Yves here. This piece is a useful addition to understanding the practical effects of the war in Ukraine, as in who gained economically. The study determined that the sanctions were a big backfire in terms of one of the expressed intents, that of punishing the politically most influential Russians, presumed to consist largely of the very rich, so the would revolt against Putin. Instead, many made out well by being able to acquire Western operations at bargain prices, such as brand name franchises, and launch Russian clones using those assets. Indeed, a few are allegedly more successful than the former enterprises. The Russian McDonald’s successor Vkusno i tochka (which per machine translation means “Delicious and that’s it”) apparently has better tasting food (and perhaps also an improved menu). It also acknowledges that demand within Russia has increased since the war started, again favoring top businessmen.
Mind you, that does not mean some high income Russians were not hurt by the sanctions. But my impression (and readers can correct me) are the ones hardest hit were professionals and small businesses that had strong ties to Europe, such as in had European clients or advised on Russia-Western business operations. This cohort would presumably be the most European-leaning of the Russian middle class. That group had long been problematic for Putin, since it was large enough for Putin to need its support. It was also generally Western-leaning (aspirational shopping, travel, and the Russian tendency to see itself as behind the West and its educated classes to see familiarity with European art and literature as a proof of being cultured). So having the most diehard Europe loyalists decamp to Europe and others witness the rabid outbreak of hostility to Russia across the US and Europe (such as barring Russian athletes and artists from performing) was another shock that worked in Putin’s favor.
By Simeon Djankov, Policy Director London School Of Economics And Political Science and Anastasiia Golovchenko, Research Assistant London School Of Economics And Political Science. Originally published at VoxEU
While tens of millions of Europeans have suffered from Russia’s war in Ukraine, a few Russian businesspeople have gotten richer from it. This column documents four distinct trends in this enrichment: through foreign asset takeovers at heavily discounted prices, via companies operating in import-substituting industries, beneficiaries of the war’s disruptive effects on European markets, and beneficiaries of increased domestic demand. Due to these trends, the number of Russian billionaires went up since the start of the war, while billionaires under Western sanctions got wealthier on average too.
According to the Forbes “200 Richest Businessmen of Russia” list, there were 123 Russian billionaires in December 2021, just before Russia invaded Ukraine. The same ranking on 15 December 2024 has 125 entries, while in the meantime a dozen billionaires renounced their Russian citizenship to protest the invasion or to avoid economic sanctions.
The war spurred scholarship on the imposition of sanctions and their initial effects (Cecchetti and Berner 2022, Lastauskas et al. 2023, Nigmatulina 2022). The central research question in these studies is whether sanctions would have a curbing effect on the economic activities of sanctioned individuals and their corporate entities. The preliminary evidence suggests this is not the case. The analysis in this column, using the comparison between the billionaires lists just before the war started and on the eve of the war’s third anniversary, seems to confirm these previous findings. Of the December 2021 billionaires, a third increased their wealth during the war, a quarter decreased it, few showed no change, while two-fifths were replaced by new entrants. Among the billionaires sanctioned after the invasion by the US, UK, or the EU, 40% increased their wealth, 40% decreased it (but stayed billionaires), and only one-fifth dropped off from the billionaires’ list. In contrast, among non-sanctioned individuals fully three-fifths dropped off the billionaires’ list and only one-fifth managed to increase their wealth. These statistics suggest that the economic sanctions have not had as much of an effect as might be expected. In an earlier study (Djankov and Golovchenko 2024) we showed that part of the explanation lies in the selection process by sanctioning authorities, which focused their punitive measures primarily on richer individuals. These individuals had further to fall in the wealth ratings when sanctioned. Still, the different rates of wealth accumulation or loss between sanctioned and non-sanctioned billionaires imply that the former have managed to adjust faster to the war and perhaps even benefit from it.
In this column, we attempt to discern patterns in wealth accumulation among super-rich Russians in the three years since Russia invaded Ukraine.
Foreign Asset Takeovers
As many foreign companies left Russia under threat of sanctions, some Russian businessmen profited handsomely by acquiring such assets at steep discounts. For example, the Kismet Capital Group bought Avito, a logistics and real estate company, from a Dutch investor. Kismet’s owner, Ivan Tavrin, ranks #55 on the December 2024 Forbes list, with an estimated wealth of $2.4 billion. In mining, Vladislav Sviblov (#116) acquired the Russian assets of Canada’s Kinross Gold and features in the billionaires’ list with an estimated wealth of $1.1 billion. In pulp and paper, Zakhar Smushkin (#64) and Boris Zingarevich (#62) doubled their wealth after buying out their American partner International Paper’s 50% stake. In banking, Vladimir Potanin (#5) purchased Societe Generale’s subsidiary Rosbank, acquiring not only its business in financial services, but also minority stakes in Rosneft, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, and Severstal. Victor Kharitonin’s (#20) Pharmstandard bought Henkel’s Russian cosmetics and household chemicals business when the German company exited Russia. Another beneficiary is Vadim Yakunin (#94). His company Protek acquired the Cypriot-owned Bion, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical ingredients. Vagit Alekperov (majority owner of Lukoil) became Russia’s third-richest businessperson in 2024, after the acquisition of assets left behind by exiting Western companies, including Shell’s gas station network and lubricant plant, Eni’s gas stations, and Enel’s power generation sites.
Major foreign technology companies like Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Google, and Apple suspended their Russian operations and sold off their subsidiaries. This void was filled primarily by two Russian companies: Kaspersky Lab, whose founder Eugene Kaspersky rose from #101 to #66 (+70% estimated wealth) on the back of government contracts, and Astra Group, whose founder Denis Frolov entered the list at #121 by taking over software infrastructure development for major Russian corporations and state entities.
The same replacement process occurred in consumer products. Vladimir Melnikov, owner of Gloria Jeans, jumped to #75 (+143%), expanding to 700 stores by taking over prime locations vacated by H&M, Uniqlo, and Inditex (Zara). Arsen Kanokov demonstrated the most aggressive takeover strategy, rising from #160 to #106 (+60%) by acquiring former Starbucks, OBI hypermarkets, and McDonald’s franchises.
Import-Substituting Industries
Businesses in several industries benefited from the war when Russia imposed import sanctions or foreign companies withdrew voluntarily from the market either as investors or importers. For example, Russian pharmaceutical companies secured significant government contracts. The pharmaceutical industry showed remarkable growth, with the aforementioned Viktor Kharitonin (owner of Pharmstandard) doubling his estimated wealth (#20) and his business partner Egor Kulkov entering the Forbes list for the first time (#29) with estimated wealth of $4.2 billion. Among other newcomers to the list are Eduard Netylko (#122), whose company Pulse became Russia’s leading pharmaceutical distributor, and Alexey Repik (#49) of R-Pharm, who bought an Israeli-owned plant in Yaroslav and opened the Research Lab medical centre in Moscow in 2023 for testing generics.
Another import-substituting sector is agriculture. The government responded to sanctions with subsidy programmes for import substitution. Alexander Lutsenko (#53) more than doubled his estimated wealth, purchasing Sodrugestvo Group’s Russian and Belarusian assets from a Luxembourg company. Prodimex Group’s owner Igor Khudokormov (#76) entered the list with an estimated wealth of $1.7 billion, after becoming the main producer and trader of sugar. Pavel Demidov of Dominant Group, managing sugar factories, grain elevators, and dairy plants across seven regions, entered at #115. Vadim Moshkovich (#50), the chairman of RusAgro, a major manufacturer of pork and sugar, saw his wealth increase despite being under Western sanctions.
Yet another subsidised sector is transport. The Russian government allocated subsidies to help airlines purchase leased planes. This support helped the airline S7’s owner Vladislav Filev enter the December 2024 list at #68 (estimated wealth $1.9 billion). The sector’s growth was further demonstrated by Roman Trotsenko (AEON Corporation) who moved from #63 to #48 (+17%). His transport business expanded into aircraft servicing, signing an agreement with Rostec to build maintenance bases for Sukhoi Superjet aircraft. Dmitry Kamenshchik’s DME Ltd., controlling Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport, rose in estimated wealth from #77 to #60 (+22%). Michel Litvak entered the billionaires list at #95 (estimated wealth at $1.3 billion) as OTEKO, the largest private investor in Southern Russia’s port infrastructure, operating both bulk and oil terminals at the Taman port on the Black Sea coast, received large government contracts. Sergey Shishkarev of Delo Group climbed to #119 (+25% wealth accumulation), managing Russia’s container terminals across the Azov-Black Sea, Baltic and Far East basins, along with a network of railway container terminals.
The war’s Disruptive Effects on European Markets
A third set of beneficiaries of the war includes the fertilizer industry, due to the volatility of European markets in products where Russia is a major supplier. Dmitry Mazepin (Uralchem) jumped from #150 to #57, tripling his estimated wealth. Vyacheslav Kantor (Acron Group) jumped from #33 to #13, more than doubling his estimated wealth. PhosAgro’s Andrey Guryev (#16) and his business partner Vladimir Litvinenko (#42) doubled their estimated wealth. Andrey Melnichenko (EuroChem) – while under Western sanctions – maintained his standing at #7. In addition, some of these fertilizer companies produce materials for military needs, where demand has boomed. For example, Uralchem and EuroChem supply concentrated nitric acid and various nitrates to multiple defence enterprises that produce explosives, ammunition for missile systems, anti-tank missiles, aerial bombs, and artillery shells.
Another beneficiary of the disruption in European markets during the war is the energy industry. Despite Western sanctions, Russian oil and gas companies achieved bumper profits in 2022 and 2023. For example, Leonid Mikhelson (owner of Novatekand Sibur) moved to #1, while Gennady Timchenko (Novatek/Sibur/Stroytransgaz/Transoil) became #6 on the Forbes list. Other businesspeople in the energy industry showed even more impressive wealth growth: Andrey Bokarev (Ust-Luga Oil) jumped from #59 to #33 (+56% wealth increase), Mikhail Gutseriev (Safmar) from #60 to #34 (+48% wealth increase), and Nikolai Buinov (Irkutsk Oil) from #66 to #39 (+50% wealth increase). The TAIF Group’s merger with Sibur in 2022 provided access to advanced technologies and broader markets. As a result, its owners demonstrated strong wealth gains: Airat Shaimiev (#91 to #56, +71%), Rustem Sulteev (#109 to #61, +83%), Radik Shaimiev (#98 to #58, +69%), and Albert Shigabutdinov (#111 to #59, +83%).
Increased Domestic Demand
Spending behaviour during the war shifted towards local consumption due to travel restrictions, limited import options, and Russian banks being cut off from the SWIFT payment system. Sergey Schneider (#93, $1.4 billion) entered the Forbes 2024 list as his discount supermarket Svetofor proved successful amid declining real incomes. Sergey Studennikov of Red&White, jumped from #78 to #38 (+78%, $3.2 billion), capitalising on alcohol consumption in Russia which reached a nine-year high in 2023. Igor Kesaev and Sergey Katsiev, controlling 70% of Russia’s cigarette market through Megapolis, moved from up to #25 (+38%) and #65 (+18%), respectively. Electronics retail DNS Group founders Yuri Karptsov and Dmitry Alekseev rose to #99 and #101, respectively. The Fartushnyak brothers and their partner Alexander Mikhalsky entered the list (at #71, #82, and #100 respectively) through their retail empire including Sportmaster sports stores, clothing chains O’stin, Funday, and Zolla, as well as agriprocessing holding Prodimex Agro (the former Swedish Agrokultura).
Conclusions
The publicly available Forbes billionaire list provides a snapshot of how Russia’s superrich have adjusted their economic activity after the war in Ukraine started and Western democracies imposed individual and corporate sanctions to freeze their assets and ban international travel and business partnerships. The analysis on this limited set of businesspeople shows several ways in which they pivoted to enrich themselves from the war and how the war has provided opportunities for enrichment in some sectors of the economy that were previously dependent on Western investors, imports, or technology.
One open question is whether profiting from the war is a legitimate reason for the imposition of individual and corporate sanctions. This motivation seems to be absent from current sanctions policy.
See original post for references
The Slav Epic gains another few chapters or canvases as a result of western sanctions.
I know that this article concentrates on Russia’s billionaire class and the effect that the war has had on them but nonetheless it would have been more revealing if the author had talked about the effects on average Russians. Maybe because so much of western economics is about the billionaire class makes this article seem respectable but I am going to take issue here. As an example, you could do a Luigi on every single billionaire living in America and the effect would be – an economic blip. And the reason is that a large number of them get their wealth through pushing electrons around on a screen or seeking to exploit average people even more. Same with these Russian billionaires. You could send the lot to Siberia and the economy would mostly carry on. Colour me unimpressed with billionaires.
Couldn’t agree more! And: Is “do a Luigi” copyrighted?
As Russia is essentially an oligarchy (hence Putin’s job security depends heavily on his ability to keep the boyars happy), the fact that Russian billionaires are doing well is an important data point.
Just some anecdotal non-billionaire observations as I’m in Moscow till mid-February: ordinary people seem to be doing quite OK judging by how crowded it is everywhere (shops, airports, traffic jams, restaurants, etc). Prices are up, but not drastically so and hardly more so than in Italy. Moscow is a well-lit and well-heated consumerist paradise: everything imaginable is available for sale, if you’ve got the rubles to spend. And apparently lots of Russians do. A surprising number of new cars on the roads (mainly Chinese). The newly opened subway line is convenient and snazzy. I will do a more thorough report in February once I’m back in Tuscany (assuming WW3 doesn’t break out in the meantime).
Reaching out into the far future (as all wars eventually come to an end), it will be interesting to see what happens when (if?) the sanctions are eventually unwound. To the extent that some of Russia’s wealthiest have benefited from an artificial sanctions regime, they might not be too keen on going back to business as usual. Putin might very well punt this problem on to his successor, as it will be a nasty squabble among powerful boyars with no possibility of satisfying everyone.
I don’t think Putin will run for President again. Like Lavrov, he likely is grooming an heir to carry his program. Whatever one thinks of Russian democracy, Putin has instilled a legacy of high political competence into Russian society. They know they can compete economically and as the planets preeminent military power (Infantry & Oreshnik) . (All from a nation of 140M people–less than half the US.)
Similar impressions here in Yekaterinburg… subway aside, but that is an old running sore. Moscow is obviously richer and has better infrastructure, but is also pricier. That surely hasn’t changed since I visited it in 2023.
The biggest consumer complaint in 2024 was over the price of butter (presumably in Moscow as well?). It did go up significantly towards the end, but that is not the stuff revolutions are made of.
As for the far future, I wonder if it will give rise to a protectionist lobby. Much as I distrust our oligarchs, I’d say that would be for the best. Protectionism is not always the answer, but the free trade dogma is devastating if allowed to rule unchallenged.
I agree, I follow a number of Russian Youtubers who left the country in protest of the SMO, hate Putin, and life has not been going well for them. They’ve been demonetized by YT and also had trouble getting work permits anywhere they’ve landed in the West (and they landed in the West thinking they’d be well-received, which was apparently incorrect).
This is one tangible way the sanctions have backfired for the non-billionaire class. In a way which impacts Russians inside and outside the country, since it’s evidence from those outside, who fled, fed back to those who didn’t, that the world hates them merely for being Russian, tends to validate and reinforce the official narrative.
Knowing the collective west hates you for your ethnicity is going to deeply affect your worldview, right?
There are those who also hate other Russians for their ethnicity/facets they consider an inextricable part of their ethnicity in everyone but a chosen few. Those people won’t be moved (though I think there are fewer of those anyway, in younger generations).
On the other hand, I do know some very liberal, anti-war, anti-Putin people who stayed here and have become increasingly disgruntled with the West, partly because of the stupider sanctions, sanction side-effects and anti-Russian “cancel culture” acts. It’s ultimately still a nuisance to them, but a nuisance can go a long way towards antagonising people.
Tomorrow I begin a two-month holiday in Thailand’s Phuket, with its heavy Russian presence. I’m curious to learn from as many as possible their views on the SMO, Putin, US/EU, etc. It would be a downer to learn most of them sound like BBC re-runs. We’ll see. Your prediction?
Thailand is a favorite destination of Russians who wanted to evade the partial mobilization. And gay men generally, which = upset over Putin having moved away from a somewhat tolerant stance. So I think you’ll see a lot of antipathy. I would be surprised if you found otherwise.
If it’s at all like my city in Vietnam (which has a big Russian population), that antipathy may not be readily voiced.
There is a belief (and maybe a reality) that our coastal city is infested with Russian spooks keeping an eye on the Russian expats. I know a bunch of Russians and have never heard them talk badly about Russian politics and geopolitics. Even in private, the most I get is a shrug.
I’d assumed, an article titled, “Who benefits from Russia’s war in Ukraine” was about, MICIMATT & DNC’s planet-destroying FRACKING Ponzi scheme?
Only Vox could ignore the stated motive: cutting CHEAP Rooski gas to EU’s AGW-mitigating industry to save “bridge fuel” with unsustainable fracked LNG exports.
I had the same impression and, before reading the article, drew up a quick list of those people outside of Russia who were likely profiting:
The US MIC,
The European MIC
US natural gas producers and suppliers,
Any number of corrupt Ukraine government officials,
Arms dealers who are selling to the Ukraine and who are buying from the Ukraine,
Western media personalities,
Various US politicians who have boosted their patriotic credentials,
All sorts of Western think tanks.
I’d add a couple, that’d likely get me banned for life? The notion, conditioned-response has us go
Ukraine invasion= Rooski oligarchs
instead of: whomever installed DNC’s FRACKING Cabal, to save Zbiggie & Albright’s collapsed pyramid scheme by picking WAR & destroying the Dollar & planet, to line a bunch of kleptocrat’s pockets? I’d just watched “Rules of Engagement” & “Hardcore Henry” so CEPR/ VOX 180° spin wasn’t what I’d expected to read, here (Ihor Kolomoyskyi, maybe?)
https://cepr.net/funders/
Sanctions effects outside the billionaires:
Gilbert Doctorow reliably reports on life among the St Petersburg intelligensia:
* https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2023/05/18/st-petersburg-travel-notes-part-iii/
* https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/04/28/travel-notes-st-petersburg-april-may-2024-first-installment/
* https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/11/12/st-petersburg-travel-notes-installment-four-entertainment/
D., a European-leaning professional, writes about frustrations with how internet censorship breaks fragile web stuff, cash becoming more necessary, and a desire to emigrate, but Europe not being able to offer work and compensation comparable to Russia:
* https://gp.ratthing.com/thunix.net/0/~defanor/blog/2024-10-09-news-spectrum.txt
* https://gp.ratthing.com/thunix.net/0/~defanor/blog/2024-12-25-aoc.txt
* https://gp.ratthing.com/thunix.net/0/~defanor/blog/2024-09-06-it-infrastructure-frailty.txt
Blogging remains popular in Russia :)
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Not an adequate response, but it might fit here:
The German language site by Ulrich Heyden, long time RU-correspondent. He was suspended by his German paper FREITAG after the war began in 2022 for being too “pro-RU”.
Since he can publish only online.
His German publications are here, going back to 1995 (I think he lives in Moscow since ca. 1992):
https://ulrich-heyden.de/
However this is still one with German focus.
So there is less of genuinely everyday Russian reality (regardless of Germany) than I would hope.
But better than anything else.
Besides if anything appears in German language – even long-term scholarship by sociologists (I once used to trust them) – about everday Russia you know what it will say beforehand.
e.g. Heyden made an interview with the excellent German reporter Patrik Baab who – for his outstanding book on Donbas – got kicked out illegally by the college where he was teaching. (Eventually he left after he had won the court case.)
“Book author Patrik Baab on the impressions of his new trip to the war zone of Donbass”
https://ulrich-heyden.de/article/buchautor-patrik-baab-uber-die-eindrucke-seiner-neuen-reise-das-kriegsgebiet-donbass-nachdenkseiten
The latest by Heyden is a piece about RUs war reporters who are targetted (Israel style) by SBU. So far 34 were killed. Nobody knows or speaks about this in the West:
“Another Russian journalist deliberately killed in the Ukrainian-Russian war zone”
https://overton-magazin.de/hintergrund/politik/wieder-ein-gezielt-getoeteter-russischer-journalist-im-ukrainisch-russischen-kriegsgebiet/
The link contents should be easily auto-translatable.
2/2
-Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, expatriate who has been living in Siberia since 1992 does some good reporting from there. Especially on how politics work. She publishes in all kinds of places.
Her site:
https://echosiberia.medium.com/
-When I had more time I tried to check out the L.A. podcast:
The Eurasian Knot
https://shows.acast.com/eurasian-knot/episodes
They try not to reproduce stereotypes but of course often are doing just that.
Albeit with a well-meaning intent and more in-depth than usual shows.
At least when I was listening until a year ago.
They had some guests who were not uninteresting, e.g. on historic issues such as “queer” in the USSR.
-https://natyliesbaldwin.com/ – the archive might offer insight too, goes back to 2014
-I believe among the regular commentators of Craig Murray’s site there is a well informed RU who might be open to answer a few questions on everyday life?
Compare US petroleum balance sheet 5 Jan 22 to 2 Jan 25. (report date)
Strategic Petroleum Reserve 593mbbl 2025: 393mbl
Natural Gas Liquids 5.5mbbl 2025: 6.8mbbl (per day)
Net Imports: 947mbbl 2025: -2.7 mbbl (- is net export) (per day)
Reduction in SPR did not fill all the exports! US steady imports of crude about 3 mbbl/day.
LNG up but does does not explain all the swing to exports.
US energy made off very well with sanctions.
Price at pump and heating not so well!
Then the budget “supplementals” for the MIC to backfill war reserves stocks released under “presidential” edict, as if the Dneiper were the Potomac.
The swamp seems to think Russia is run by Ba’athists, and their house Russophobes represent reality in Russia.
It appears to me that sanctions, especially cutting Russia off from SWIFT, have boomeranged and hurt the West much more than they have hurt Russia. The SWIFT cutoff and Russian asset seizure have severely damaged the credibility of the USD-based system. That, and Venezuelan gold seizure, were unbelievably stupid own-goals. The people responsible for this are mental midgets. Utterly bereft of ability to think forward.
They have hurt europe, and made it even more pliable.
The only west that matters, the usa (its elites and their supplicants,not their populace) has been empowered.
fair
Biden, Blinken, and Sullivan have been delusional in their conduct of foreign policy, nowhere more than in Russia and China.
Sanctions have clearly strengthened the internal Russian economy. A quarter century of technology transfer has rendered consumer goods fungible in terms of quality. Meanwhile markets for raw materials have expanded to places more interested in raising their own consumption than in kowtowing to their former colonizers.
The only regime that they managed to change was their own.
Yes, but in a pleasing way to them.
They claim external and internal threats (mostly through stunts) to debase their most feared enemy, their own population.
Maybe, another article: “Who Doesn’t Benefit from the US/Nato’s Proxy War in the Ukraine?” Obviously, the Ukrainians are getting the short end of the stick. And, one might presume , some, maybe a lot, of their backers are not benefiting , e.g. are the British and German,, economies stellar
There is a point for sanctions, at least some of them. One valid reason is to cut Russian war funding, which is absolutely logic for the West, if the current sanctions are doing it it’s another question. There is a second reason, the same that Western manufacture was moved to China for these and those reasons, very well entire factories from EU (and US as well) could move to Russia, even with the workers inside, maybe Russian salaries are not as low as Chinese were, but energy prices are (by far) and facilities (ports, railways) are even far better than many (if not most of them) of EU countries. Not to talk about taxes, subsidies and fiscal policies.
Of course this was not the main reason (the main reason was the belief they could down the Russian government and make a regime change), it wasn’t even one to be considered then, but it is now one more reason, and one to hold sanctions in place far long after the war ends. Russia is not that big country, but it is bigger enough than any individual EU country (far bigger than most of them), with very skilled workers, and in any circumstance the (economic) gravitation would be intense. In an alternate universe, an EU Russia would be the dominant inner power by far, as Putin said a Russia making part of the EU was not in the interest of the EU itself (nor Russian either, but this is another matter). This is partially a consequence of the ill-making of the EU, it was made for four highly industrialized and somewhat equal partners (France, FRG, Italy and Benelux), now it is a mental asylum even withit the current mandarins, a demential mixture of countries very far less common interests than the original founders and huge internal inequalities, to make a good thing of all this you need a totally different system of management and planification. What is happening now (in the EU) was totally predictable, if the US didn’t remove politicians and put in their place the actual lackeys, I mean, if people as regarded as Chirac, or Schmidt, or whover, would be in charge now, the EU would simply lick the China ass instead of US one (this was long feared by the US and is the reason they have been removing in the last 15 years anyone who could imagine he/she could ignore Washington’s will).
A correction: Russia does not need to sell energy for “war funding”. Russia is a sovereign currency issuer and could simply net spend. But its economic leadership are deeply neoliberal so they won’t go there.