There are plenty of theories of what brought down Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243 on Christmas Day. The plane, which was traveling from the Azerbaijani capital Baku to Grozny in the Russian region of Chechnya, ran into trouble over Russia and made an emergency landing in Aktau, Kazakhstan, in which 38 of the 67 people on board were killed.
The black boxes from the aircraft are currently being analyzed at Brazil’s Center for Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents, but what’s already clear is that some have already made up their minds that Russia is responsible. Media in the US and Europe were of course quick to point the finger. That’s unsurprising; they blame Moscow for every stubbed toe and spilt coffee.
What is surprising is that the president of Azerbaijan — whose country has maintained strong ties with Russia despite the with-us-or-against-us Western pressure in recent years — is on the same page as the Western media.
That marks a major shift. Regardless of whether the alleged downing of the plane was part of a new stage of provocative pressure against Moscow, an accident with Russian air defense missiles, or was some sharp-winged birds, it does appear to be doing real damage to the Azerbaijani-Russian relationship.
And that could have major implications for the South Caucasus where the pivot state of Azerbaijan is the most important transport and logistics hub in the region.
Let’s take a look at what the Azerbaijan president is saying about the incident and examine what it might mean for the region.
Aliyev’s Statements
Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev was once described in a Wikileaks US diplomatic cable as an unpredictable hothead similar to Sonny Corleone, but he has been anything but in recent years. While calmly playing both sides, he’s managed to retake Nagorno-Karabakh (whatever one may think about the method), become a major gas supplier to the EU, and maintain strong ties with Moscow and workable relationships with other players in the region.
His comments about the plane crash therefore raise eyebrows.
Before the black boxes are analyzed, Aliyev is putting the blame on Russia, which he says accidentally shot down the plane, continued to use electronic warfare against it afterwards, and then tried to cover it up. He might end up being right, but these are still bold proclamations coming from the president who just recently stood by Azerbaijan’s alliance with Russia. Here are the relevant quotes from his Dec. 29 interview with Azerbaijan Television at Heydar Aliyev (Ilham’s father) International Airport:
The facts indicate that the Azerbaijani civilian plane was damaged from the outside over Russian territory, near the city of Grozny, and almost lost control. We also know that means of electronic warfare put our plane out of control. This was the first impact on the plane. At the same time, as a result of fire from the ground, the tail of the plane was also severely damaged…
The fact that the fuselage is riddled with holes indicates that the theory of the plane hitting a flock of birds, which was brought up by someone, is completely removed from the agenda. It is possible that when the plane was damaged, when it was hit, the pilot could have perceived it as a collision with birds. Because it would probably never have occurred to anyone that our plane might be fired at from the ground while flying over a country friendly to us. Unfortunately, however, some circles in Russia preferred to put forward this theory. Another regrettable and surprising moment for us was that official Russian agencies put forward theories about the explosion of a gas cylinder on board the plane. In other words, this clearly showed that the Russian side wanted to cover up the issue, which, of course, is unbecoming of anyone. Of course, our plane was hit by accident. Of course, there can be no talk of a deliberate act of terror here. Therefore, admitting guilt, apologizing in a timely manner to Azerbaijan, which is considered a friendly country, and informing the public about this – these were measures and steps that should have been taken. Unfortunately, for the first three days, we heard nothing from Russia except for some absurd theories…
Some believe that the plane was deliberately sent off course by ground handling services in Grozny because the plane was already out of control, and there was a high probability it would fall into the sea. If this had been the case, the cover-up attempts would have been successful, and the so-called bird theory would have been presented as the most likely version…we can clearly say today that the plane was shot down by Russia. This is a fact, and no-one can deny this fact. Again, we are not saying that this was done intentionally, but it was done.
Strong accusations. Notably Aliyev does not once mention Ukrainian drones, which were being launched against civilian infrastructure in the region at the time of the plane downing. That might help explain how Russia accidentally shot at the plane — if that’s indeed what happened. It’s unclear why Aliyev doesn’t mention the possibility that shrapnel from a Ukrainian drone could have caused the damage to the plane.
While Aliyev no doubt has public opinion to worry about after such an awful incident, is it not odd that even if his theory is 100 percent correct, he wouldn’t at least try to soften the blow against his ally Russia and present Ukraine as at least partially responsible? Instead Kiev is largely getting a free pass as public anger is directed at Moscow.
For what it’s worth, Aliyev’s theory of what happened is the same as US officials quoted in American media. Both could be right, although Western media no doubt have an interest in using the incident to drive a wedge between Baku and Moscow.
The question is whether Aliyev is on board with that potential outcome? Could he be looking to play an Erdogan role where he utilizes leverage over Moscow in a similar way that Ankara has?
Viewing Aliyev’s Comments Against Backdrop of Recent Events in South Caucasus
Aliyev’s being so quick to forcefully blame Russia is a bit of a Sonny Corleone reaction, especially for someone who’s played his cards carefully in recent years. Could recent events in the Caucasus help explain his shift? Let’s examine the terrain:
Russian influence has come under increasing pressure there since the start of the Ukraine war.
Georgia looks to have fought off a color revolution attempt for now. Again it’s important to note the ruling party in Georgia is not anti-US or EU, it simply wants to maintain good ties with Russia and not be turned into another Ukraine.
In Armenia it’s another story. It continues to move out of Russian orbit politically if not economically. A US military officer is now the main adviser to Armenia’s defense ministry, the French are training Armenian units and signing weapons deals, and India has replaced Russia as Armenia’s top arms supplier. Yerevan is also seeking security guarantees from Brussels and Washington.
Moscow is observing the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process from the sidelines (it used to lead the talks), although it still seemingly exerts quite a bit of influence over Baku. The two sides are nearing the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on a peace agreement that could have major implications for connectivity at the Eurasian crossroads. Simultaneously, Türkiye and Armenia are working to normalize relations, a process that Ankara ties to Armenia’s talks with Baku.
The US has weaseled its way into these processes via Armenia and is looking to exploit the situation to weaken Iran and Russia.
There are hang ups to deals between Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Armenia, including Baku’s demand that Armenia remove an implicit claim on Nagorno-Karabakh in its constitution.
The most challenging issue in Armenian-Azerbaijani talks, however, is the establishment of transport links and specifically who will control them.
The Battle for Control Over Logistics Corridors in the South Caucasus
The so-called Zangezur Corridor – which would stretch parallel to Armenia’s border with Iran and link Azerbaijan to its Türkiye-bordered exclave of Nakhchivan — is the missing link in what would be the shortest land transport route between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. And key to many involved parties is not only the shorter distance but the fact that it’s one of the few routes that entirely bypasses Russia.
The corridor would also be a key intersection point of other burgeoning North–South and East–West routes.
The Middle Corridor, for example, which passes from China through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye extending to Europe could see major upgrades with the opening of Zangezur.
And so outside involvement and pressure steadily builds on Armenia and Azerbaijan .
The main issue holding up talks between the two is Point 9 of the trilateral statement signed between Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia in 2020 following the Second Karabakh War, which reads:
All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions. Control over transport communication shall be exercised by the Border Guard Service bodies of the FSS of Russia.
Azerbaijan continues to insist upon this point, while Armenia no longer wants Russian border guards present, and instead argues for solutions like Russia monitoring the corridor from afar. How exactly that would be done isn’t yet clear.
The Armenian prime minister is making statements about entrusting Zangezur’s security to foreign private forces. These ideas are coming as Armenia removes Russian border guards.
On Wednesday at Armenia’s request, the Russians withdrew from the only official Armenian-Iranian crossing, which followed the departure of Russian border guards from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport in July,. Since 1992 Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Iran have been the responsibility of Russian troops.
Meanwhile, the number of EU guards on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border keeps expanding.
Both Azerbaijan and Russia are critical of the EU mission creep, and Baku continues to insist that Yerevan agree to the deployment of Russian border guards along the Zangezur Corridor.
Could that be changing?
Any agreement between Baku and Yerevan (and its Western backers) that excludes Russia would be a major power play from the Turkic axis and a perceived win for the US-Israel axis as it would sideline Russia and Iran.
How the latter two would respond remains to be seen, but what’s clear is how the Middle East conflicts and Ukraine war are bleeding into the Caucasus. It’s easy to see how it could become part of a deal that helps temporarily ease the tensions among the conquering parties of Syria by continuing to focus on areas on overlapping interests or get dragged in nonetheless.
Here’s a brief look at key players positions in this theater of The Great Game:
Iran
Pretty straightforward:
Regional peace, security and stability is not merely a preference, but a pillar of our national security.
Any threat from North, South, East, or West to territorial integrity of our neighbors or redrawing of boundaries is totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.
— Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) September 5, 2024
From Iran’s perspective the Zangezur Corridor is a nightmare. Neocon think tanks in Washington have long dreamed of using Azerbaijan to destabilize Iran — as they have for weakening Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Ethnic Azeri citizens who are estimated to make up 15 percent of the Iranian population.
Tehran’s concerns about Azerbaijan are further aggravated by Tel Aviv’s support to Azerbaijan (more on that below). Tehran also faces the following economic fallout from the Zangezur Corridor, according to Security & Defence Quarterly::
-
Azerbaijan used to pay 15 percent of the 350 million cubic metres of gas sent to Nakhchivan through Iran as a transit fee. With the opening of the new corridor, Iran may lose this profit.
-
An agreement on sale of gas was signed between Türkiye and Iran in 1996. Based on that agreement, Türkiye has been buying gas from Iran for years. While Türkiye pays Iran US$490 for a thousand cubic metres of gas, it can buy the same amount from Azerbaijan for US$335.
-
If a gas pipeline is built from Azerbaijan to Türkiye through this corridor, Iran’s loss of gas revenue may be huge.
-
The planned gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Iran to Türkiye then to Europe was frozen in 2017 because of financial disagreements. Turkmenistan can now deliver this gas to Europe via Azerbaijan.
-
The importance of Iran’s pipeline to Armenia has also decreased.
The Strategic Council of Foreign Relations in Tehran, whose director is Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs Kamal Kharazi, condemned the construction of the Zangezur corridor, indicating that the corridor has been introduced as NATO’s “Turan corridor,” a project ostensibly supported by Israel and NATO, which aims to foment ethnic unrest in the areas of Iran inhabited by Turks. As per the aforementioned Council, NATO’s Turan corridor is supposed to directly bring NATO onto the northern border of Iran, the southern border of Russia, and western China and lay the groundwork for their disintegration.
Moscow and Tehran are reportedly set to sign their strategic partnership in the coming weeks, which will alter the calculus of all involved parties.
Türkiye
Türkiye has been the driving force behind many of the Caucasus cooperation projects in recent years, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic Pipelines connecting Azerbaijan to Europe via Türkiye.
Erdogan and friends view the Zangezur Corridor as bigger than all that and a key piece in the country’s rise as a Eurasian Great Power. Here’s what Ankara envisions:
- A gas pipeline from Baku to Türkiye through the corridor.
- Increased leverage in negotiating gas prices with Iran.
- Resurrecting the Trans-Caspian pipeline and transporting that gas through Türkiye to Europe (A pipeline through a Nakhchivan corridor could help boost supplies to Europe to upwards of 31 bcm, although that would be years away, and ironically, due to its heavy investments in the Azerbaijani oil and gas sector, one of the bigger beneficiaries of any Brussels-Baku deals could be Russia. Azerbaijan is even importing more Russian gas itself in order to meet its obligations to Europe.
- A logistics corridor stretching to China.
- A railroad line from Türkiye to Nakhchivan could make Türkiye a regional transit hub in addition to an energy one.
The US-Israel-EU
The US wants to sideline Russia and Iran. The EU does what the US wants.
Therefore, the West (including Türkiye) tries to ensure the flow of resources of the South Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe bypassing Russia and Iran and reducing their influence, as well as that of Beijing. As always, the US permanent state is in lockstep with Israel, and it’s important to note that despite the surface friction between Ankara and Tel Aviv, in the South Caucasus their interests once again align.
Israel supports pan-Turkic ambitions through the Caucasus because Tel Aviv views Turkish influence as preferable to that of Iran — even if it potentially sets “Greater Türkiye” and “Greater Israel” up for a future clash.
Israel too continues to exert influence in Azerbaijan through its role as the country’s main weapon supplier, including air defense systems, all the latest in drones and surveillance tech, as well as cooperation in cybersecurity. Israel is also Azerbaijan’s leading oil importer, a trade which continues to be partially facilitated by Türkiye despite the country’s ban on trade with Israel — or what Erdogan calls a “Zionist terrorist organization.”
China
Beijing wants to expand its influence and open or expand more trade routes. China has signed strategic partnership agreements with Tbilisi and Baku and is pursuing major infrastructure projects, such as that port in Georgia, which causes so much heartburn in the US.
Russia
Russia wants to maintain a dominant role in the Caucasus, including in trade corridors, which become even more important due to Western isolation efforts. It was long in Moscow’s interests to have a simmering conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as that allowed it to play peace broker and maintain a presence, but it is increasingly being pushed out of these processes.
It still has a military base in Armenia, as well as peacekeepers, and border control, although their numbers are declining at Armenia’s request, and the military base could be next.
Armenia
The corridor would be a boon for Armenia — as long as it doesn’t alienate Russia, which it largely depends on economically. From the Emirates Policy Center:
Russia has also kept Armenia in its orbit through maintaining economic ties. The trade turnover between the two countries increased from $2.6 billion in 2021 to $7.3 billion in 2023. That has significantly ensured the growth of Armenia’s GDP by 12.6% in 2022 and by 8.3% in 2023. Armenia declares that it is not interested in breaking relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), affirming plans to actively participate in the organization despite the fact that Armenia has frozen its membership in the CSTO and is reducing its activity in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Moreover, the EAEU-Iran free trade agreement boosts Armenia’s role as the only EAEU member bordering Iran. Close economic ties also give Russia leverage, as many Armenian producers depend on its market, allowing Moscow to impose restrictive measures if needed. Additionally, EAEU membership prevents Armenia from signing an Association Agreement with the EU, creating a long-term economic deterrent against turning to the West.
Despite the economic reliance on Russia, Armenia has largely been infiltrated by American interests and could likely be made to go along with a deal that fits with the US-Israel’s goals.
The key is Azerbaijan, which much like Türkiye effectively plays both sides. It enjoys ties with Russia primarily in energy and logistics while upping its natural gas deliveries to the EU. It has a strong weapons-for-energy relationship with Israel that it uses to help balance its relationship with Iran.
Aliyev’s reaction to the downing of flight J2-8243 could point to a willingness to take some more chances with Russia. Like Erdogan, Aliyev might reasonably believe that Russia needs it at this time and is not in position to take a strong stance or retaliate. Moscow must cooperate with Baku on trade connectivity due to the West’s attempts to isolate it, and that’s a reliance Azerbaijan might now be keen to exploit.
Washington has long tried to resurrect animosity between Baku and Moscow. The US ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mark Libby, who previously worked in Baghdad and as deputy chief of mission and chargé d’affaires at the US Mission to the EU among other posts, was hastily dispatched to the country in December of 2023. One of his first actions was to visit the Alley of Martyrs dedicated to those killed by the Soviet Army during Black January 1990 (these old USSR wounds are gifts that just keep giving for the US, e.g.,“The Holodomor Industry” in Ukraine). Where that obvious ploy failed, the newer wound caused by Russia’s alleged downing of the flight could succeed.
In conclusion, it’s still too early to answer cui bono, but if actions accompany Aliyev’s accusations then we could be looking at another win for the US-Israel axis.
Aliyev’s lightning offensive and retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh was buttressed by Turkish and Israeli weapons, and a humiliation for Russia whose interposition forces proved toothless. It is the main reason why Armenia is completely dissociating from Russia, since from its point of view the military defense agreement proved worthless (even though it never covered Karabakh as Russia recognizes it as part of Azerbaijan and even Armenia never formally recognized the Artsakh). While he still wants friendly relations with Russia, he is no longer beholden to it like his former Soviet apparatchik father was.
Don’t underestimate the emotional impact of a plane being shot. The downing of MH17 has turned the Dutch into one of the biggest supporters of Ukraine.
Who downed MH17?
Wikipedia says russia, but then wk says alot of things, like they need money to keep knowledge free
Despite the fact that there is no evidence that Russians did it and plenty of circumstantial evidence that Ukrainians did it, eh?! By that account the Dutch should be in fact tooth and nail against Ukraine.
Should Russia have defended N-K/A, even though Armenia does not acknowledge its existence? I think the ownership of that loss is Pashinyan’s alone.
Russia didn’t act because the Armenian government pointedly did not ask for assistance and then went out of their way to cooperate with on the ethnic cleansing of NK.
The Kremlin is once again shooting itself in the foot with its inept PR game and its inability to call the “dear partners” out for what they have done.
The plane was only shot down by Russia to the extent that it might have been a Russian SAM that fired (and even that is not certain — there could well have been MANPADs smuggled there, but the Kremlin is keeping silent about it because it would be too embarrassing to admit that internal security is so broken).
But in reality the downing was caused by the Banderonazis in Kiev and the “dear partners” in the West — the former launched the drones, the latter provided the targeting, and it was all planned very carefully to coincide with the plane landing, precisely in order to cause that kind of accident.
And that is if the drone was launched from Ukraine in the first place, which is not at all certain — it may well have been launched from Georgia/Azerbaijan. Same thing for all the other drones that reached Vladikavkaz, Grozny and Kaspiysk.
So why is the Kremlin not blaming Ukraine for it and is instead apologizing? It would be so obviously beneficial in international PR terms, plus it is also the truth about what happened?
Anyone who cannot answer that question does not understand the SMO and why on the third year of it NATO and the Ukronazis are making another push, right as we type this, into pre-war Russian territory, while the “Supreme Commander” is nowhere to be seen yet again, not even to comment on it, let alone use the abundant means at this disposal to stop it immediately.
I regret to say that I agree with most of your comment. Especially about internal security being broken (I think the MANPAD angle is a real possibility). I’m in Moscow these days and the honest truth is that you wouldn’t even think that there’s a nasty little war going on nearby. Security at public gathering points is near-zero, even less that it was when I was here a year ago. I don’t want to see Russia adopt Israeli-style counter-terrorist measures, but c’mon guys…..get with the program, especially as UKR agents/terrorists can blend into Russia seamlessly. And Russia has been handing out passports to UKR citizens like cotton candy at the Ohio state fair…..don’t even get me started.
Let the investigators do their jobs and then let’s see where the chips fall. But so far, this fiasco has been a major fail on Russia’s part. Aliyev is a sharp operator and will play this one for all it’s worth.
Hats off to Conor for another fine summary of a complex situation.
I note Bobby Kennedy‘s daughter-in-law lost friends on PanAm 103. I know how she feels.
That USS Vincennes was rewarded by Reagan for shooting down an Iranian airliner does not make the loss of PanAm 103 any more palatable.
I doubt Azerbaijan will get too worked up about this and has so far not explained how Raisi‘s helicopter crashed after leaving Baku for Iran after a US plane arrived in Baku
Things happen
Probably not so much overturning the board as Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev using this as leverage to get some sort of concessions from the Russians. I would be fairly confident that he has extreme mistrust in the EU getting themselves involved in his part of the neighbourhood as he sees what has been done to Armenia and has no interest or desire to have the same done to Azerbaijan. Certainly he has no desire to see his neighbourhood set on fire like the west has done in eastern Europe and the Levant nations.
Azerbaijan had Israel as an arms supplier but also Turkey. Now Turkey and Israel are on opposing sides in Syria he has some difficulties.
He also has gas moving through Russian pipelines into Turkstream and Iran a close friend of Armenia not thrilled about Azerbaijan relationship with Israel or death of Raisi
Azeri oil transited through Turkey is keeping Israel’s lights on. Supposedly Turkish controlled HTS has given away all the strategic areas of southern Syria to Israel in the last month while liquidating Shi’a, Druze, Christians, and Alawites.
So for now, I think he has no difficulties with either of those allies. However, Russian weapons have proven to be far superior to Turkish or Israeli weapons systems in the fighting in Ukraine.
This is similar to my thinking too, and for several reasons.
For one, consider that the two biggest flash-points on earth right now are Ukraine and Syria. The first is an abortive attempt to detach a state from a neighboring great power, based on a delusional and obsolete form of nationalism. The second was a stodgy, cynical, family dictatorship (also based on obsolete nationalism) sitting on simmering religious and geopolitical fault lines. Of all the countries on earth, Azerbaijan is arguably the only one that simultaneously resembles both of these things.
My guess is that behind the scenes, Aliyev is feeling nervous about the precedents set by both Ukraine getting dismembered and Assad in Syria falling.
Obviously, he’s not going to be happy about a civilian plane being shot down either. Even a broken clock is right twice a day so maybe the Western media is right about this one (though I’m very suspicious of the timing). But even if it’s a set-up, I don’t find it surprising that if he’s going to lash out, it will be at whoever is easiest to blame at first.
I’m just throwing this out there as a hypothetical bone for the commentariat. But consider both the Grozny and S. Korea crashes in this light. We live in the age of advanced mechanical bird warfare (i.e. drones) and electronic warfare as elements of ever expanding hybrid warfare (the on and off the battlefield. There is an unsubstantiated but mention-worthy possibility that these events were a connected and entirely regrettable series of tit-for-tat actions. As in Western interests (NATO partisans) downed the first one to make convenient hay for the narrative cycle, and Eastern interests downed the JEJU flight as an asymmetric response.
Just to add some things that aren’t already in the comments: all sides are definitely trying to press their advantage around the Zangezur Corridor. The more I think about it though, assuming the governments are keeping their eyes on money and tonnage, I wonder if it’s a bit overblown.
Business plans may accept that there is much ruin in a nation, but Europe is in structural decline in so many ways. I’m not a logistics person, I wouldn’t know how to start running the numbers, but I imagine what Azerbaijan could gain by playing nice with INSTC dwarfs their share in any potential corridor through the Armenian highlands. I doubt there would be many takers for Zangezur as more than a backup to the Belt & Road route through Tehran either. You would have two additional mode changes just to use the Caspian, and the whole point of a trade route is to hit the biggest markets, not cut them out.
On the matter of energy, that discount for Azerbaijani gas is pretty tasty from Turkey’s standpoint, but there’s also the matter of capacity:
From the EIA
Even if you toss in all the natural gas from a hypothetical Greater Turan, you’re not breaking even with Iran’s output, and that’s despite half the planet doing everything it can to suppress Iranian production. Seen that way, Turkey’s desire to access other gas might actually be more sincerely defensive than it first looks; while it’s been stymied so far, if Iran ever gets enough pipelines to Pakistan and India in place, South Asia could probably soak up much of the production from Iran and Qatar.
Finally, on the Azeri separatism issue, I don’t have enough on the ground info to say anything with certainty. I have heard first-hand that (like much of the middle-east), the Azerbaijanis are very fond of Turkish pop-culture, and the nationalists definitely lean more towards Turkey. I think the US & Israeli belief that this gives Azerbaijan the advantage by pushing separatism is like most Western beliefs though, shallow, self-interested, and likely to backfire. Saddam Hussein made the same assumption about Iranian Arabs, which ended very badly for him, and Iranian Arabs are almost definitely more disadvantaged than Iranian Azeris are.
Without getting too into the weeds of it, it completely misses how deeply intertwined the Azeris and Persians are in Iran, and they have been since at least the Safavids, arguably even the Seljuks. Most Azerbaijanis may not be very outwardly religious either, but if Azerbaijan decided to start a war with Iran over it, I would actually give better than even odds that Iran winds up absorbing Azerbaijan very similarly to how Russia is annexing the Donbass.
I see this tragedy in a different light. Southern Russia and Ukraine is a war zone. The Azerbani airline was flying into a war zone. And blundered into a battle. Not a good place to be.
If this is what happened. Russia should simply acknowledge the fact. And move on.
Iran has just shifted one of their strategic radars to cover the border with Azerbaijan so they are aware of their danger. Israel used this section of the border to get some of the few missiles past for their last attack on Iran so should find it harder now.
The details of the coming agreement between Russia and Iran will make many things clear. These small countries letting themselves be used in this manner are taking a great risk because Mr Putin won’t live forever and neither will Mr Erdogan. Current ambiguities will not last.
What do they think was fired at the plane? An anti-aircraft missile? Bullets? Or something else? I don’t know much about anti-aircraft weapons, but wouldn’t a missile strike have crashed the plane immediately, versus making some holes in the tail? Yet the plane was able to turn and fly all the way back across the Caspian Sea before crashing.
Thanks Conor, this summary is great!
Like others, I wonder about the possibility of a MANPAD, and given that other commercial flights have been shot down over this war zone – I not going to fly over it, that’s for sure.
This is just the side effect of dragging on the war for so long. Other countries don’t care Russia is doing this to minimize cost to the society. They just see the long war as an opportunity to get something from Russia. Of course this is encouraged by the West as part of its hybrid warfare.
Greater-Turkey and Greater-Israel? The two powers in the region that have committed genocide?
Match made in heaven.
And how does that Armenia Turkey connection exactly work on that note?
None of this makes sense.
But then what in geopolitics ever does.
p.s. interesting again that the US loves to feast on a “Holodomor Industry” but not on an “Aghet Industry”.
I seem to remember reports that the plane circled for about 2 hours after flying across the Caspian before crashing. Seems very odd if its been hit by a missile?