor.
(…)”
In late ’60s my school had French Indo-China in the same place on an old globe where Walter Cronkite’s TV maps showed North and South Vietnam.
One of my U.S. GI ancestors who grew up in the Chicago neighborhood of Pilsen was killed in Papua New Guinea in 1944, 8400 miles away. Not sure if it was on the Dutch or former German/Australian side of the island.
The sooner Trump ends all entanglements with the Europeans. especially the former colonialists, the better.
Vircoulon has quite some biases. This one is funny:
” the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.”
“Eastern Europe” = euphemism for “Russia” and there is no threat from there, on the other hand France is at war against Russia. Could read about the tribulations of the 155th Ukrainian brigade nicknamed “Anne de Kiev” (who was not Ukrainan, as this didn´t exist back then, she was half-Swedish, half …Rus). This is a brigade formed and trained in France. Right now there are French troops training in Dniepr area near Kiev. And since 2022 French artillery has been shelling civilian targets in Donetsk, and did probably the shelling on the Christmas market in Belgorod last year. So what threat?
then Middle-East? what? France is re-launching Picot-Sykes policies there and supporting the Israeli genocide on Gaza. Threat from Gaza?
Vircoulon works among others for IFRI , an institute that was set by Thierry de Montbrial as a French copy of similar ones in USA.. Montbrial made stays at American universities in the 70’s and he is tied to many organizations and think tanks of the NED web.
A key element in the context, not told by Vircoulon (he works for IFRI….): since the 90’s USA has worked at kicking France out of Africa. Djibouti was a French area, then USA forced Chirac to share the ground and an American base was set there.
Rwanda/Congo: still war there. Conflict area through local proxies among France, UK, USA around mineral and energy resources by the lakes region. Brits and Yanks have worked against France.
In Sahel USA has been playing a bit with Al-Qaeda avatars, similarly to Syria.
the eviction of France from Africa by USA is rich in literature and even at mainstream magazines, for instance:
https://www.revueconflits.com/pourquoi-lamerique-veut-elle-chasser-la-france-dafrique/
The main threat to France comes from those barbarian Rooskies that just want to conquer Paris again, in order to have a coffee in a bistro, and leave.