Category Archives: Banking industry

Why the Obama Administration Will Hate Neil Barofsky’s Book “Bailout”

Having read an advance copy of former Special Inspector General of the TARP Neil Barofsky’s new book, Bailout, I am pretty confident most NC readers would enjoy it. He got to be what I call a designated asshole in his DC incarnation, not that that was the way it had to turn out. For some unfathomable reason, the Bush White House decided it wanted someone who’d take the SIGTARP role seriously in the job. And they chose a Democrat, perhaps figuring that as much as he’d be a thorn in their side, Obama would be hard pressed not to keep him on, and he’d be even more of a problem for them.

Six reasons why the Obama Administration will hate this book:

Spain Slides

By Delusional Economics, a regular blogger at MacroBusiness and a consulting editor at the Macro Investor newsletter. He is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint

It was an all round horrible night for Spain, starting with a bond auction that went a little wrong:

Quelle Surprise! New York Times’ “Deal Professor” Ignores Facts and Law to Defend Citi Employee Stoker in SEC Toxic CDO Case Rakoff Highlighted

While the New York Times’ DealBook section generally hews to a financial-services-industry-friendly line, presumably as a Faustian bargain for being a preferred leakee, there’s not even a weak defense for the article by the New York Times’ so called “Deal Professor” Steven Davidoff, “If Little Else, Banker’s Trial May Show Wall St. Foolishness.” It’s yet another brazen effort to diminish the seriousness of rampant fraud by arguing it was just carelessness. But to make his case, Davidoff misrepresents both the facts of the situation as well as the law. Since Davidoff’s lawyer union card is an explicit part of his brand at the Times, this story amounts to another credentialed effort to run the “nothing to see here, it’s too hard to get these guys” line that has become the Administration’s pet excuse for not going after one of its biggest sources of campaign funds.

Yanis Varoufakis: It is Now Official – The Eurozone’s Monetary Transmission System is Broken

By Yanis Varoufakis, Professor of Economics at the University of Athens. Cross posted from his blog

Under normal conditions, the interest rates that you and I must pay on a home loan, a car loan, our credit card, a business loan are pegged onto two crucial rates. One is the rate that banks charge one another in order to borrow from each other. The other is the Central Bank’s overnight rate. Alas, neither of these interest rates matter during this Crisis. While such ‘official’ rates are tending to zero (as Central Banks try to squeeze the costs of borrowing to nothing), the interest rates people and firms pay are much, much higher and track indices of fear and subjective estimates of the Eurozone’s disintegration.

Philip Pilkington: The New Monetarism Part I – The British Experience

By Philip Pilkington, a writer and journalist based in Dublin, Ireland. You can follow him on Twitter at @pilkingtonphil

While there are pretty stark dissimilarities between the current quantitative easing (QE) policies of many governments and the old monetarism that prevailed in the late-70s and early-80s, the reason that these both policies were ineffective is because they were based on the same flawed ideas. The key difference between the two is that where monetarism was implemented as a deflationary and contractionary policy, QE is currently being implemented as an inflationary and expansionary policy. As a result, examining the failure of monetarist policies thirty years ago provides important lessons considering QE and its offshoots.

Before looking at the similarities between these two doctrines, we will explore the actual historical trial of monetarism.

Sheila Bair on Bill Moyers: “Libor Always Troubled Me”

Bill Moyers starts with the Libor scandal as a way to get Sheila Bair’s perspective on the failure to get meaningful bank reforms. It’s refreshing to see how direct she is in saying the fixes aren’t hard, the problem is lack of will. She also discusses the death of moderate Republicans, and “free for all markets”.

Michael Crimmins: Why Hasn’t Jamie Dimon Been Fired by His Board Yet?

By Michael Crimmins, who has worked on risk management and Sarbanes Oxley compliance for major banks

JP Morgan’s jawdropping revelations in its Friday earnings call don’t seem to be attracting the attention they deserve. The market may have shrugged off the size of the losses and the corporate governance modifications plans, but the announcement opens the door wide for the next phase of this scandal. The biggest question is whether Jamie Dimon should keep his job.

Will the Libor Scandal Lead to Prosecutions? Some Hidden History and Current Prospects

We have a video double header, with both clips addressing the question of what action officials might take as a result of the escalating Libor scandal.

So How Much Did the Banksters Make on Libor-Related Ill-Gotten Gains?

Commentators and analysts have been starting to estimate what the costs to banks for their Libor manipulation might be. We’ve pointed to an estimate by the Economist that says the damages for municipal/transit authority swaps due to Libor suppression (during the crisis and afterwards) could be as high as $40 billion. Cut that down by 75% and you still have a pretty hefty number. Other observers (CFO Magazine) have argued that the losers were mainly other banks, and since banks are pretty much certain not to sue each other, the implication is the consternation is overdone. But these markets were so huge ($564 trillion was the 2011 trading volume in one contract, the CME Eurodollar contract, which uses dollar Libor as its reference rate) that even a little leakage to end customers still adds up to a lot of exposure.

Libor Investigation Extended to US Mortgages, but What About TALF Loans?

A good report by Shahien Nasiripour recounts that the OCC has woken up to what a hot potato the Libor scandal has become, and has identified the mortgages that might (stress might) have been hurt by the rate diddling.

To start with, the universe that might have been affected is not that large. Per the Financial Times account:

The Mortgage Condemnation Plan: Fleecing Municipalities as Well as Investors (Updated)

Beware of financiers bearing gifts.

A scheme proposed by a group called Mortgage Resolution Partners, which is being considered by San Bernardino, CA, to use the traditional power of eminent domain to condemn mortgages, was pretty certain to be a non-starter, so I’ve ignored it. But it’s gotten enough attention to have roused the ire of a whole host of financial services industry lobbying groups, as well as endorsements from Bob Shiller and Joe Nocera, and a thumb’s down from Felix Salmon, so it looked to be in need of serious analysis.

Are the Mice Starting to Roar? Municipalities Turn Defiant with Wall Street

Municipal finance has long been a cesspool. States, towns, hospitals, transit authorities, all have long been ripe for the picking. Sometimes local officials are paid off (anything from cold hard cash to gifts to skybox tickets), but much of the time, there’s no need to go to such lengths, since preying on their ignorance will do. As we’ve pointed out, even though these bodies often hire consultants, those advisors are often either not up to the task (how can people who don’t know finance vet an expert?) and/or have bad incentives (more complicated deals, which are generally more breakage prone, tend to produce higher consulting fees).

Dave Dayen highlighted one example yesterday: the city of Oakland has decided rather than pay $15 million in termination fees to get out of an interest rate swap deal gone bad: