Germany held an election yesterday. It went about as expected. The biggest surprise continues to be how the majority of parties all support some flavor of ongoing belligerence towards Russia — a policy that is destroying Germany.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its best result in any national vote (20.8 percent) since it was founded in 2013. The party which started out more as an anti-EU, anti-NATO party and became more ethno nationalist and now favors both an end to conflict with Russia as well as strong ties with the US, looks likely to be excluded from government according to statements from Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leaders.
The pro-war, capital-friendly CDU came in first with 28.6 percent and will likely head the next government with former Blackrock executive Friedrich Merz at the helm.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s centrist Social Democratic Party (SPD) was rewarded for its disastrous governance of the past four years with its worst national election result (16.4 percent) in more than a century. Yet its stance on “supporting” Ukraine remains unchanged.
And the warmongering Greens lost a few points from 2021 but remained mostly steady with 11.6 percent of the vote.
As of Monday morning in Berlin the anti-war Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) is at 4.97 percent, which means the party would just miss getting into the Bundestag. Some BSW members are crying foul:
The Germans abroad referenced by De Masi cannot vote at embassies or consulates and postal delays might have prevented their ballots from arriving on time. Euronews, for example, reports on abroad voters still waiting for their ballots on Thursday, which even if returned immediately via express mail would have been unlikely to arrive before the 6 pm Sunday deadline.
Here are some possibilities on the future governing coalition from Deutsche Welle:
To form a government, a majority of at least 316 seats out of the 630 seats in the Bundestag is needed. A coalition between CDU and AfD would have been possible numerically, as both parties easily pass this threshhold, adding up to 358. But according to conservative leader Friedrich Merz, this is out of the question.
That leaves Olaf Scholz’s SPD as a possible partner, which together with CDU scrape by with 328 seats. A bigger majority could be formed if CDU were to add the Greens to the mix, reaching 416. But the CDU’s junior partner CSU has repeatedly ruled out governing with the Greens.
Over the coming days and weeks a coalition will likely be formed, voter shifts will be dissected, and campaign promises will fade away.
There will be plenty of time to examine that, but here I’d like to pose a few questions. Will the new chancellor and the new government be able to confront reality and begin to seek a path out of Germany current …predicament? How could they do so? And are any of the parties that will be seated in the upcoming Bundestag even asking the right questions that would lead to possible answers?
Germany’s House of Mirrors
Germany’s political elite largely represented by the four parties (the CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and the Free Democratic Party, which fell below the five percent threshold to be seated in the Bundestag) remain stuck in the “rules-based order” transatlantic fantasyland championing their democracy and liberal values while demonizing Russia, reality is at the gates.
It’s increasingly difficult to square that paradigm while remaining obsessed with supporting Israel’s genocide campaign and criminalizing speech (notice JD Vance in his widely celebrated Munich dress down didn’t criticize Germany’s heavy handed approach when it comes to this area of free speech).
But more than anything it is an economy circling the drain, which is largely the result of the war against Russia, as well as hitching itself to the US empire with a more combative stance against Beijing.
And for all the talk of a US-Russia peace, what do we have so far? Let’s cut away all the headline-grabbing transatlantic political fights and look at the ways Germany and Europe remain on autopilot on a journey to becoming the next Ukraine:
- The EU is using the current US-Ukraine split for a renewed push to repurpose cohesion funds and/or get Eurobonds. The idea of joint EU debt in order to fund militarization is reportedly “picking up steam.”
The madwoman in Berlin, foreign minister Annalena Baerbock let the cat out of the bag on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference that $700 billion is coming. She told Berliner Zeitung the following:
“We will launch a large package that has never been seen on this scale before,” said Baerbock. “Similar to the euro or the [Coronavirus] crisis, there is now a financial package for security in Europe. That will come in the near future.”
According to Baerbock, the deal will be announced sometime after the German election. The package is believed to include money for ”military training, the acceleration of relief efforts, arms deliveries and what Europe could offer for security guarantees.”
Merz, too, is reportedly on board. He had this to say following yesterday’s victory. From DW:
The favorite for the future German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, sharply criticized Donald Trump’s administration and urged Europe to distance [itself] from Washington during a post-election panel airing on state broadcaster ARD.
“I am communicating closely with a lot of prime ministers, and heads of EU states and for me it is an absolute priority to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we achieve independence from the US, step by step,” Merz said.
“Step by step” is doing a lot of work there. Merz was after all recently floating the idea of buying F-35s from the US.
How will the European public, which has largely soured on the war, react to more power going to Brussels and loads of debt in order to keep losing to the Russians?
The humiliation from the US has been so thorough — self-inflicted by Europe but humiliating nonetheless — while the propaganda against Russia so relentless for years, I wonder if we’re going to see a rally around the EU flag moment similar to the time after the official start of the Ukraine war in 2022. The hatred and fear of Russia certainly remains strong:
- Where will the EU get most of the weapons paid for from the proposed $700 billion package? They’ll turn to the US. There will be little benefit for EU economies. Bloomberg notes how if increased military spending were funded with tax increases, or cuts in other areas, military keynesianism won’t be in the cards:
One factor limiting the stimulus to be had from rearmament is that Europe buys much of its military gear from American suppliers. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report estimated that 78% of purchases come from production outside the EU—and 63% from the US alone. That means any “multiplier” effect of stepped-up spending on growth would be low. What’s more, recruiting more Europeans to the military and defense industry would bring down unemployment, possibly fueling inflationary pressures that would lead to higher interest rates. In all, Rush calculates that EU economic output might be higher by about 0.6% in 2028, “which implies a modest nudge up in GDP growth in the next few years.”
- Neoliberal dream. Germany’s railway system is in a state of collapse, it and other EU countries are now cutting sick benefits, and other social programs as the costs of “supporting” Ukraine’s national suicide and the EU’s economic suicide add up.
And yet the priority is more weapons to fund an unwinnable war and prevent the Russians from conquering Europe — a threat for which there is still no evidence and makes no sense if you spend ten seconds thinking about it.
But on the plus side from the perspective of the European vultures, it provides cover to continue dismantling the welfare state and privatize everything from infrastructure to social services.
- For a time US natural gas exporters get to continue to profit. Following the Munich Security Conference humiliation, the EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič flew to Washington promising more concessions from Europe in order to please the empire’s capital. Among the potential offers from the EU: axe EU methane emission rules that would punish the US LNG industry while ponying up evermore money to buy more from the US, cut tariffs on US-made cars, and get tougher on China.
- Oh and there’s the potential that should the US and Russia eventually enforce a peace, American companies will in the not-too-distant future return to Russia. European ones? Not until the EU swallows some humble pie. And it will be the US that gets to pick over the scraps of whatever is left of Ukraine (Washington is targeting more than just rare earths in Ukraine’s real assets: pipelines, ports, nuclear power, and key infrastructure). The EU can deal with the fallout of the failed state on its and Russia’s borders.
The US and Russia could work out some rapprochement, which some in Washington believe will help with other wars in the Middle East, as well as the looming confrontation with China.
Meanwhile, the EU continues to piss into the tent, and should talks between Washington and Moscow fall apart, Europe’s militarization is setting it up to become the next Ukraine. That would certainly “extend” Russia as the famous 2019 RAND report suggested. At the very least, Europe’s doubling down on suicidal belligerence ensures that it remains walled off from the Eurasian project for the foreseeable future, and the US can focus its efforts on blowing up other bridges in the world’s heartland.
One would have thought that the US would have had to stay in the heavyweight fight against Russia in order to continue to profit off of Europe’s misery, but this line of thinking might have underestimated the EU’s impotence. As of now, it looks like the EU countries are content with ongoing vassalage despite the increasing abuse coming from Washington.
What Is Needed to Get Germany — and Europe — out of This Mess?
The New York Times ran a Friday guest essay by one Konstantin Richter entitled “Germany Is in Big Trouble, and Nobody Knows What to Do About It.”
What? There are plenty of people who have been saying for the past three years (at least) that Germany was heading down a ruinous path.
To change course all it would take would be a minimal amount of courage to imagine Germany as part of Eurasia, break with transatlantic slavishness — including quitting NATO, repair ties itself with Russia, take up China on its offer to merge the Belt and Road Initiative with Europe’s Global Gateway, and forge stronger ties in other areas.
Rather than spend untold billions on arming against some imaginary Russian invasion, the EU could use that money to rebuild its economies with the help of Russian energy, Chinese investment, and integration with Eurasia. Yet, there are no signs this is being considered — at least not yet.
Why, for example, are European heads of state not requesting their own bilateral talks with Russia? There is nothing preventing them from doing so. Why not resurrect the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe? At some point — one way or another — Europe is going to have to come to terms with Russia’s desire for a new European security architecture agreement.
Do any of Germany’s leaders look capable of such a task? Are they even thinking about it? Are any in Europe for that matter? Maybe Orban?
What’s on Offer Instead?
Well, let’s take a brief look at the positions of the parties in yesterday’s election.
Merz and the CDU. They represent the status quo with regards to Russia and atlanticism with more financialization to boot. Merz is the author of 2008 book “Dare more capitalism” and dare he does. The former Blackrock executive loves himself some privatization and deregulation. German workers are likely to see their living standards continue to decline under a Merz government.
Merz likes to talk about Germany taking on a leadership role in Europe. What does that entail?
Here’s a taste:
International fugitive and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he had a “warm conversation” with new German chancellor Friedrich Merz. Despite an ICC arrest warrant, Merz said he would invite Netanyahu to Germany, according to Netanyahu’s office.
— jeremy scahill (@jeremyscahill) February 24, 2025
Here’s what the European Council on Foreign Relations expects:
Should Merz triumph, the new German government will have a mandate to pursue a foreign policy based on integration steps concerning defence spending and debt-sponsored innovation policies. Eventually, Germany will be less likely to aim for the broad supranational alliances it previously developed to ensure no state was left behind. Instead, a ‘two-speed Europe’ is likely—although it come at the cost of alienating Germany’s core EU partner, France.
…apart from Merz, the CDU’s leaders are generally younger—the powerful leader of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, is 49; the informal leader of the CDU’s conservative wing, Jens Spahn, is 44. Politically socialised in a reunified Germany, this new generation refers to their country as a clear leader in both Europe and the EU. Their parents were born after the second world war, while their grandparents—who might retain some connection to the post-war order—have long since passed away. Consequently, they lack the ties which defined previous generations of German leaders. To them, restraint is a foreign policy concept not rooted in personal conviction.
AfD – Who knows? What Wolfgang Streeck said last year in an interview with Die Zeit about the AfD rings increasingly true:
I don’t know a single consistent thought from [Bjorn] Höcke and his followers. It’s all just cynical symbolic provocations.
Lately that lack of consistency means taking a more friendly turn towards the US. The party that started out as an anti-EU and morphed more into an anti-immigrant has long been hated and feared by the German political-media establishment. Yes, it has a small core support from neo Nazis, but the real reason was its anti-NATO stance, brutal honesty about Berlin being a “slave” to the US, and a desire to make nice with Moscow seeing as it is in the national interest of Germany to do so.
Well, last month the AfD adopted a motion in support of Germany and the US building closer relations, and it has embraced of Elon Musk and the Trump administration. So one can expect it to be an extension of the US rebrand in Europe. The shift also shows up in polling. German public opinion begins to take a more realistic view of the country’s relationship with the US:
But the AfD supporters, unlike other German voters, are softening their stance towards Washington:
Streeck, in that interview with Die Zeit, continued:
Conservatives on the right believe in a natural hierarchy, a world in which the better ones are there to tell the less good ones what to do. But I am an unconverted egalitarian: all people are of equal value. Furthermore, right-wing conservatives believe that there can be no peace in this world: there are Schmittian existential enemies with whom we can only live if we don’t let them live. The latter has become a central theme of the American neocons and the European NATO conservatives, including our foreign minister.
Zeit: Are you comparing Annalena Baerbock to Höcke?
Streeck: If you say that this war can only end when we hand Putin over to The Hague, then that means final victory: German tanks in Moscow. And I say we should think about that again.
And that leads us to…
The Greens
At least we know what we’re going to get here: more crazy, exemplified by Baerbock.
Annalena Baerbock is apparently still angry about Russia’s WW2 defeat of Nazi Germany. Baerbock fixates on the Oder River, where her Nazi grandfather fought against Russia. Imagine the anti-Russia hatred in the Baerbock households during Annalena’s formative years. https://t.co/esk9rOsgZ0 pic.twitter.com/ujWx2IV3JX
— ⏳Towhee 🌏☮️ (@amborin) February 21, 2025
The Greens are already angling to get into the next government with the party’s Bundestag leader, Britta Haßelmann, telling DW that the Greens are now more of a governing party than an opposition party. Wonderful.
SPD. Representative of the “center.” Largely on board with Germany’s neoliberal war path, but might get there slower than the Greens and CDU.
Die Linke. The Left Party collapsed in recent years after abandoning nearly all of its former working class platform in favor of identity politics in an attempt to appear “ready to govern.” The party saw a resurgence in response to the AfD’s rise, as well as a renewed focus on economic issues. It also softened key foreign policy stances including dropping any pretense of opposition to NATO, and there’s no evidence that the party is prepared to consider what is necessary to get Germany out of the hole it has dug for itself.
BSW. Sahra Wagenknecht from the party that bears her name might be the one politician who grasps the enormity of Germany’s challenge and what it takes to tackle them. She’s been pushing the balancing of ties between the US and Eurasia and rebuilding German industry while also curtailing immigration. Alas, as of Monday morning in Germany BSW is only at 4.9 percent — just short of the 5 needed to get the party’s anti-war voice in the Bundestag.
If Merz and company are serious about moving forward with hundreds of billions for militarization, it’s hard to see how the situation in Germany doesn’t go from a disaster to devastation. Even without that colossal misstep, it still appears as though the situation is destined to get a lot worse before it can get better.
It all brings to mind something Glenn Diesen wrote the other day:
… idealism is dangerous as unrealistic demands and uncompromising moral slogans are destroying both Ukraine and Europe. A key rule in political realism is that refusing to accept the world as it is will result in devastation.
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Once Trump’s team settled on a plan regarding Ukraine-Russia-Europe events and policy changes have been moving so fast these recent weeks, I’m half expecting Trump to announce an alliance with Russia against Ukraine and Europe. I jest, but never expected such quick US reproachment towards Russia. But Trump’s swift reproachment with Russia comes with a warning: Why is he doing it? So that the US can next try to drive a wedge between Russia and China. He motives I suspect are not entirely pure or innocent as he presents.
Trump campaigned in 2016 in favor of better relations with Russia but was convinced/coerced into continuing anti-Russian policies. Russiagate was powerful in this regard.
So perhaps his turn toward Russia is another part of him doing everything that the permanent bureaucracy and the media stopped him from doing last time. For better or worse.
Good observation on driving a wedge. But Brian Berletic, always a voice of sanity, believes this is anything but a rapprochement with Russia. He believes the US intends to continue the war but is trying to rework the division of labour. As always he is meticulous about backing himself up with sources direct from the parties themselves. Check out his post of two days ago with Angelo Giuliano, titled “Is There a Real US-EU Split?” Warning: it’s a long one – 2 hours.
I trust Brian on military issues; on geopolitics, not so much. Experts such as Jeffrey Sachs differ with him, in major ways.
This is ad hominem. You need to address the particulars of his argument and try to debunk that and not engage in a personal attack in lieu of a rebuttal.
I’ve watched Brian’s podcast and his interviews here in BKK. He tends to become adamant about US “actions”. His military background is extensive enough but his grasp of geopolitics often seems naïve, rather idealistic. He often “protests too much”.
Sounds good to me.
Seems more to me that the Trump administration is trying to get Europe to take over the Russia Ukraine fight to free up the US to spend more resources on losing WW3 to China.
The whole story of the rare earths (which Ukraine doesnt have) and other natural resources being committed to a $500 billion dollar fund seems like a way for the US to come back down the road and claim Russia is “stealing” things which the US has already rightly stolen for itself!
EU leaders have flocked to Kiev today to announce their undying support. The Germans now seem determined to give Ukraine taurus missiles to fire directly into Russia. Starmer now ‘guarantees’ that Ukraine will join Nato. World War III to come?
Only if Trump agrees to send US troops into the Ukraine which he does not want to do, no matter how many times countries like the UK and France try to trick him into it. If countries like the UK, France and Germany sent troops into the Ukraine, the Russians have already said that they would attack them which is why they won’t do it without total US backing. Numbers would be low in any case. I believe that with troop rotations in mind, that the UK has said that it can only send in a hodgepodge force of some 3,000 troops as part of such an effort so that is about a brigade’s worth. You couldn’t garrison a major city with a force that size. They would probably be outnumbered by the local police force.
Thank you, John.
The UK’s stuffed. Let’s get it over with. Northwood and High Wycombe are down the road.
Perhaps a warning shot on Chequers first?
Thank you. Good idea.
I had some friends visiting over the weekend and showed them Chequers and Wotton.
I’m sure the Russians have the GPS coordinates
51.74357064219684, -0.781010480432043
Do they seem determined to do so? (sending Taurus to Ukraine and launching them towards Russia). I though it was nothing but cheap talk by Merz moths ago. Not having warranted support from the US which in turn has stopped launching ATACMS i believe this will not happen. It would be extremely stupid given Europe is absolutely unprepared against Russian retaliatory attacks with whatever they have including the Oreshniks.
It´s just filling empty space. I have seldom seen such a blowhard as Merz. Even worse than Scholz or even Habeck who has actually turned out to be a giantly dishonest asshole considering his insulting behaviour towards his own ministerial staff.
I have got accustomed to a little trick – if you wanna know a politician´s true colours go back to their early years and look what they did and how. And you will mostly see a ridiculous, cowardly clown.
At least Lindner is honest. He promised not to enter another coalition with the Greens and will do what he said
They are going to punish the establishment by voting for it again. And has the public really soured on the war? They seem to not like the economic repercussions of the war, but the war course itself remains popular.
There is no innocent population that was forced to go down this path by a treasonous political elite. Most people actively want this, they are just bitching and moaning about the personal discomfort that follows from their own actions.
A note from Germany: I don’t think a lot of people already realized the internal contradictions of the EU’s- and especially Germany’s policies. As the polls in the post show and also from personal interactions in the comment section of Die Zeit, there is still a majority in Germany fully behind Project Ukraine (and Israel, most likely out of a bad conscience regarding the 3rd Reich and not a rational assessment of the genocidal nature of Israel’s reaction to a cowardly terror attack by Hamas.). A lot of people still buy the excuse that severing the connection to Russia’s gas was necessary and actually forced on us by Russia and not a conscious choice by our politicians, that switching to more expensive LNG is the price we have to pay for freedom – even if it puts us further down the path of irreversible climate change -, and that the sanctions severely impacted Russia’s ability to fight a war, even though the evidence for this is not forthcoming, as Europe is still the 2nd largest buyer of gas from Russia (after China) and also a major buyer of Russian LNG. The discount on Russian oil is almost back to zero, while in Germany 7000 jobs are being destroyed every day (according to an IG Metall union session I visited a few days ago). A CDU/SPD coalition will not change the course. They seem as convinced as the plebs that Russia can still be beaten on the battlefield, completely unaware that Ukraine’s main problem is now a lack of capable soldiers, in addition to a lack of weapons. They might think that sending Ukraine weapons capable of striking deep into Russia will solve the problem, not realizing that this will only exacerbate the conflict. We are ruled by morons. Unfortunately, the other parties here in Germany are not much better. The AfD is just a reactionary, neoliberal sham, who now cozy up to Trump & Musk. The Greens are fully on board. The Linke and BSW are too insignificant to make any difference. Merz will use the “schwarze Null” (balanced budget requirement) and the “imperative” for an arms race with Russia to slash social spending. Great times ahead.
What is clear from the German election result is that the country is still divided into east and west Germany.
After the asset stripping of eastern Germany to profit the west, the far right moved into the area and started to blame foreigners for all their woes, rather than the real culprits which was the German state and German corporations. This suited the west because it diverted attention from the real cause so they colluded to support the lie of foreign workers and not corporate asset stripping. Thus east Germany became the new home for the fascists of west Germany, the type of politics that the east had banned because of its destructive divisive nature.
Now Germany is divided between the far right and the not quite so far right, not because thy are supported but because the left has been so heavily infiltrated by the right (the Greens are now a pro war party). It is said that the turnout has been high at over 80% but the result is still fractured and the German election rules have left many parties marginalized and unable to campaign effectively (criticism of Israel can result in bans). What is clear is that this election leaves the country deeply split and the people strongly opposed to the state
The final tally for BSW — the only voice in the center-to-left spectrum that opposes further German military support for Ukraine — is 4.972%, missing by only 14,000 of more than 49.6 million votes cast (82.5% turnout) to hit the 5% required to enter the Bundestag (good graphics and numbers freely available here). This is a tragedy. Had they made the mark, the probable center-right aggressively Russophobic minority government would be more difficult to achieve.
Not really, it wouldn’t have mattered since in that case only a CDU/SPD/Green coalition would have had a majority of seats in the parliament, and all 3 are fully on board with Project Ukraine.
The blind march to war is so disheartening. It feels like 1914 around here.
A CDU/CSU coalition with SPD is natural given their convergence on the top policy agenda items. (The Greens fit quite well too.) Given the progress of AfD, would it make sense for the CDU/CSU to form an pact with the SPD for future elections?
Where are my manners? Thank you, Conor, for this valuable summary. My comment was already in mod when it dawned on me.
Thank you, Conor.
Further to the dodgy grandfathers, how about AfD toff Beatrix von Storch’s.
Beatrix von Storch
You couldn´t make up a better name for a shady character in some spy B-movie.
“Storch” of course meaning the bird stork.
“Why not resurrect the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe?”
Aha, Conor Gallagher, because the OSCE had found extensive violation of human rights in Ukraine — including torture chambers and disappearances. The OSCE had to tone down those unfortunate findings after it became necessary to prove that the Russians were just plain old crazy Asiatics.
Meanwhile, going forward, the horizontal bar chart: Which founding / core country is not like the others, at all? Italy.
The Italian bar contrasts strikingly with the bars for Poland and Germany, which are similar indeed. So you have two rather unsuccessful countries spoiling for a fight.
As to the Denmark bar, something is rotten in Denmark. Let us pray that akvavit consumption drops.
And Italy is going its own way, as I watch the news and read the papers. Everyone from well-established Giuseppe Conte and most Five Stars, plus Marco Tarquinio in the Partito Democratico, to commentators like Alessandro di Battista and supposed alt-right (but more of a populist anarchist) Pubble are pushing Italy in another direction.
And then there’s the Pope Factor.
No wonder Giorgia Meloni is at CPAC telling the Elect that Italy is for sale and for plunder. Long term, she’s short term.
PS: Noting the AfD’s figures, and noting Linke’s resurrection, I am reminded of a map that I saw today of results.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_German_federal_election#/media/File:2025_German_federal_election.svg
This is what happens when the oh-so-rational Germans have economic integration (merge and purge) without considering social and political integration. The old East asserts itself.
Bavaria is extremely conservative. Conserving what?
The right to have illegitimate children? According to the Catholic Encyclopaedia, 14.01% of all births in Bavaria around 1890 were illegitimate, second to only Austria with 14.67%.
Given her petite stature, she cannot possible see too far ahead… Some very high heels would be useful. Could get to be Putin’s height…
Judging by the trajectory of the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, AfD will fill the following function:
– say no to NATO until the vote when they immediately say yes. AfD will not help Germany to leave this destructive organization.
– do not care about sovereignity because they voted yes to the defence agreement cooperation = surrender your territorial sovereignity. AfD will not tell the USA to deoccupy the country.
– use immigrants as a scapegoat for all the ills in the country and attract voters with this argument
– continue to inflict neoliberal pain on society to maintain and/or increase voter support because of immigrants causing all ills of the world
– toe the lines of the zionist lobby and the US and neocons
Goals stated to SD by a zionist lobbyist https://x.com/Johnpatrick500/status/1889794786959241408
2024 petitions from Sweden Democrats (SD)
Petition from SD to the Swedish government to withdraw support to UNRWA
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/motion/indraget-bistand-till-unrwa_hc02225/
Petition from SD to move the capital to Jerusalem
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/motion/erkannande-av-jerusalem-som-israels-huvudstad_hb0259/
Petition from SD to cut all aid to Palestine
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/motion/upphorande-av-bistand-till-palestina-och-en_hc02386/
Petition from SD to cut diplomatic relations with Palestine
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/skriftlig-fraga/diplomatiska-atgarder-efter-palestinskt-stod-till_hb111057/
These far-right parties are definitely completely detached from the idea of sovereignity.
Larry Johnson put some pen to this too:
Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democrats (CDU), is a war hawk and is likely to push anti-Russian policies. Fortunately, with only 28% of the vote, he lacks a mandate to up the ante and risk war with Russia. The political fissures that divide the German people mean that their country, once considered a powerhouse in Europe, will become irrelevant.
https://sonar21.com/german-election-results-signals-more-chaos-ahead/
It’s now been two decades since I last visited Europe, and I spent quite a bit of time there in the 80s and 90s: I longed to return, but now I’m thinking I’d rather keep my memories as they are.
As a Romanian, I say that it cannot happen to nicer people.
Prior to WWII, Germany forced Romania via the Vienna Dicktat to cede the Northern Transylvania to Hungary, which was the downpayment to have Hungary join in the coming fight against USSR (likely it was not in the small print, otherwise Hungary would have rather taken the chance to stay neutral and maybe get the Austrian treatment after war).
Then, with the non-agression treaty with USSR, Germany winked-winked, nod-noded for USSR to take over Basarabia from Romania (and of course the free hands in the Baltic and Finland, which was to be just provisional). This ensured that Romania would join Germany in the attack against USSR in June 1941, to recover lost territory.
And the attitude towards the genocide in the Occupied territories…
It cannot happen with nicer people…
I don’t think anyone in Eastern Europe is feeling sorry for the Germans.
German ideological infections are highly resistant to rationality treatment. However, the national recovery from near death in 1945 was quite vigorous. We can only hope that the return of realism in Germany does not require a similar degree of suffering. Germany needs to pull the EU together and lead an independent foreign policy that establishes economic ties indifferent to U.S. geopolitical machinations.
Thanks.
Only one wrinkle I feel, overextending Russia will not. The 2019 RAND paper is lacking data and insight into the reality of Russian planning and conduct. In fact I would suggest it´s the other way around EU overextending especially with commitment on the Pacific frontline being expanded.
The Russians have stepped up production of hypsersonic systems among others for this very reason. With current Zircon covering almost all of Europe. The entire arsenal is well known to readers here. And that´s just the tip of the iceberg. Almost none of what RAND suggested will work. And where it did with Syria, in the long run we will see how it actually plays out for the perpetrators of that mess. Besides by now Russia appears to have found a new base with Algeria. Not to speak of BRICS etc.
But as I said last night, as Connor stresses above – there is noone in Germany in sight who admits this or would act according to it.
Germany.is.doomed.
I can only hope BSW will create a grassroots basis with doing streetworkers´ jobs to work up from there. Like the Communist Party did in the Autrian city of Graz. As of now they are “our last hope” to quote Princess Leia.
And the massive swing voters movements are proof of how insecure people truly are.
With China having the Russians´ back and Russia being self-sufficient on every possible level RAND was producing fairy-tales. Besides that report was based on data at least 6 years old. wow. That´s like a lightyear away.
Thanks Conor for your essay on the “alternate reality” Germany lives in.
The main topic of the election campaign was not – as someone with a glimpse of common sense would have guessed – the accelerated deindustrialization process bleeding Germanys industrial sector dry or the destruction of the – in former times – very reliable german energy system or the destructive proxy war fought in Ukraine costing hundred thousand of lives and billions of Euros but the stupid idea of firewalling the AfD (a party with roots in hayekian neoliberalism as well as national conservatism) out of the parliamentary process. With the “firewall” the entrenched interests of the established party cartel manages to keep away the AfD from the possibility of having immediate influence on government politics. The other party which could have been a threat for the existing party cartel – the left-conservative BSW – was smeared as “puppets of Putin” by the MSM and – to make things worse – undermined itself by agreeing to government coalitions with cartel parties in Thuringia and Brandenburg.
Not only were economic questions sidelined during the election campaign, a huge part of the populace seems neither interested in economic policy nor informed about the dire straits the national economy is in. And in the short run there will be no change of this: The MSM – one of the main tools of the professional-managerial caste – is still very good at “manufacturing consent” and upholding the “alternate reality” Conor described so precisely.
p.s.
quick look into the 2019 RAND study and its initial verdict of the Russian military which I need not comment here further. Just looking into their quoted sources reveals how they are missing the crucial points albeit trying to not denigrate the enemy. Which with faux respect fed false hopes.
What is most striking: how little Western – publicly available – studies have changed since.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3063.html
“(…)
The present-day Russian military is a capable, albeit uneven, fighting
force. Its ground and air forces can dominate the country’s near
abroad militarily, (…) The Kremlin also possesses a survivable strategic nuclear deterrent consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-based ship-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers
with air-launched cruise missiles, along with a formidable arsenal of
tactical nuclear weapons. Thanks to decades of sustained investment,
Russia boasts advanced air defense capabilities. Compared with the
United States (or the Soviet Union), Putin’s Russia has a limited ability
to project force, but defeating it on its home turf would be extremely
challenging and costly. Moreover, it maintains these capabilities with
a defense budget comparable to that of several weaker military powers,
(…)
Western observers disagree over the level of Russian military leaders’ acceptance of such
concepts as “hybrid warfare” and such proposals as “escalating to deescalate”
with nuclear weapons, but the 2014 seizure of Crimea demonstrated
the Russian military’s capability to wage an unconventional
military campaign.
(…)
While much Russian military equipment still dates back to the
Soviet period, Russia launched an ambitious modernization program
at the beginning of the decade seeking to provide the military with
“70 percent modern equipment by 2020.”18 While the post-Crimea
budget crunch has forced the Kremlin to scale back these targets, generous
funding in the early 2010s enabled substantial progress.
(…)
The Russian militaryindustrial complex has shown it can produce modern weapons, if only
in relatively limited numbers. Certain systems favored by Russian decisionmakers
have benefited from decades of sustained investment and
are world class. The S-400 air-defense system and T-14 Armata tank
are advanced systems with no U.S. counterpart, as is Russia’s family of
mobile ground-based strategic nuclear launchers.
(…)
Much of Russia’s defense industry has been neglected since Soviet times and is in desperate
need of capital modernization. Critical production facilities and
suppliers are located in former Soviet republics that are now hostile
to Russia, particularly Ukraine, necessitating costly substitution programs.
Like the rest of the Russian economy, the military-industrial
complex is afflicted by corruption, although this might not be particularly
bad by Russian standards. Moreover, much of the defense
industry is state-owned via large holding companies. Both Russian and
Western critics often charge that isolation from market forces is a critical
weakness of the Russian military-industrial complex, but it is far
from clear that this presents a vulnerability that could be exploited by a
cost-imposing strategy. Corrupt and inefficient as the Russian defense
industry might be, the cost-control problems afflicting U.S. defense
procurement are so large that the Russians are often highly competitive
on a cost-comparison basis.
Potential Vulnerabilities
For all their strengths, the Russian military and defense industry still
suffer from many vulnerabilities. Even though ground forces make up
the bulk of the Russian military and are still using outdated equipment,
the Russian defense budget deemphasizes them in comparison
with other services. While the quality of the average Russian soldier
and his equipment is improving, it still lags considerably behind U.S.
standards. The need to recapitalize the defense industry and the inadequacy
of available funds to do so have helped perpetuate these critical
weaknesses. Such areas as surface shipbuilding are in parlous condition,
contributing to an uneven modernization. Furthermore, the scientific
and technical capital underlying Soviet military strength has atrophied,
as have the human resources available to the Russian militaryindustrial
complex. Finally, military spending has been more protected
from the effects of Russia’s budget crisis than have other areas of the
state budget, but it is likely only a matter of time before economic realities
catch up with Moscow’s military ambitions.
(…)”
In fact the truth of how little they understood in 2019 (and apparently might still do to some extent) is buried in the very last 1,5 pages of the 277 page study. Even if not all assessments in the entire study are wrong they did regard Russia as a leightweight. With some horrible consequences to everyone but Russians.
Implications and Recommendations for the US Army
“(…)
Ultimately, the task of “extending” Russia should not fall primarily to
the U.S. Army or even the U.S. armed forces. Indeed, the most-promising
ways to extend Russia—with the highest benefit, lowest risk,
and greatest likelihood of success—probably fall in the economic and
information domains rather in the military domain. Moreover, as this
study has argued, Russia is not seeking military parity with the United
States and might simply choose not to respond to some U.S. military
actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence), while other U.S. military actions
(e.g., posturing forces closer to Russia) could ultimately prove costlier
to the United States than to Russia. Nonetheless, there are at least three
major implications of this work for the U.S. Army.
First, the Army should rebuild its expertise on all things Russian,
including foreign area officers, linguists, and intelligence analysts. If
Russia does indeed pose a long-term threat, then the U.S. Army needs
to develop the human capital to engage in this strategic competition.
Second, the Army should consider investing—and encouraging
the other services to invest—more in the handful of capabilities
(e.g., ATACMs, IFPC2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other
systems designed to counter Russian A2AD capabilities) that could
extend Russia. The U.S. Army also might consider spending some of
its R&D resources on less mature, more futuristic systems (e.g., swarm
unmanned aerial vehicles or remote ground vehicles). While these
measures would likely be insufficient in and of themselves to extend
Russia, they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and could augment
a broader whole-of-government policy. Third, even if the U.S. Army is not directly involved in “extending
Russia” per se, it will play a key role in mitigating the consequences.
As already mentioned, all the measures to extend Russia incur some
degree of risk. As a result, enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe
and increasing U.S. military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin or
active protective systems for Army vehicles) might need to go hand-inhand
with any move to extend Russia as a way of hedging against the
possibility of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.
(…)”
A key difference that is missing is the aspect of morale: it is very clear to Russian front-line fighters why they are there and what they a doing it for, where as aside from the remaining true-believing Azov troopers who are simply thrilled to be killing “orcs,” most Ukrainian troops would likely rather be elsewhere.
I don’t have the stats, but I know that the USA forever wars helped demolish many a hundred, two hundred years family traditions of serving the nation by serving in the military. Many of the actual combat vets I’ve encountered from these seem pretty messy in the head and often have fairly high disability-ratings from the VA. I haven’t come across one yet who thinks “it was worth it.”
Training will only carry one so far, and it’ll usually click on when SHTF, but over the longer-term motivation from fear alone will not carry one through– it becomes burn-out.
What do our soldiers fight for, especially if there is no god, tradition is dead, and that those who run their country actually hate them?
edit:
I am seriously sorry, I seem to not learn that the correct spelling is CONOR!!! Not CONNOR as in Terminator´s LISA CONNOR.
You probably mean Sarah Connor. ;)
Thanks Conor for the excellent article. 🙏
Germany´s biggest alternative news site NACHDENKSEITEN seems pretty devastated. They have 3 articles alone today filled with the tune of the doomed.
“The BSW’s election defeat – a political disaster”
““I don’t know any parties anymore…!” – or: Requiem for a country”
“Peace is the big election loser”
It is interesting though that Germany´s pro forma most influential evening news TAGESSCHAU
writes:
“Millions of votes not represented in the Bundestag – “A little more than one in seven votes in the Bundestag election went to a party that will not be represented in the next Bundestag. According to the results of the counting of all constituencies, around 13.9 percent voted for a party that failed to clear the five percent hurdle. That corresponds to around 6.9 million votes”
Add to that 17% of non-voters. There is a lot of potential there for BSW.
BERLINER ZEITUNG with a commentary on Habeck:
German version
https://archive.is/x2kV1
The end of Robert Habeck: His power was more important to him than his political ideals
After the election, the Green Party member quickly found the culprit for his failure: Friedrich Merz. But that is not true. It was Habeck’s will to power. A commentary.
by Anja Reich
On the day of Robert Habeck’s defeat, one could once again experience what had caused him to fail. It was election Sunday, between 6 and 7 p.m., the first projections were in, the Greens were at 13.3 percent, later they slipped to 11.6 percent, far below the expectations of the man who had stood to become Chancellor for the Greens.
In interviews, Habeck was asked about the reasons for the Greens’ poor performance, and he had – well – an interesting explanation: Friedrich Merz is to blame. His vote in the Bundestag with the AfD. Green sympathizers had wished that he would never speak to the CDU again, said Habeck with a concerned expression. But that was not possible for him, Habeck. Because: “I can’t do that. I’m polarized differently, we’re polarized differently.” And then he added: “In that respect, we are now victims of Friedrich Merz’s voting behavior.”
Robert Habeck – a victim of the CDU?
The Green candidate for chancellor – a victim of the CDU? Because he stood by Friedrich Merz in a difficult hour? Against his own conscience? Anyone who followed Habeck’s election campaign must have thought at this point that the Vice Chancellor was suffering from memory loss.
Let us remember what really happened after the much-discussed decision on the “Influx Limitation Act” on the last day of January this year. The CDU had introduced the proposal for the law to the Bundestag, knowing full well that the AfD would also vote for it. But contrary to expectations, not only the SPD and the Greens voted against it, but also some members of the FDP and the Union. The law failed. And Robert Habeck ? Seemed to be in a good mood.
He wanted to become Chancellor, to beat Merz; he had started the election campaign in November with this unrealistic goal. And it became more and more unrealistic. The CDU was at 30 percent in the polls, the Greens around 15. But now, after the vote with the AfD, people took to the streets, even former Chancellor Angela Merkel stabbed Friedrich Merz in the back, the churches protested against him, half the country, it seemed.
Robert Habeck wanted to depose Friedrich Merz from his poll throne
Habeck’s tone towards the CDU suddenly became harsh and relentless. He accused Merz of breaking taboos and breaking his word. “Not once, but twice. Not by accident, but on purpose. Against all warnings,” he shouted at a campaign event in Cologne. The CDU candidate had disqualified himself for office. Habeck even had his election campaign changed: “One person. One word” became “One word broken. Hundreds of thousands of people.”, “Word instead of word broken,” “Habeck instead of Merz.”
Just a few hours after the Bundestag vote, Habeck’s anti-Merz ad was already appearing on Spiegel Online and other websites. Something was happening, he announced, “from the depths of the soul of the country.” He wanted to become chancellor, to topple Merz from his poll throne. That was Habeck’s mindset. And nothing else.
But the Greens’ figures did not improve, and Habeck’s plan to beat Merz did not work. And again he changed his strategy, his tone, drafted a ten-point paper himself to limit migration, offered himself to Merz, and said on Markus Lanz about the CDU’s vote with the AfD: “Mistakes can be healed.” There is more that the SPD and CDU have in common than what divides them.
If not chancellor, then at least minister in a government with Merz and Scholz. That was the new plan. And many of Habeck’s supporters must have realized by now: The former do-gooder, the Greens’ great hope from the last election campaign, seemed to be primarily concerned with one thing: himself, with his position. Having power was more important to him than political ideals.
Habeck’s last hope was the success of the BSW – of all things
That is the case with many politicians. But Habeck’s bad luck was that the Left, led by the young East German Heidi Reichinneck and the former Greenpeace activist Jan van Aken, showed that there was another way: the uncompromising fight against the right, the commitment to left-wing ideals and green politics. The Left’s poll ratings shot up. The Greens warned against voting for them. In vain. In the end, the Left were the winners and the Greens the losers. And Robert Habeck also lost his direct mandate in the Flensburg-Schleswig constituency – to the CDU candidate.
His last hope was, of all things, the Sahra Wagenknecht coalition, which Habeck had accused of being “bought by Russia” during the state election campaign. If the BSW had received more than five percent, the CDU would have needed the Greens as well as the SPD for a coalition, and they would have taken on government responsibility – and Robert Habeck would probably have become a minister. But the BSW did not make it. The CDU does not need the Greens for the government. On Monday, Habeck announced that he no longer wanted to take on a leadership role.
An end that seems almost symptomatic of a man who for a long time no longer seemed to know what he stood for – or against. In the end, he was not dependent on the outcome of his politics, but on a party he despised.
Regarding that comment about some BSW members crying foul over the vote of Germans living abroad – as one of the members of that particular club I’ve seen a noticeable amount of anecdata from Germans mostly living in the US and Canada that their ballot documents didn’t arrive in time or at all. Apparently that’s not unusual based on comments from some members of a forum I’m on, but it seemed worse this time.
The way voting works for Germans abroad is that you need to get in touch with the town you were last registered to vote in and they’re supposed to mail you the ballots. The excuse this time around was that the local election offices didn’t get the final candidate lists until very late and had to rush the ballots to the printer and out the door. Given how long it can take to get a letter from Germany to the US, I’m expecting that a fair number of people will have received their ballots too late to send them back in time or will get them after the election. Not that this is a massive surprise for me as I’ve lived about half my life outside Germany and I didn’t get the impression that the bureaucracy is set up to deal with their citizens living abroad very well, at least not during the last quarter century.
Did I vote? No. I fell foul of a law that states that one has to petition the Bundeswahlleiter for permission to vote if one lived abroad for more than 25 years. That tends to take a while from what I heard (would’ve been my first time) and with the short notice for the election, it wasn’t even feasible to go through that process and have the documents sent out in time.
In NJ you can vote from Europe by email (with a printed copy as backup).
I am disheartened by BSW’s near miss from entering the Bundestag — Sarha Wagenknecht offered something otherwise missing from the German political scene.
Instead it looks like more “radical centrism” and a continuation of the policy failures of the German political establishment. Where there is no vision, the people perish …
I am disheartened as well. I reckon we’re not the only two. Wasn’t she regularly polling in the teens?
It looks like the flashy new Linke’s youth scene drained Sarah’s support just in the last months. Very disappointing, but one can hope that the trad Left will become useful again.
Following the #BSW hashtag on Twitter a bit, I also read people saying that in recent months die Linke had received a bunch of positive press, extra coverage which apparently was unusual.
Just speculating, but no doubt this media campaign was designed to draw people away from the BSW.
AfD is quite useful to the establishment centrists and to the oligarchs, as has been explained in comments above. BSW and any serious popular left movement is a threat.
“…And yet the priority is more weapons to fund an unwinnable war and prevent the Russians from conquering Europe — a threat for which there is still no evidence and makes no sense if you spend ten seconds thinking about it.
But on the plus side from the perspective of the European vultures, it provides cover to continue dismantling the welfare state and privatize everything from infrastructure to social services…”
“…The US and Russia could work out some rapprochement, which some in Washington believe will help with other wars in the Middle East, as well as the looming confrontation with China….”
And if no war with China materializes, all that money was thrown at “AI” hype which is nearly ALWAYS presented needing to be urgently adopted “becuase China.”
Three years in, couldn’t understand then and can see consequences now. I cannot fathom why anyone would favor fighting a war you are going to lose.
FWIW Macron arrived at the White House today. Trump did not receive him at the entrance.
Adam Tooze – a few of the statistics are in English via FT
Deutschland 2025 – A live (and complicated) democracy.
https://substack.com/@adamtooze/p-157799674
p.s. Democracy? Well I guess you can spin it in any way.
Who can fail to be charmed by Lord Bebo’s clip of the delightful Annalena’s expression of joy at finally achieving the goal her grandfather shared with the Mustache Man and for which he so bravely continued to fight for at the Oder even after Germany’s unconditional surrender? I hazard that it takes a real man, a prime example of pure blooded German manhood, to continue committing war crimes long after the war is over. He, too, was probably a vegetarian who never killed a living creature for food.
Regarding Annalena Baerbock’s €700 billion (yes, euros) for Ukraine, that money really looks like its coming. I know some people consider this to be some Russian disinformation, so here is a link to a pro-Ukraine news site telling the story:
https://united24media.com/latest-news/europe-eyes-unprecedented-eur700-billion-military-aid-plan-for-ukraine-5981
(though the site credits Berliner Zeitung as the source)
It isn’t just the war that is in favor of this package. The military support package is about the same size as the €750 billion NextGenerationEU (NGEU) programme, which was set up to help EU countries cope with the Covid pandemic, and was financed with EU common debt. The NGEU programme increased the EU debt from 50 billion to 300 billion, which not only made larger investments possible, but also made the EU a bigger player in the bond market. The NGEU programme will end in 2026, so the EU needs another similar package to maintain its economic influence.
“Regarding Annalena Baerbock’s €700 billion (yes, euros) for Ukraine…”
I thought this was sarcasm, but evidently a serious Western European proposal. To me, the reality would be self-destructive madness.
On the hidden transformation of the German LEFT PARTY as the cause for its sudden “success”:
German daily JUNGE WELT:
https://archive.is/28kXW
From: Issue of 25.02.2025 , page 3 / Focus
2025 federal election
Left strengthens Western ties
Triumphantly back: The Left Party owes its return to the Bundestag primarily to a change in preferences among the urban “progressive” electorate
By Nico Popp
If the Left Party’s 4.9 percent in the 2021 federal election marked the transition from the latent to the open party crisis, then the 8.8 percent (4.35 million votes) in the early federal election in 2025, or so it seems, represent its conclusion. Two months ago, after years of political and organizational decline and at three percent in the polls, still almost written off, the Left Party has managed a comeback that no one expected. No other party has made such gains in the election campaign, no other has gained so many members.
The Left Party had actually based its election campaign on winning at least three direct mandates, because a second vote result of more than five percent was still considered almost unattainable at the turn of the year. In the end, the party won six constituencies directly, four of them in Berlin, where Die Linke was also the strongest force in terms of second votes with 19.9 percent. Co-party leader Ines Schwerdtner won the mandate in Berlin-Lichtenberg, Gregor Gysi in Treptow-Köpenick, Pascal Meiser in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Ferat Koçak in Neukölln. Neukölln is the first “western constituency” that the party has ever won. In the Berlin-Mitte and Berlin-Pankow constituencies, the Left Party candidates were only narrowly defeated by the Green candidates. The former Thuringian Prime Minister Bodo Ramelow won the Erfurt-Weimar-Weimarer Land II constituency, Sören Pellmann again won the Leipzig II constituency (the only Saxon constituency that did not go to the AfD).
What happened here? Clearly, in the middle of the ongoing election campaign, a political constellation arose that was extremely favorable for the party, but which the party did not bring about itself. This constellation has resulted in considerable parts of the urban “progressive” electorate, who have voted for the Greens for decades (and in some cases for the SPD or Volt in the 2024 European elections), but who nevertheless steadfastly maintain the self-image of being “left,” making the transition to the Left Party – albeit only at the last minute and against the very specific background of the election campaign focusing on the interrelated issues of migration and dealing with the AfD.
Pascal Meiser’s victory in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, which had long been considered a Green “model constituency,” is exemplary in this respect, and was not anticipated by anyone in the party just a week or two ago. This development is particularly striking when contrasted with the finding that the election campaign focused on social policy issues in the party’s old strongholds, the eastern German states or a former 50 percent constituency such as Marzahn-Hellersdorf, has not led to a return to previous highs. Here, the party has at best slightly improved on the comparatively poor result of 2021.
The sudden and steep rise was driven by significant gains in the western German states (and especially in the big cities), where the party has recently performed disastrously. On Sunday, however, it also climbed above five percent in Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein, i.e. in large states that were previously considered particularly “difficult” for the party. The party was particularly successful here and elsewhere in constituencies with university towns, where the Greens have long been the main winners. In the Münster constituency, for example, Die Linke received an above-average 12.5 percent of the second vote (plus 7.5 percentage points), in Bonn 12.5 percent (plus seven), and in Freiburg 13.9 percent (plus seven).
Overall, the individual state results of the Left Party in the West and in the East are no longer so far apart. This is a first in the party’s history, in which the success (or failure) in a federal election always depended on the result in the East German states and in which, even in the phase of the party’s initial successes, such as the 2009 federal election, the gap between the results in the West and the East was very large – not to mention the PDS years, when the votes were almost exclusively obtained in the East and repeated attempts to “expand” to the West failed. This chapter now seems to be finally closed – the former strongholds in the East are no longer there, but the party has prospects of approaching ten percent of the vote in the western German states under favorable conditions. The focus of the party’s voters and members has shifted to the West.
With this election, the party apparatus has achieved two long-held goals: breaking into the “progressive” electorate of the Greens and SPD and at the same time reducing dependence on the old strongholds in the East. The attempt to stabilize this state of affairs by further forcing political and programmatic adjustments to the new clientele will not be long in coming.
addendum to the article:
Background: More crosses
The early federal election has at least brought about a moderate repoliticization: the non-voter bloc, which had grown to almost a quarter of those eligible to vote in federal elections, has shrunk somewhat. 82.5 percent of those eligible to vote – 49.9 million – cast their vote this time (2021: 76.6 percent). This is the highest voter turnout since the GDR was incorporated into the Federal Republic in 1990. The lowest voter turnout was recorded on Sunday at 77.7 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, the highest at 84.5 percent in Bavaria.
According to the preliminary results published by the Federal Returning Officer on Monday, the Union won the election. The CDU and CSU together received 28.6 percent of the second votes, while the AfD, which almost doubled its 2021 result, received 20.8 percent. They were followed by the SPD (16.4 percent), which fell by almost ten percentage points, Alliance 90/The Greens (11.6 percent) and the Left Party with 8.8 percent. The FDP, which played a key role in bringing about the end of the traffic light government in November 2024, is no longer a member of the Bundestag with 4.3 percent. It has lost about two-thirds of its 2021 vote share.
The BSW, which entered the race for the first time in a federal election, narrowly failed to clear the five percent hurdle. On Monday, the Federal Returning Officer reported 4.972 percent of the vote (2.46 million votes) for the party; in the end, it was about 13,400 votes short. The party performed above average in eastern Germany – best with 11.2 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, where it also finished ahead of the Left Party (10.8 percent). The party also achieved double-digit results in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. It is striking that the party only received 9.4 percent in Thuringia, where it had received 15.8 percent in the state elections in September 2024 – so entering a coalition with the CDU and SPD cost a lot of votes. Another key factor in the narrow failure was that the party remained below five percent everywhere in the west, with the exception of Saarland. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the most populous federal state, 4.1 percent of voters voted for the BSW.
In the Bundestag, which has shrunk to 630 seats as a result of the traffic light coalition’s “electoral reform”, the Union parties have 208 seats, the AfD 152, the SPD 120, the Greens 85 and The Left 64. In addition, there is a single representative from the SSW. Apart from the AfD, with which no party wants to work together, the Union, as the strongest force, only has a parliamentary majority with the SPD.
Popps article analyzes the surge of the party “The Left” correctly: “considerable parts of the urban “progressive” electorate, who have voted for the Greens for decades (and in some cases for the SPD or Volt in the 2024 European elections), but who nevertheless steadfastly maintain the self-image of being “left,” making the transition to the Left Party”. Estimated 700.000 voters flocked from “The Greens” to “The left”. That means: it is a borrowed success. The “Left” abandoned their old working class base in exchange for the academic salon bourgeoisie. The latter tends to look for moral purity instead of material interests based on the respective position in the economic process. It is to expect that this “greened left” will act like “The Greens” and say yes to “project Ukraine”, to “no borders/no nations” and to the neoliberal-authoritarian EU.
On election night a fried reminded me of the “demise” of the Kipping party wing. Later I realized that actually it is not the temporary past demise that is of interest but its partial fulfillment now. THIS was Kipping´s idea: sneak away GREEN voters to the LINKE. After GREENS betrayed their promises this project materialized with one smart move: They “woked” the LEFT without calling it that.