Yves here. Yves here. While Andrew Korybko’s conclusion about Iran seems reasonable, one can get there by a somewhat different route. There is a considerable body of thought, as well as evidence, that Iran has more than enough in the way of deeply bunkered missiles for them to survive even a US nuclear strike handily. That would mean the end of Israel and likely a lot of Saudi oil production facilities. That’s even before getting to the question of whether Iran also has the means to detect and therefore potentially shoot down not-perfectly-stealthy B2 bombers if they reach Iranian air space.1
So the equation is not that Iran is actually lacking in leverage (being able to drive oil prices to the moon on a sustained basis is a lot of leverage) but the US does not accept that Iran has meaningful power (as in its believes it can destroy the regime and/or the nation).
But the US grossly underestimated Russia before the Special Military Operation and seems disposed again to excessively discount a hostile power’s capabilities (mind you, the US made them hostile…). And Iran may have helped feed that perception by having a nuclear program that is believed capable of building a bomb in short order.2 If Iran were confident that it had a mutual assured destruction capability with respect to Israel, US bases in the region, and oil infrastructure in the region, why would it need to be keeping a nuclear capability close at hand?
Korybko does not point out, as we did in a recent post, that the US demands of Iran are so extreme that Iran can’t say yes. They want Iran to give up not just nuclear development but also its missiles, as in conventional deterrence. And with the US demonstrably agreement-incapable with Iran and generally, why should Iran bother with this exercise, except to delay and hope the eye of Sauron US attention moves elsewhere?
Many commentators are weighing the odds of Israel (and thus the US) attacking Iran, given the buildup of forces in the area (not just the B2s in Diego Garcia; see John Helmer in his latest talk with Nima for a brief mention at 3:00 of more assets being moved from German to Qatar, consistent with a “raid on Iran”).
It seems likely that the immediate US objective is not Iran but the Houthis, given that the US is already making frequent strikes to try to decapitate its leadership. If the US were to succeed in stopping Houthi attacks on Israel shipping, it might back off on Iran, since the recently leaked Hegseth memo indicated the US really does want to focus on China.
But it does not seem likely that the US will subdue Ansar Allah, since Saudi Arabia and past US efforts failed. Admittedly, there is the possibility if we collectively get lucky, that the Houthis will even deliver the US a bloody nose, say by shooting down one of those precious B2s. That hopefully would lead to a major rethink about taking on Iran.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
Iranian-US tensions are boiling after Trump threatened to bomb Iran following its rejection of direct talks over a new nuclear deal. He also ordered the Pentagon to move six B-2 stealth bombers, which CNN assessed to be a full 30% of the US’ stealth bomber fleet, to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. The Iranian Supreme Leader responded by promising strong retaliation if the US attacks while one of his chief advisors warned that their country would then have “no choice” but to build nukes if that happens.
Although the US Intelligence Community’s latest Annual Threat Assessment claimed that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”, there have been long-standing concerns that it could quickly do so if the decision is made due to its nuclear program allegedly have a rapid breakout potential. This makes it no different in principle than Japan’s, which could begin churning out nukes in a matter of months, but neither the US nor its regional allies consider Japan to be a threat, unlike how they view Iran.
The US’ renewed bombing campaign against Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen might have been partially intended to send a message to the Islamic Republic aimed at getting it to enter direct talks over this issue by signaling that Trump 2.0 does indeed have the political will to initiate military action if it refuses. Despite Iran’s recent rejection of his demand, Trump might still hold off on this for now due to the likelihood that Iran could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage to the US’ regional bases and allies.
Furthermore, diplomacy hasn’t yet been exhausted since Iran didn’t reject indirect talks of the kind that Russia offered to mediate after reportedly being asked by the US to do so, which was discussed here. Therefore, it would be premature for the US to seriously consider bombing Iran at this time, yet that option isn’t off the table if indirect talks fail to reach a deal. Iran lacks the leverage for a fair deal with the US, however, so it’ll either have to accept a lopsided one or prepare for a major war that it might lose.
Iran is a proud civilization-state that’s loath to subordinate itself to anyone, hence the difficulty in getting it to agree to drastic curbs on its nuclear energy program that would enshrine its status as a second-class country in this regard, all while abandoning any chance of nuclear weapons in the future. From Iran’s perspective, this could embolden Israel into one day launching a large-scale conventional or even nuclear war against it, which Iran believes has only hitherto been deterred by dangling this Damocles’ sword.
That said, while Iran could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage to the US’ regional bases and allies (first of all Israel) if it’s attacked over its refusal to agree to a Russian-mediated lopsided deal, it cannot inflict such damage to the US’ nuclear triad and would thus likely be destroyed. Iran couldn’t count on Russia intervening to help it either since their newly updated strategic partnership doesn’t include mutual defense obligations and Moscow doesn’t want war with Washington or West Jerusalem.
Even though the US could survive a major war with Iran, it still prefers to avoid one. So long as the US’ demands remain limited to drastically curbing Iran’s nuclear energy program and don’t expand to include curbs on its support for regional allies or its ballistic missile program, then creative diplomacy could prevail. For that to happen, Russia would have to devise a set of incentives for Iran that the US approves of and Iran then agrees to, but that’s still a far way off and Trump might strike first if he loses patience.
____
1 Many military-connected but not Israel-friendly commentators have claimed that an Israel effort to strike Iran after Iran retaliated successfully for the assassinations of Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh was curtailed because the Israel pilots could detect that Iran was “seeing” and therefore could shoot their supposedly stealthy F-35. But the F-35 apparently throws off a lot of electronic signals and is less stealthy than the B2.
2 I discount the days to less than two weeks claims, but “not much longer than that” seems credible. There is also the wee issue of missile delivery, but I have read experts that have claimed that Iran would already have solved the big technical issues in building a hypersonic missile.
50 comments
Comments are closed.
I will note two points here. The first is those six B-2 stealth bombers that were moved to Diego Garcia. On the face of it that sounds bad but the reason why they went to Diego Garcia was because the US asked Saudi Arabia and some Gulf States to base them there but they said “Aww, hell no!” Iran said a few weeks ago that any attack coming from one of them would make them a target for retaliation. There is no way that the Saudis, for example, will risk their entire oil/gas infrastructure just to please Trump. And why throw away the detente between them and Iran as negotiated by the Chinese so that the Israelis and the US can blow up the entire region. To hell with that noise.
The second is their nuclear capability which is really about their need, like all countries, for medical isotopes. Are they going to give that up and depend on the kindness of strangers to get a regular supply which I believe has short lift spans? Yes, the amount of enriched material that they have is high but that is actually their leverage. They can always negotiate that away like they did in the first nuke deal where that excess was taken to Russia. But it has to be there first. Kinda like if you are selling something. You start with a high price first as you can always go down but you can’t go up.
Interesting and it makes sense. It seems for a few years now the DoD assessment has said Iran could obtain a nuclear weapon in short order. This implies they have the materials, as actually assembling a nuclear weapon is quite simple, it’s the lack of highly refined uranium and plutonium in sufficient quantities that makes obtaining a nuclear weapon difficult. As long as you protect your ability to access/create those enriched materials, temporarily negotiating away existing supplies seems like a very smart option when you’re in a short-term pinch.
I would assume a surprise element, that we learn Iran has developed the missile range to reach DG. It seems irresponsible to not take this possibility into consideration.
And if this is the case, then if the US attacks Iran from DG there’s also a possibility there would be no DG for the planes to return to. So they would therefore need to land at those aforementioned Saudi and Gulf state bases which said hell no or otherwise ditch the planes in the ocean. So the air assets may be expended on use?
Everyone is making assumptions about everything. What is a fact is that Israel has submarines and the means to launch nuclear missiles from them. Golda Meir stated decades ago if Israel went down they’d take the rest of the world with them. The world includes Washington DC doesn’t it?
I’ll make an assumption, Israel has such a grip on DC and Trump in particular he’d rather lose a bunch of expensive aircraft than incur the wrath of the guy who gave him a gold pager as a gift.
IIRC, when Trump abrogated the JCPOA the US prohibited the import of medical isotopes. Iran the began enriching Uranium to 60%
I’m curious about an assumption the author makes – that if the US were losing a war in Iran, it would launch nuclear strikes. It thankfully didn’t happen in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or anywhere else the US has lost a war in the nuclear age. Have there been any signs of a big change in American willingness to use nukes, besides Trump’s personal willingness to choose the most aggressive of the 3 options the military advisors give him?
The author also only references unacceptable damage in Iran’s region. Every article I read about an American-Iran war seems to assume that Iran would only damage places/groups local to their region. But just like a lot of people overestimate the US military, I think I a lot of people underestimate what Iran or other medium-large countries could do if attacked, and assume the war could stay contained and local when that’s not necessarily so.
I suspect Iran has leverage, but the US overestimates itself and underestimates its adversaries. Thus the leverage may not prevent a war. We shall see!
Many neocon commentators, as well as some official hotheads, seem to think tactical nukes don’t count.
The reason for the fixation on nukes with Iran is that is the only weapon that might destroy Iran’s deeply bunkered nuclear enrichment program.
Of course that opens up the question of which countries will receive the nuclear fallout and that depends on which way the winds blow. No country will look kindly on nuclear fallout arriving on their front door step. I was reading how after Chernobyl blew, several days later you had diaries in the American mid-west dumping milk. So how far will the nuclear fallout from a nuke attack on Iran spread.
Ground penetrating nuclear munitions destroy by seismic shock, so its radiation release may be buried in the hole. More release could come from the buried partially disrupted target. So US could claim its now public super-duper non-nuclear penetrator released evidence of Iranian nuclear weapons program, and leave experts to glaze the public mind with debates over isotope signatures. Hit a half dozen sites then declare success regardless of reality. I’m worried about unfettered Israeli response to even a fairly restrained Iranian retaliation or even an initial israeli pile-on as war lust ignites the hardliners. Then I could easily envision a terror inducing air burst over Tehran. After that …
And then again, perhaps not.
see
“Nuclear penetrating munitions, also known as bunker busters, are designed to penetrate hardened targets or targets buried deep underground. One notable example is the B61-11, which was introduced by the United States in 1997. It uses an existing nuclear explosive from an older bomb design and is housed in a hardened steel casing with a new nose cone to provide ground penetration capability.
Tests of the B61-11 show that it can penetrate only about 20 feet into dry earth when dropped from an altitude of 40,000 feet.”
from https://programs.fas.org/ssp/nukes/new_nuclear_weapons/loyieldearthpenwpnrpt.html, via AI Summary as the link wont load on my computer.
Given the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, any newer generation, ‘supposedly focused” nuke would never have been tested.
Is anyone communicating the threat of radioactive rain to Trump, who seems listening-incapable?
Iran is near Russia, leading to a reasonable chance of fallout on Russian territory. Hopefully, Russia has indicated that this is unacceptable, perhaps promising to transfer advanced ICBM missile technology to Iran as to North Korea (where the US no longer threatens destruction) – Message to Iran: Get nukes if you want the US to cease its targeting.
Ground burst nuclear weapons, which throw tons of radioactive dirt into the air, generate much more radioactive fallout than air burst weapons. You don’t want to be downwind from one of those.
Actually I dont want to be downwind of any nuclear weapon (or nuclear power plant that melts down). Just a personal preference.
If Iran responds to an attack with a serious assault on Israel, then no one knows how the Israelis will respond. One might say it all depends on how much pain the Iranians could deliver and how much pain the Israelis could suffer before they decide to it’s time to put aside their fabled restraint (sarc) and decide the end of times has come.
The way the Israelis are acting today, one could be excused for thinking that “The End of Days” has already arrived.
Red heifers on the Temple Mount will be the “Sign” that all is lost.
I know that this is very difficult due to the competence of Mossad, but if I was running Iran I’d have a contingency action already set up in Israel. Not an attack from the outside which would obviously be visible on its journey. Iran must have been planning for this sort of scenario for a long time, and they too are very competent technically. And likely still feel embarrassed about stuxnet.
This would be a good plan. However my impression is that Mossad runs circles around the special services of every other country in that region. They are ruthless, and very, very, good.
IMO the nuke thing is nonsense and those pushing it are merely catapulting the propaganda for Israel and the neocons. Recall how some said Israel would nuke Lebanon but instead they took out Nasrallah the old fashioned way.
Not to mention that using nukes would mean that Israel would finally have to admit that they have nukes and are defying the non proliferation regime in a way that Iran never has. Even Trump’s tissue thin rationale would explode under such hypocrisy–not that this would bother him much….apparently.
Yes, that sort of commentary is just noise – if they wanted to use nukes, they’d do it. So much of what comes out of Israel and the White House is either deliberate deception or minor officials pretending to know more than they do. As you point out, almost everything said before the event by the media and by self appointed online experts about Israels attacks on Hezbollah turned out to be wrong.
Its very unlikely that Israel has either ground penetration nukes or the technology to deliver them. And they know very well that using one would provoke an immediate nuclear arms race in the wider region. Its not even clear that the US has a useable ground penetration nuclear weapon ready for use. And given that one hasn’t been live tested in many decades, it would be a huge risk to use one. They might just end up delivering all the components for a nuke for free to Iran.
Strikes on the underground facilities are to some extent a red herring. Much of the supply chain for a nuclear weapon includes a range of facilities across Iran that would be much more vulnerable to a variety of conventional attacks.
The vulnerability of Iran is not in its underground facilities, which are so deeply buried that they would probably resist all but an intensive, repeated bombardment, but in its overall defence manufacturing chain, which includes many facilities which are far less defended, plus, most importantly, its energy infrastructure. Iran is almost entirely dependent on natural gas for industry and domestic energy, in particular a set of 10 more or less parallel long distance pipelines running from the Gulf to Tehran and the urban areas along the Caspian. These, along with associated infrastructure, are essentially undefendable due to their extreme length and vulnerability. They are far more vulnerable than the oil facilities of KSA or, for that matter, Israels electricity network. Despite their apparent vulnerability, oil refineries and associated infrastructure are very extensive and require very intense bombardment to destroy. During WWII the US and Britain devoted massive aerial bombing resources to attacking the Romanian oil fields and refineries and the Dutch East Indies and while they reduced output, they never succeeded in destroying them totally. Natural gas facilities, on the other hand, are extremely vulnerable, as Germany has discovered.
I can’t link to it at the moment, but the usually very reliable Deep Dive Defence channel on YT devoted a number of video essays to the Israeli attacks on Iran and its capability to strike nuclear facilities – worth viewing for anyone who thinks that they were necessarily a failure for Israel.
On the issue of stealth – the whole issue of ‘can stealth aircraft be detected’ is a red herring. All stealth aircraft can be detected by the right radar wavelengths and passive (IR and other) means. This is well known and irrelevant – stealth is part of integrated packages of active and passive avoidance/suppression of defences and cannot be assessed in isolation. Any US/Israeli attack would involve a panoply of different weapons and electronic systems with specific purposes to suppress defences, prevent immediate retaliation and achieve whatever the tactical and strategic aims would be (which I would guess extend way beyond simply destroying nuclear facilities). While the Iranians no doubt have some surprises up their sleeves, the US/Israel has a huge informational advantage as the ‘attacking’ side as they can choose where and when to strike.
The Iranian ballistic and cruise missile inventory is very impressive, but I think many are greatly overstating its potential military usage. Such weapons depend on very precise targeting information which (unless the Russians and Chinese help out), the sheer number of missiles you require increases exponentially (think of the number of missiles you need to hit a hanger with missiles with a 100 metres CEP compared to ones with 200 metres SEP). Long range missiles, hypersonic or not (and there are many ‘issues’ with hypersonics which is worthy of many essays) are not a wunderwaffen. They give Iran retaliatory options, but have their own limitations, not least when being used against countries which have the ability to completely cripple your domestic energy infrastructure for years to come.
The Iranian government has been very careful about falling for the bait set for it by the US and Israel, not to mention its other regional enemies/frenemies (it has multiple issues to deal with on its borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Armenia, etc). I doubt very much if they consider that they have particularly strong leverage. Any conflict with any of their neighbours will be very damaging to a country which is politically and economically in a very precarious position, and has taken some very serious blows to its strategic objectives in the Levant and Caspian region recently. It is very much in their interest to keep their heads down, their powder dry, and wait for strategic opportunities to arise when its many enemies are otherwise engaged.
‘It is very much in their interest to keep their heads down, their powder dry, and wait for strategic opportunities to arise when its many enemies are otherwise engaged.’
Sounds right that. Trump may want to go after Iran but he has hung the Ukrainian albatross around his neck. He told the Russian to freeze the conflict on his say so but they politely said ‘nyet’ leaving him ranting and boxed in. Meanwhile Iran continue their preparations.
I am not as impressed with Daniel Davis as you are. He is clearly too close to US military sources and has regularly said all sorts of nonsense about Ukraine, such as Russia losses v. Ukraine losses, even the “stalemate” claim when that was clearly not true. So I don’t regard him as a very good source. The initial claims of big Israel damage in Iran were quietly walked back. Despite the hundred IDF warplanes having been deployed, only about 20 missiles were fired, causing negligible damage limited to a few radar installations in western Iran near the Iraqi border. Even the hardly pro Iran Mirror conceded the point that little harm was done”: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/israels-strikes-little-damage-send-32623246
Russia’s recent strategic pact with Iran has a section (which turns out is identical to that in an older deal) obligates Russia to assist Iran if attacked. John Helmer in the above linked video argues that that obligation is much stronger than a lot of YouTubers seem to think (although I am sure he would concede it falls well short of sending forces). I think Russia absolutely would provide Iran with targeting info if Iran were attacked. It’s already widely believed that part of that deal is to integrate patchy-in-quality Iranian air defense into the very very good Russia air defense network. Russia has mighty good reasons of its own not to see Iran defeated.
Just to be clear, Deep Dive Defence is not the same as Daniel Davis’s channel (Deep Dive). I’m always loath to quote DDD as I don’t know the background of the channel or their sources, but it seems legit (and is regularly linked by other legit sources) and has a very good insight to the technical and engineering aspects of Iran’s defences and Israels capabilities.
In brief, DDD argues that the last Israeli attack involved very small scale, but very accurate and targeted strikes intended to demonstrate capabilities, without causing actual significant damage in order to de-escalate. The focus was not on the key nuclear facilities, but on ancillary plants associated with the overall supply chain.
Russia had a pact with Armenia (via the CSTO), which didn’t turn out well for Armenia, and Iran would be aware of this as they are very close allies. I’m absolutely sure Russia would provide satellite data at the very least for Iran, but as there are no shared borders or easy access, its difficult to know what else they can provide, apart from hardware. For the most part, targeting information has to be ‘live’ to be useful in a dynamic conflict like that, it would be very difficult to integrate the systems to achieve anything useful. Integrating modern systems defence like this is extremely complex – Iran has only recently (apparently) had success in integrating its own myriad patched up systems.
I think with Armenia, the Armenians in fact surendered to the Azeris and recognized their claim and then started badmouthing Russia for not protecting them (this is well after the recent war ended).
before war the Armenian PM has also done all kinds of things that undermined the defense capabilities. Pashinian got a lot of rope for himself, enough for several hangings, not only one.
+ 5th gen. Russian fighter bombers delivered to Iran if I remember Martyanov correctly from Febr. He will surely come back to the topic.
Betcha they will be armed with those extra long range air to air missiles that the Russians have been using in the Ukraine. And if one shoots down a B-2, the Russians will blandly reply when asked that it was not them but a proxy Iranian pilot that did the deed defending his country
They sold Su-35s – highly capable, but very much 4th Gen aircraft (or 4.5 if you belief the marketing guff).
Iran was apparently given a possible option of Su-57’s, but they decided that the Su-35 was more appropriate for their needs.
But listing individual weapons systems and adding up notional ranges or explosive power from Wikipedia pages is irrelevant. What matters is how they tie into doctrine (the same for every military) and how advanced and relevant the kill chains are – on both sides. Almost all relevant information is not in the public domain, so its all speculation.
PK, your analysis seems reasonable.
“The Iranian government has been very careful about falling for the bait set for it by the US and Israel, not to mention its other regional enemies/frenemies …”
Like this:
“Pentagon to move six B-2 stealth bombers, which CNN assessed to be a full 30% of the US’ stealth bomber fleet, to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.”
Russian intel [may/is] working with Iran is the subject of Larry Johnson SONAR 21 this AM.
Iran has advantages of distances and dispersion.
While bombing to achieve a strategic goal has a checkered history.
Thank you. Of course the Russians will help out contra the above premise. There’s no upside for Russia in a lunatic assault on Iran and China gets a lot of their oil from there. The blithe assumptions of the war hawkers are, as Johnson as said in other columns, quite daft.
Link to Larry’s latest. Russia will come to Iran’s help in different ways and according to UN charter and also to make sure that the logistical strategy that includes Iran will be implemented, just to get rid of dependecny of the West.
https://larrycjohnson.substack.com/p/will-russia-help-defend-iran-against
How do they “keep their heads down, their powder dry, and wait for strategic opportunities to arise…” when they have a two-month deadline to agree to “negotiate or face bombing the likes of which they have never seen” (as the belligerent loose cannon currently occupying the White House put it). Trump and Israel will settle for nothing less than total Iranian capitulation, on their terms and their timeframe. I remember you making the argument a few days into the Russian SMO in Ukraine that Putin had made a strategic blunder by invading as the correct play would have been to wait and continue engaging diplomatically with the securocrats in the West (this while the president of the Nazi-enamoured state menacing Russia’s border and slaughtering civilians en masse in the Donbass had announced, to rapturous applause at the Munich Security Conference, threats of Ukraine acquiring nukes). Putin had spent years pursuing the path of diplomacy with the West to get Russia’s security interests included in the broader calculus of a new European security architecture. That approach yielded no results as he was ignored, ridiculed and laughed at by the war-mongering EU and US elites drunk on their propaganda that their sanctions blitz would bring the Russian economy to its knees while the shiny high-tech wunderwaffen from Nato’s “defense tech sector” would wipe the floor with outdated Russian military tech on the battlefield. This would trigger an uprising that would remove Putin from power, or so the dazzling logic went. The point is, when the US and its vassals want war, they have the ability to engineer supporting conditions in a way that narrows the range of strategic options available to their targets.
In the case of Iran, Netanyahu senses that the moment for his decades long dream of getting the US to do a demolition job on Iran is at hand, and the window of opportunity won’t be open for long. Trump has packed his security and foreign policy cluster with rabid Zionist war mongers who are all-in on gunboat diplomacy, and half the american public are still transfixed by the Orange messiah and his revolutionary crusade to MAGA, and will likely buy any war he’s selling. These are the people that have Iran in their crosshairs, and they’re making maximalist demands that Iran will never accept. Iran has very little by way of Game Theory Optimal strategic choices here, unless if you see something I don’t.
Or as I would say: The USA’s pretext for war with Iran isn’t any weapons treaties, it’s the power of the Israel’s lobbyists.
“Netanyahu senses that the moment for his decades long dream of getting the US to do a demolition job on Iran is at hand, and the window of opportunity won’t be open for long.”
First, there is a stumbling block that must be dealt with: Ansarallah.
Attacking Iran while the Houthis can lob missiles and drones on the rear of the American forces is a risk that the staffs of the US Navy and US Air Force would definitely prefer not to run. Even with an arsenal that is smaller and less advanced than Iran’s, Yemen has proven it can cause no end of trouble to NATO vessels and aircraft (especially those Reaper drones).
Hence the massive, daily bombardments against Yemen that started a couple of weeks ago. Other people at NC have expressed doubts that Ansarallah can be subdued in that 2-months timeframe set by the Trump. We shall see.
The point is that the US/Israel is trying to provoke Iran into a rash response. The wisest thing for Iran to do is to do what its been doing for decades – work to its strengths, and not be forced into action by anyone else’s agenda. I’m sure that like everyone else they are perfectly well aware of how unstable Israel is becoming, and at how many allies Trump is losing. Time, as always is on their side.
As always with that region, the real action takes place behind closed doors – alliances being made, deals being cut (not least with the Saudi’s and Gulf States). Whatever the decision making process that goes on behind the scenes in Tehran, they’ve proven themselves to be patient and geopolitically aware, and like most relatively ‘weak’ countries will have a clear awareness of the limits of their own soft and hard power. While they’ve taken a bad beating in the Levant, they know what they are doing.
Out of curiosity PK, what might a rash response from Iran look like in your view? The only potential rash response I see is a preemptive strike, which the Iranians certainly wouldn’t be crazy enough to attempt. Tehran has said an attack on Iran would trigger a retaliatory response, which is the minimum the Iranian people would expect.
Anything that goes beyond the normal tit for tat (overt and covert) in the region would be rash. As Revenant suggested btl yesterday, some of the US moves might be intended to provoke a missile aimed at Diego Garcia (I doubt this is the case, but you never know with this lot).
‘Moscow doesn’t want war with Washington’ ,well its had it for 3 years anyway.
As Iran hasn’t produced a bomb mainly because it doesn’t want to force reciprocal moves by the Saudis, is this again Trump theater to keep Israel happy?
Houthis shooting down invisible B2s – here´s the catch – if they do, we´ll never find out…
It better be a target that cannot go into Cloak-mode.
I´ll spare you the Star Trek VI video-link on cloaked ships being destroyed.
I can’t understand the position and objectives of Iran. It makes no sense at all to me. If Iran had nuclear weapons (as it has North Korea), situation in my capacity would be far more stable, no matter if Saudi Arabia could get them too (even with Iran’s help). The main reason for Obama to deal the JCPOA was to avoid general proliferation, but I don’t think a collapse of NPT could trigger such a scenario. In fact, even before the TNP existence Sweden and Switzerland abandoned their nuclear programs (to have nuclear weapons) for a variety of reasons, including that the Swiss had a nuclear meltdown inside a mountain. It is far expensive (ask the British), and the warheades thenselves grant you nothing, you have to deliver them. Just now, I think only Japan, Germany and Brazil could have nuclear weapons, with enormous problems for the three before their public opinions, no lesser matter the budget. And we can discuss if the TNP has been something useful or a mere decorative treaty. All the countries that can or need such weaponry, they have it. I am not saying the treaty itself is unuseful, what makes it unuseful is the policies of the nuclear countries.
Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads and the US elites behave like if they don’t exist. Maybe the main reason for Iran not to have such weapon is not to see itself in the necessity of using it.
There are other factors like Khamanei’s fatwa, but I think Iran’s strategy can mostly be summed up as “the Japan option”. IDK all the details, but there’s a lot of thinking that getting as close to building a bomb without actually doing it is usually the sweet spot. You get most of the deterrence and all the benefits of a full fuel cycle (medical isotopes, research, naval reactors) with almost none of the downsides.
What I think is interesting, while I obviously don’t know for sure & it sounds conspiratorial, is that Iran may already have some tested nuclear devices, possibly since Trump’s 1st term. It would be very in character for the Iranians to cross the nuclear threshold quietly, talk about their nuclear posture as if that’s what they plan to do after they’re attacked, then let the political pride of their enemies (Trump, Netanyahu, even factions in the IAEA) run the cover-up for them. This also lets them quietly decommission any devices and tip-toe back to threshold status when the US & Israeli threats finally end
As I always argue, military capability, and even the performance of individual weapon systems mean very little in the abstract. It all depends on the relationship between the weapons systems employed, and, most of all, the objectives of the two sides. The real issue is whether the US knows what it wants to achieve, has a plan for achieving it by military force, and is able to do so in the face of Iranian defensive capabilities. To that extent, the arsenals of the two sides, in aggregate, are not the main issue. We do not know what capabilities the US might actually use, and against what targets, we do not know how Iran would choose to respond. I have to say that US objectives at anything less than rhetorical level are very unclear, and possible Iranian responses are not much clearer.
Yes, that is the big question. Its never been clear to me if either Israel or the neocons has a clear idea of what they are trying to achieve with Iran, or if they even have the same strategic objective – to some extent Iran is useful for Israel in that the traditional rivalry between KSA and Iran gives them leverage over other Arab States. And as has rarely been openly acknowledged, the fall of Assad fundamentally changes the strategic context for both Israel and Iran. I doubt either Tel Aviv or Tehran has failed to notice this.
And as you articulate more clearly that I could, endless discussions of individual weapons systems is almost entirely irrelevant to the outcome of a conflict. Wars are won and lost by doctrine, strategy and systems, not by wikipedia page lists of weapons capabilities.
In the slightly longer term, the UK has considered Persia/Iran strategically important since the 19th century, especially with regard to Russia.; the US/UK overthrew the Mossadegh govt. in 1953. Shah Reza Pahlavi in power (as a compatible regime) until 1979. Now the west does not have a compatible regime to deal with in general.
Perhaps installing another compatible regime in Tehran is an objective, given the geostrategic location vis a vis Russia and China, Belt and Road etc. may be a factor. More control over Iran’s vast energy reserves. There may be several reasons why war/regime change is desirable. What do you reckon?
Historically Iran was always very important as a key axis on the Silk Roads, and then of course it hit oil. It was the key source of oil for Britain in WWII. This was of course the motive for the coup that put the Shah in power when the Iranians developed the outrageous idea that maybe the oil belonged to them..
I don’t think Britain has had any real strategic interest since then, even for the occasional dreamer of Imperial dreams (one of my favourite old books is The Road to Oxania by Robert Byron, and account of travelling through the region to Afghanistan in the 1920’s – he combined a huge admiration for Persian culture with the conviction that it all rightfully belonged to the British Empire).
But nowadays, I’m not sure that it has any strategic interest, apart of course from all its oil and gas. Plus the perception that it is an enemy of the wests friends (Israel and the Gulf Arabs), which makes it an enemy. I’m not convinced that the neocons thinking is any more sophisticated than this.
I’m sure the neocons do dream of a friendly regime there, but unless they are exceptionally slow learners even the dimmest neocon must realise that the chance of engineering a coup for that is somewhat slim, although I’d never put it past various exile groups in the US to have persuaded at least some in Washington that there is some sort of pro-Western government in waiting. Plus of course one thing the Zionists and Wahhabists agree on is that persuading the US to wipe out their Persian enemy is maybe a cool idea, saves them having to do anything. And of course both are very influential in Washington.
Most likely, the neocons just want to smash it up as it is an enemy, and they hope that a reconstituted Persia with various independent chunks (Baltistan and Kurdistan, for example), might be more amenable to control. The problem for Iran is that this is something that many of their neighbours might generally think is a good idea too.
Thanks PK, I can agree with that. The only other possible interest would be to block Iran in China’s BRI and pry Iran away from Russia and China. It will be interesting to see if the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project is completed as well as Russia-Iran gas pipeline.
Totally agree with you, Aurelian, except I think the Iranians could have a relatively clear endgame in mind (not that I know this is their actual strategy). The 2 keys to remember are that Iran is now officially part of SCO and Venezuela is unofficially part of the Resistance Axis.
I don’t think it’s a coincidence China started a major naval exercise (maybe even an “exercise” like before Russia went into Ukraine) right when the US told the USS Carl Vinson to leave the theater. Similarly, Maduro has been keeping Guyana on a slow boil ever since the Gaza War started.
I could be wrong, but I suspect Iran’s plan if Trump commits to an attack isn’t to go all out, but use their society’s “hardness” to dissipate the US and free up allies to hit other theaters. It’s interesting that everybody forgets that’s what Iran’s allies have been doing primarily in the Gaza War; it’s grim and not the kind of war a materialist society would fight, but I don’t see any sign soaking up Israeli & now US fire isn’t slowly working and keeping Hamas alive.
The only strategic setback they’ve kind of seen is the Syrian government falling, and even that may turn to their advantage. The Assad gov clearly wasn’t much of an asset in its own right, and the loudly anti-resistance Syrians & Lebanese are looking more naive & clueless everyday. Apparently there are rumors just within the past couple days that Deraa locals are fighting the IDF independently of the gov in Damascus
I tried entering a longer post on this but the internet or some NC filter ate it. I think we’ll see, in rough order: (1) intense cyberattacks, (2) single atmospheric nuke used to generate an EMP frying as much of Iran’s military electronics as possible, (3) attempted decapitation strike on government with zero regard for how many civilian casualties come with it. Then, once enough chaos has been inflicted to kill a coordinated retaliation, bunker busters and MOABs flown in. Each stage will proceed with supreme confidence (AKA blind faith) and total disresepect for the UN and the laws of war as widely recognized. I have no idea if Iran is prepared for this and if it will work as desired by attackers.
Wesley Clark described a list of seven countries to “take out” based on discussions in 2001. Only Iran remains. I would say the US aim is to cross that last item off the checklist. Iran’s goal is to avoid that.
Talk today centers around first-strike and second-strike capabilities, as well as Iran’s deterrence – it claims the ability and willingness to stop oil flowing from the gulf. All are untested: Iran’s air defense, hardened target survivability, US bunker busters, B2 ability to operate in a contested environment particularly if Russia shares ISR info, the impact of Iran missiles on gulf targets, the possibility of Iran launching on warning of US launch. And potential orthogonal moves by Russia and China. Seems risky. But if the market continues to crater and layoffs result…
Iran’s nuclear programme began during the existence of the Imperial State of Iran (1925–1979) without any objections from Israel, USA and its European vassal states.
The succeeding Islamic Republic of Iran merely continued the nuclear programme from where the defunct Imperial Iran had left off. Therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for USA and Israel to interfere with Iran’s sovereign right under NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear programme. Paranoid fears of some secret nuclear weapons programme is no excuse.
Iran has done all it can by signing onto JCPOA, which Trump destroyed. Any attack on Iran will result in US military bases across the West Asian region being reduced to ashes. Israel won’t escape unscathed. Of course, there is the global economic meltdown from closure of the Strait of Hormuz.