Despite roughly a decade of stories about a split between President Recep Tayyip ErdoganErdogan’s Türkiye and the US, ties appear as strong as ever. Erdogan continues to make bold statements against Israeli expansionary aims, but beyond the rhetoric Türkiye has done nothing but aid in the Palestinian genocide by continuing to ship oil and other goods to Israel. Türkiye is now dealing with the aftermath of the arrest of Erdogan’s biggest political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, on corruption charges and accusations of supporting terrorism. And it’s notable how quiet the US and EU have been. Sure it would be hypocritical of them to lecture on the freedom of speech crackdown, but that’s not stopped them before. Elon Musk’s X, formerly known is Twitter, is also helping Türkiye crack down on dissent as it has done in the past.
President Trump did Erdogan a solid last week by endorsing him and helping calm Turkish markets. According to Bloomberg, the exodus of foreign capital following the arrest of Imamoglu probably reduced Türkiye’s foreign-currency reserves by $26.6 billion over just three days from March 19-21 — an expensive removal of a political rival. This left the central bank’s net reserves at $32.4 billion at the end of last week, economist Selva Bahar Baziki wrote. More:
Trump praised President Erdogan, confirming investor expectations that Turkey was likely to face little external political pressure after Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul and the head of state’s main political rival, was detained and then jailed.
“Good place, good leader, too,” Trump said during a meeting of ambassadorial nominees on Tuesday. Trump’s comments came after a brief introduction by Tom Barrack, the founder of Colony Capital LLC who is Trump’s longtime friend and nominee to be ambassador to Turkey.
Trump’s “confirming investor expectations that Turkey was likely to face little external political pressure” helps explain why Erdogan moved to consolidate power now. After ruling for more than two decades he is looking to change the constitution so he can run for another term in the next presidential election scheduled for no later than May 7, 2028. And there’s reason to believe he and his circle want to keep rule in the family even after he’s gone. The arrest of Imamoglu and ensuing crackdown help move toward that goal.
And right now the West needs him. Europe is desperate for Turkish cooperation in the crazy plan to build a coalition to go into Ukraine.Ankara is a key player in Syria after helping to topple Bashar al-Assad. The US wants Türkiye’s help encircling Iran.
“Erdoğan has read the geopolitical moment rather well,” Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a visiting fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, told Agence France-Presse.
It is often said that Türkiye is transactional in its ties (aren’t most countries?). Recently there seem to be a lot of unannounced transactions taking place. Let’s take a look.
Easing Defense Restrictions
Back in October, not long before the offensive to overthrow Assad, the US and its European vassals suddenly ended a years-long unofficial embargo imposed by Western allies on Türkiye, which has hampered its defense sector development. According to Nordic Monitor, “At the forefront of countries posing difficulties in Türkiye’s procurement is Germany, which has been withholding export permits for firms supplying Türkiye with much-needed engines and power systems for its domestic projects.”
Now we’re approaching the end of official sanctions on the Turkish defense industry imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). They were applied to Türkiye by the Trump administration in 2020 following Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019. Türkiye was also suspended from the F-35 program.
Ankara has been eager to get out from under the sanctions — which hurt particular imports like semiconductors and microchips — as they hurt the country’s defense industry ambitions, which include its own air defense project and domestically-produced fighter jets.
Reuters reported on Wednesday following a meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the two countries are moving towards the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and readmission to the F-35 program.
There has also been speculation that Erdogan might be visiting the US soon to seal the deal.
Meanwhile, the US and Europe are both increasingly relying on Türkiye for weapons manufacturing.
The US Army just signed a $435 million deal with Türkiye’s Repkon to design, build, and commission a TNT production facility in the US aimed at building up the US supply of munitions.
BAE Systems, too, just inked a deal with Repkon USA to collaborate on the development and manufacture of advanced munitions.
Repkon is reportedly soon expected to produce about 30 percent of all US-made 155mm artillery shells. Last year the Pentagon bought 116,000 rounds of ammunition from Turkiye’s Arca Defense and more purchases purchases are expected this year. And although the the Pentagon contracts General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (a US company) to build three 155mm projectile metal parts lines in Texas, but the company is relying on Turkish subcontractors to do the work,
While EU-Türkiye defense cooperation is caapped by opposition from member states Greece and Cyprus, some bloc countries are increasingly inking deals with Ankara. And as the EU looks to scale up weaponry purchases due to the imaginary threats of Russia invasion and US abandonment, they could be looking to Türkiye even more.
Here’s the International Institute for Strategic Studies with some background on the budding relationship:
While the sale of armed UAVs has been high-profile and lucrative, Turkish industry has also enjoyed success in other domains. Of the country’s four major armoured vehicle manufacturers, three – BMC, Nurol Makina and Otokar – have won contracts with European customers. Most significantly, in late 2024, Otokar secured a contract with Romania for 1,059 Cobra II 4×4 vehicles, the majority of which will be built locally. In the maritime domain, the recent success in Portugal follows a 2020 contract with Ukraine for two corvettes based on Turkiye’s Ada-class (MILGEM) design.
Other opportunities are also being acted on. In December, Spain signed an agreement to collaborate with Turkiye on a new jet training aircraft – almost certainly TAI’s Hürjet – with media reports suggesting that this could form part of a wider swap deal, with Spanish Airbus A400M airlifters going in the other direction. Although Hürjet is currently in the prototype phase, TAI might also see opportunities with other countries that have a jet trainer requirement. Elsewhere, Baykar’s acquisition of troubled Italian aerospace company Piaggio Aerospace received approval in December, with hopes that it will provide another entry point into the Italian and wider European market.
On the drone front, Türkiye and Italy entered into a mega partnership last month. Turkish UAV giant Baykar (owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law) is teaming up with Leonardo for its electronics and radars in a 50-50 joint venture to make new-and-improved drones in both Türkiye and Italy, which would “ease certification for selling in a European market worth $100 billion in the next ten years”
We can’t forget the Macron-Starmer suicidal idea to go into Ukraine either. They’re desperate to get Türkiye onboard. Here’s Turkish Minute:
Britain and France are leading efforts to form a so-called coalition of the willing of countries willing to assist Ukraine by sending hardware and even troops, with Türkiye a key partner due to its large military, world-class drone production and rare position of cordial ties with both Kyiv and Moscow.
Are they hoping Russia won’t attack them if there are Turkish troops and Ankara’s cordial relationship with Moscow?
Project Encircle Iran
Beyond the US and Europe turning to Türkiye in a desperate bid to keep up with Russian artillery production, what else could all the easing of sanctions and unofficial embargoes signify?
Maybe there’s a potential clash of Greater Israel and Greater Türkiye in the future but for now both countries appear united under the US umbrella with the goal of destabilizing Iran.
Türkiye has long opposed the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, groups aligned with and/or backed by Iran operating across the Middle East. As we mentioned a=on a recent piece on Middle East logistics wars, the Iran-Iraq-Syria corridor was one of Tehran’s major strategic goals to secure access to the Mediterranean.
The destruction of Syria by the US-Israel-Türkiye destroyed that goal.
And Türkiye is trying to implement new projects in its place, such as routes through Iraq.
Developments are also underway in the South Caucasus that seem to be inching towards a US- and Israel-supported agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and perhaps Türkiye that would effectively block Iran to its north.
Tehran is worried that Türkiye and Azerbaijan — through force or negotiations with Armenia, which is now heavily influenced by Washington — will open a corridor in Armenia along its border with Iran. Should Türkiye and Azerbaijan do so, Tehran would lose influence over both as Azerbaijan currently relies on transit through Iran to connect to its exclave and Türkiye is dependent on Iran for logistics to bypass Armenia. Tehran is especially worried about a NATO Turan Corridor which sees the West link up hypothetical client states throughout central Asia. From Dr. Vali Kaleji, a Tehran-based expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies:
Iran sees the creation of the Zangezur corridor as a matter beyond the access of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan exclave and believes that this corridor will provide direct military access for Türkiye as a NATO member in the Caucasus and west of the Caspian Sea. Indeed, a significant number of Iranian elites and experts believe that the expansion of Türkiye’s presence in the South Caucasus, especially through the Zangezur corridor, will strengthen pan-Turkism in the region, which is a direct threat to the Azeri regions of north-western Iran.
The peace steps between Türkiye and the Kurds as another potential piece sliding into place for the encroachment eastwards of Greater Israel, Greater Türkiye and the NATO stalking horse.
Back in January we wrote about a potential deal between Türkiye and US over the “Kurdish question” and the lifting of an unofficial military tech embargo on Türkiye. That has been steadily progressing as restrictions are eased on Ankara and as the US encouraged its Syrian Kurdish proxies to ink a deal with the Al Qaeda government in Damascus. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose government plays a major role in Damascus, backed the deal.
Turkic peoples, including Azerbaijanis, make up roughly 20 percent of the population in Iran, and in the country’s West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan Provinces the population is mostly Azeris and Kurds. Baku makes some noise about self-determination there, but American neocons especially dream of using the Azeris and Kurds to destabilize Iran.
The wiser play for Türkiye would likely be something along the lines of the following (courtesy of The Century Foundation):
Türkiye, for example, has emerged as the new dominant force in Syria. Ankara could now serve as a vital conduit, facilitating Moscow and Tehran’s efforts to reconnect with Damascus. Meanwhile, with Turkish allies in charge in Syria, Türkiye’s dependence on both Iran and Russia has waned considerably. Yet Ankara is likely to navigate these waters with care, avoiding outright provocation of Russia and Iran. This carefulness may involve granting Iran’s allies limited room to maneuver—so long as Turkish economic interests remain firmly protected, especially its desire to monopolize regional energy transit routes bridging the Middle East and Europe.
But that take doesn’t take into account how Erdogan bit off more than he can chew in Syria, as well as the expansionary fanatics in Türkiye that were empowered in recent Turkish elections are people Erdogan needs to keep happy.
In elections of 2018 and 2023 the biggest winners were the Islamist nationalists who believe in Turkish superiority. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Iyi party took 21 percent of the vote and won 92 seats in parliament in 2018. Anti-refugee sentiment and economic hardships increased the vote share of Islamist ethno-nationalist parties in 2023, and they continue to have major influence on Turkish foreign policy. It’s not hard to draw a line between the history of say, the MHP, and Turkish support for extremist proxies.
The MHP was founded by Alparslan Turkes, an army colonel with links to Operation Gladio and it gathered strength with its tight relationship with right-wing paramilitaries like the Grey Wolves and Turkish organized crime in their CIA-backed battle against left-wingers, Communists, Kurdish, and Alevi organisations.
With their belief in Turkish superiority and their goal to rule the Arab world, these forces are in many ways the flip side to the same coin of Zionism. They are now emboldened and looking for more.
With their interests increasingly aligned with those of Washington which is in a transactional mood with Erdogan, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Türkiye try to make more moves to expand its influence to the detriment of Iran.
Thank you, Conor.
A few weeks ago, France’s former ambassador to Israel, the UK and the US, now a leading light at the European Council on Foreign Relations and regular pundit on France’s LCI tv channel, Gerard Araud talked about an alliance between Europe, not just the EU, and Turkiye to contain Russia, including restricting access to the straits and preserving Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He added that Europe and Turkiye had interests in common, containing Russia, an interest that went back centuries, but that did not mean Turkish membership of the EU or greater access to the single market and easier migration. I wondered what Turkiye would get apart from replacing poor whites from fly over, blacks and Latinos as Europe’s cannon fodder.
That map made me think of my former employer’s archives and a map showing a Berlin to Baghdad railway with an extension to Mecca.
Speaking of the Grey Wolves, John Paul II’s assailant, Agca, was one of them.
Erdogan and the US in the same bucket? How long before one fangs the other? Neither can be trusted. The US … the Empire of Chaos as some characterize it … is pursuing chaos because some neocon weenies have a plan. Nothing and no one is a better sign of death, destruction, and failure than a neocon weenie with a plan. Why is it necessary to torture West Asia? DC’s knickers must still be in a twist about some ancient grievance best let go when hector was a pup.
Been having similar thoughts. How would that work out? The US has shown itself to be agreement-incapable, the EU as agreement-incompetent and Erdogan? You can only trust him as far as the door. He will always backstab you, even if it mean that he damages himself and his country. Dealing with him has been described as exhausting. They may make agreements with each other but whenever an opportunity pops up, each of them will try to get an advantage on the other two. maybe the basic deal on the table is that Erdogan agrees to let Israel expands its borders, including into Syria, and in return they US/EU will agree to let Erdogan to expand east which includes into China. And if they can outflank Iran, they will help him do so.
Perhaps the leisure class are bored with all that leisure and feel the need for some global chess to bolster their egos. One might go further to suggest the crackpot social Darwinism that fueled so much 20th century slaughter never really went away. If you make animal evolution and competition your model you act like animals?
At any rate thanks to Conor for another detailed report from the chess board. While an alliance of all these right wing actors–current Israel perhaps the most right wing of all–seems grim one should bear in mind that the Russian, Chinese and Iran axis they wish to take on has far more people and far more experienced fighters. At least back in the UK empire days people like Churchill were willing to put their own bodies on the line for the cause–tragically so in WW1. The neocons think robots and a few willing recruits will do the job for them. But when they come up against some more authentic nationalist powers hubris may very well meet nemesis. That is of course unless the nuclear genie comes out of the bottle and they take the rest of the world with them.
“One might go further to suggest the crackpot social Darwinism that fueled so much 20th century slaughter never really went away.”
Indeed. Thus a bigger global war is arriving.
“At least back in the UK empire days people like Churchill were willing to put their own bodies on the line for the cause” Only as long as they “got the ships, the men, and the money too…” and the other party had nothing.
ALso, it is known that the Brits would happily send others into the fight…
Given the unexpected developments in Syria and the arrest of Imamoglu, thereby closing Türkiye’s most important urban electoral venting option whilst increasing the risk that the country’s foreign adventures may quickly get out of hand, it will be interesting to see whether Erdogan has any depth of support in the military, whose officers have probably have studied the failure of the 2016 coup operation in some depth, and whether Erdoga’s erraticism has re-awakened the spirit of Kemelism and the will to modernise and re-establish Türkiye’s economy, politics and foreign alliances on firmer ground. If nothing else, Türkiye’s military are aware that Russia may have a less cautious leader following President Putin who might well be more inclined to employ Russia’s advances in non-nuclear weapons technology to initially lubricate and then stabilise the diplomatic process.
“Anti-refugee sentiment and economic hardships increased the vote share of Islamist ethno-nationalist parties in 2023, and they continue to have major influence on Turkish foreign policy.”
It’s also like the constant financial crises (often hear of financial turbulence in the country) help to yank the chain of control. That insecurity and instability keeps opposition from getting on its feet as much as the more drastic measures.
So if I understand correctly, we’re about to see the world championship of backstabbing and treachery, yeah? Interesting times.
Although it is generally asserted that the Syrian regime collapse is a massive geopolitical loss for Iran (my thought: compared to what realistic outcome?), IMHO, it appears to be more dogma than evidence-based.
For example, consider: “Meanwhile, with Turkish allies in charge in Syria, Türkiye’s dependence on both Iran and Russia has waned considerably.”
Huh?? Exactly how does Turkish dependence on Russia depend on Syria’s status? The dependence is on weapons (that work—the S400) and energy transfers to Europe. And given Iran’s massive missile arsenal deterrence against the US (and Israel), it’s unclear how Turkey gets advantage. Meanwhile, Iran’s rapidly strengthening economy builds on its strengthening ties with China and Russia (and BRICS more generally) are unrelated to events in Syria and cannot be affected by Turkey.
It reminds me of the Democracy Now analysis (which I abandoned during the Russia gate nonsense): Domestic protests were always increasing pressure on the administration (any administration), ratcheting up pressure on the administration, and just wait for it—any day now, the pressure will change the policy. Yet, in the end, nothing changes—the pressure is just noise about which power cares, not a whit.
The West called the Kherson Russian retreat a loss (it was a tactical retreat). Today, it’s evident that it was a strategic move that aided Russian gains—it stretched Ukrainian lines and consolidated Russian lines.
The West seems unable to discern the difference between tactics and strategy.
From the Century report: “[Israel broke Hezbollah’s military capacity] and [eviscerated its leadership with a combination of technological superiority, remarkable intelligence penetration, and ruthlessness.]”
The first half of the sentence is demonstrably false – Israel’s losses on the ground were far greater and military successes far less than in 2006.” A fair assessment would separate these two into separate arguments.
I just couldn’t read further, but I note that rather than using Google Translate and reading the original Hizballah document, they cite a CIA report on the letter (5)! Now who would do that (outside the agency)?
“Hizballah Issues ‘Open Letter’ on Goals, Principles,” Central Intelligence Agency,
Thank you, Conor, for such an insightful and revealing post. You always increase my meager knowledge base with your timely writing.
“With their belief in Turkish superiority and their goal to rule the Arab world, these forces are in many ways the flip side to the same coin of Zionism.”
It is interesting the fact that Iran doesn’t seem at all eager to run over the Arabs. Russia and Iran, both sufficient in their resources and if not hindered, more than capable to generate high levels of material satisfaction to their citizens are in no expansionist move. You see the Israelis, the Turks, lacking resources as the ones more than willing to take control of the others. And it is Russia and Iran that are pillored.
However, the Turanic corridor would really need a tunnel under the Caspian Sea. I am more than convince that Russia from north and Iran from south will monitor like hawks what is going on there. All the while China will keep in check the west end of that corridor.
Great article, Conor, and I think you’re absolutely right about your main thesis: if the US is picking a side in Turkiye, it’s now firmly aligned with the AKP. At the same time, I think it’s obvious Russia and Iran won’t be taking Erdogan’s side like they did during the coup attempt a decade ago.
What’s interesting is that I recently asked someone, whose read on Turkish politics I really trust, about the flip-side of that: who if anyone might be backing Imamoglu. My understanding was that in the past the CHP was reliably the pro-NATO party. Apparently Imamoglu has a reputation of butting heads with the CHP orthodoxy in a lot of ways though: more religious, less westernized liberal, possibly more into realpolitik. It could always be an act, but authentic or not, that’s how many people see him and where a lot of his organic support comes from.
The timing of it all is definitely suspicious too; the only thing I’m not sure of is if Erdogan is initiating all of this now because he senses an opportunity or he’s afraid of something. I can totally imagine Erdogan and Trump cooking up some conspiracy, but operationalizing it (and therefore the “opportunity” interpretation) implies a really high level of trust and coordination among several governments that don’t seem very trustworthy or organized.
The one thing all of my Turkish friends agree on is that the economy is really bad right now. And on the geopolitical front, while Turkiye is definitely in the driver’s seat in Syria, it’s still undecided whether that will turn out as a benefit or a massive headache. As you point out, Turkiye and Israel are sort of weird mirror-images currently, but just as a lot of Israel’s behavior actually looks like a wounded animal flailing about (if you don’t mistake the petty violence for actual dominance), I’m not sure the AKP government is doing this right now out of confidence.
There’s no doubt that the economy isn’t serving the working Turk. But where is that a priority or measure of success from the powers that be? The US economy was doing great for Wall Street, but eating Main Street alive. If you judge Turkey on debt levels, growth of industrial production, exports or technological development, things are not so bleak. No doubt the imbalances will lead to some bust up (especially if they fail to become a monopoly energy intermediary to Europe, which is likely), but 5 steps fwd and 2 steps back is still progress. It’s always been a volatile, high inflation country.
Oh, I agree with you completely about Turkiye’s real economic capacity and development; they may be doing better than anywhere else in Europe on that count. Those just aren’t necessarily the things most voters focus on immediately. I think there’s a lot of frustration with inflation, wages, housing, job opportunities, etc.
Right or wrong, my friends say that’s the perception, and they told me a couple things that imply it’s real. For example, I was told that even before Trump, the US was cracking down pretty hard on granting tourist visas to Turkish citizens; apparently they were deemed a high-risk of overstaying to work under the table.
Apparently it’s losing Erdogan a lot of support even among previous AKP voters (“he just makes promises and breaks them all the time” is a recurring theme). Between the economy and his foreign policy (he gives way less support to Palestine and way more to the new Syrian government than many Turks like), I can believe his political support has become really fragile.
It appears to me that China would control the East end of the corridor.