‘Greater Türkiye’ Faces Major Headwinds Abroad and at Home 

Last week Israel bombed key targets in Syria as part of a “warning” to Türkiye not to take control of the Tiyas Air Base in Syria’s central governorate of Homs, also known as the T4 airbase. The attack highlighted the limits to Ankara’s ambitions in Syria where neither Israel, the US, or even Russia wish to see Ankara exert too much control.

At the same time, Erdogan’s government is facing its biggest domestic test in years over the sloppy political prosecution of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.

Where could these linked turbulences take Türkiye? And what would be the wider fallout? Here are some observations and thoughts on some key points.

Nationalists Present at Protests

While we can’t put it past wily Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to give the go ahead for an intentionally sloppy arrest of Imamoglu in order to welcome unrest, justify a crackdown AND push through constitutional changes that would allow him to stand for reelection again, it would be a highwire act — even for him.

One important observation that calls that theory into question, however, is that it’s not just your usual bourgeois university leftists and opportunistic politicians taking part in protests. From Selim Koru at Kulturkampf:

Most young people on the streets, however, are not leftist, but a new kind of Turkist-nationalist. Turkism used to be a pretty orthodox endeavor. You became part of the Idealist hearths [Ülkü Ocakları] as a student, then continued your life in its hierarchy, and attached yourself politically to the MHP. As the MHP was effectively acquired by the AK Party, its allure with a new generation of Turkists faded. Turkism has since been detaching from its hierarchical organization, becoming a looser, but more disseminated political movement and ideology. So Turkism and what we used to call “Ülkücülük” seem to be separating. The new form is more Kemalist, less organized, more gender-neutral, more anti-immigrant…

If the protests were simply composed of left-liberals, the regime would have no problem simply steamrolling them, since they usually assume that these people are either not popular with broader segments of society, or that even if they are, they aren’t popular with people who might otherwise support them. The fact that the protests are (as far as I can tell) kindled and led by the left, but demographically anchored on the right, and is mostly non-Kurdish, makes this a very tricky problem for the regime.

How big is the shift taking place in Turkish politics? And if Erdoganism is dying, what replaces it? If recent trends are any indication, it would likely be more along the lines of Turkish supremacy.

In elections of 2018 and 2023 the biggest winners were the Islamist nationalists who believe in Turkish superiority. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Iyi party took 21 percent of the vote and won 92 seats in parliament in 2018. Anti-refugee sentiment and economic hardships increased the vote share of Islamist ethno-nationalist parties in 2023, and they continue to have major influence on Turkish foreign policy. It’s not hard to draw a line between the history of say, the MHP, and Turkish support for extremist proxies in recent years.

The MHP was founded by Alparslan Turkes, an army colonel with links to Operation Gladio and it gathered strength with its tight relationship with right-wing paramilitaries like the Grey Wolves and Turkish organized crime in their CIA-backed battle against left-wingers, Communists, Kurdish, and Alevi organisations. The MHP allies itself with Erdogan’s nationalist Justice and Development Party (AKP). Meanwhile Iyi does so with the opposition as both major political alliances court increasingly nationalistic voters.

This setup helped Erdogan maintain power as it left the opposition was in the impossible position of trying to make up ground by simultaneously keeping the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party voters on board and attracting the voters of nationalist candidates while simultaneously nurturing the belief in Turkish superiority and goal to create a “pan-Turkic” empire, these forces are in many ways the flip side to the same coin of Zionism. If that idea is inherently unstable, the politics in Türkiye remained turbulent but the same: Erdogan in charge.

There were signs that strategy was starting to crack in the elections of 2023, however. While Erdogan beat expectations in the presidential vote, his party lost seats at the parliamentary level as nationalist parties outflanking him on the refugee issue were the big winners in the elections.

The Nationalist Movement Party gained one spot in the 600-seat Turkish parliament and is now at 10.4 percent – a high amount for a party that has ties to the Ulku Ocaklari, or Grey Wolves.

All in all, far right parties got more than 30 percent of the parliamentary vote as working class and low income voters in both urban and rural areas opted for nationalist and/or Islamist candidates. Duvar reports:

As one of the most crucial elections of modern Türkiye’s history ends, the Turkish parliament now hosts plenty of far-fight MPs while the vote share of the far-right parties is even higher than in the previous elections. …

Türkiye has been experiencing a similar path with its global counterparts. The leftist and center parties struggle to capture the voters who have been facing detrimental consequences of the economic crisis and allured by the far-right discourse.

While Erdogan has miraculously survived numerous political crises, he also wasn’t facing as many economic headwinds as he has in recent years. What had been his greatest strength for years – the economy – has now become his biggest weakness, and that makes him more vulnerable than ever.

Economic Destabilization

There are signs the government is nervous. On Thursday, 11 people supporting the boycotts — including actor Cem Yigit Uzumoglu, who played Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror in the Netflix docuseries “Rise of Empires: Ottoman” — were arrested.  Some stores in Türkiye closed in solidarity with protestors in what Erdogan officials are calling a “coup attempt” on the economy.

One reason protests could be likely to continue is that the Turkish economy continues to slide — and the political upheaval is only making matters worse.

While the Erdoğan government is allocating a record budget to the defence and security sector in 2025, the war on workers continues.

Almost half of registered workers in Türkiye earn the minimum wage and millions of unregistered workers earn much less, yet the government increases in the minimum wage come nowhere close to matching the runaway inflation in recent years. In December the government announced a 30 percent increase in the minimum wage by 2025 to 22,104 liras, which is just above the starvation threshold.

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s inflation rate dropped to 38.1 percent in March, down from February’s 39.1 percent, and marked the 10th consecutive month of falling inflation. The annual rate peaked at 75 percent in May before starting to ease since.

Still, the cost of living crisis remains , and many families are struggling to pay for food and housing. There are stories of a lost generation of children who are forced to forgo school in an effort to help their families eke out an existence.

Türkiye was 38th out of 39 EU or OECD countries between 2019 and 2021, with a child poverty rate of 34 percent. The state allocates billions in aid for struggling families, but it hasn’t kept pace with inflation.

Potentially adding fuel to the protests fire in Türkiye is the government’s decision on Friday to increase electricity and natural gas prices, which only adds to the financial strain on households and businesses.

The Energy Market Regulatory Authority jacked up electricity prices for residential consumers by 25 percent, and rates for the public and private service sectors increased by 15 percent, while industrial users saw a 10 percent hike.

In an attempt to bring inflation under control, Türkiye’s interest rates went from 8.5 percent to 15 percent in June 2023 and all the way up to 50 percent by March 2024. They’re currently at 42.5 percent.

Türkiye’s economic problems have only been exacerbated by the recent unrest, which could put Erdogan over the barrel geopolitically. Türkiye is reliant on trade with and investment from the EU states with the US and Gulf states playing a secondary role, which could increase their leverage on issues like Iran and Russia.

At home more reactionary forces have been empowered by the economic downturn over recent years and are looking for more. Erdogan thought he could control the frustration and maneuvered politically to remain in office in his tough 2023 reelection fight. The great question now is whether he’s lost the plot. If he has, there are millions of dangers lurking in Türkiye that could further destabilize the entire region.

CIA Islam in Türkiye

Vanessa Beeley’s sources in Türkiye tell her there are up to 12 million takfiris in Türkiye. That number might be a tad high, but wouldn’t be entirely unsurprising since Ankara has been nurturing such elements since before the Syria war even began way back in 2011. If unrest continues — whether it’s genuine or engineered — those groups might see an opportunity.

How much control does Erdogan really have over them? Or are their allegiances up for sale? And will/how much has the destabilization of Syria spilled over into Türkiye?

There aren’t ready answers to these questions, but if the takfiris step into the ring, all bets on the outcome of the current upheaval could be off.

It’s entirely possible that Erdogan who thought he was conquering Syria could instead see Türkiye absorbed into Syrian chaos.

Upheaval in the Context of Wider Regional Struggles

I recently wrote about increasing alignment between Türkiye and the US on the issue of Turkish militarization and the overlap between Turkish expansionary goals and Washington’s maximum pressure on Iran.

We should note that despite the friction between Greater Israel and Greater Turkey in Syria, much of Turkey’s greater ambitions lie to the East in what some elements view as the “Turkic world.”

Here is a better view:

Here’s the crux of the issue: The US and Israel want to use Turkey to destabilize and weaken Iran, but not allow Turkey to become too powerful in the process. With that in mind, would a destabilized Türkiye be more beneficial to the US? What about for Israel?

Türkiye’s alignment with NATO is unlikely to change regardless of who is in power due to the heavy presence of Western economic and spook forces in the country. It would be more likely that a government more in service to US and Israeli goals arises.

As of now, Türkiye is largely cooperative with Zionist goals, continuing to ship oil and other goods to Israel and backing down after Israel issued its fiery warning to Türkiye.

The Erdogan government is also careful with Iran. It’s okay with helping apply pressure and working to expand influence at Tehran’s expense but shows no signs of wanting to get sucked into any sort of conflict with Tehran. Perhaps another government might be less cautious.

One area of potential conflict with Iran remains the southern region of Armenia. Türkiye and Azerbaijan are eager to open a transportation corridor connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan.

Iran sees this (likely correctly) as an effort by NATO, which has an increasing presence in Armenia, to open a Turan Corridor which sees Türkiye and the US/NATO link up hypothetical client states throughout central Asia, attempt to destabilize the Azeri regions of north-western Iran while encircling the country.

To give a better idea of the dangers, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is a big fan. Here’s what she said Friday at the first European Union–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan:

“Smooth border crossing within Central Asian and South Caucasus countries is also essential to reach the Black Sea,” von der Leyen said. “After three decades of closure, the opening of the borders of Armenia with Türkiye and Azerbaijan is going to be a game changer.”

Interesting that she presented it as a fait accompli. 

Ursula isn’t the only one making noise there. Last week, media in Armenia and Azerbaijan reported that Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Jianchao, suggested that China could be involved in construction of the ‘Zangezur corridor’.

He supposedly made the comments during a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

The Chinese Charge d’Affaires Chen Ming to Armenia quickly refuted the reports, however, and articles in Azerbaijani outlets, as well as Sputnik, were quickly scrubbed of the comments.