Category Archives: Credit markets

Revisiting Rehypothecation: JP Morgan Markets Its Latest Doomsday Machine (or Why Repo May Blow Up the Financial System Again)

Yves here. One of our ongoing frustrations at NC is when the media and blogosphere get up in arms about what we think are secondary issues.

We’ve been loath to comment on a Thomson Reuters article that claimed that rehypothecation of assets in customer accounts was the reason MF Global customer funds went missing. The reason we’ve stayed away from this debate is that the article, despite its length, did not provide any substantiation for its claim. While it did contend that US customer accounts were set up so as to allow assets to be rehypothecated using far more permissive UK rules, and described how rehypothecation could be abused, it did not provide any proof that this was what took place at MF Global. Note that this does NOT mean we are saying that rehypothecation did not play a role, merely that the article was speculative.

The bombshell testimony of CME chief Terry Duffy yesterday, that a CME auditor heard an MF Global employee say that “Mr Corzine was aware of the loans being made from segregated [customer] accounts,” suggests that some of the money went missing via much more straightforward means, namely, taking it and hoping to be able to give it back if the firm survived.

But there is plenty of reason to be worried about rehypothecation.

From Bad to Worse for the IMF

By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.

For some time now I have been pointing out poor economic policy implementations within the European economy and how those policies are likely to effect the real economies of European nations. As I re-stated on Monday, my major concern with the current thinking from European economic leaders is their misguided belief that implementing austerity before credit write-downs/offs is a credible policy for a highly indebted, non-export competitive nation with a non-deflatable currency.

Wolf Richter: Germany’s Last-Ditch Compromise, At A Price

By Wolf Richter, San Francisco based executive, entrepreneur, start up specialist, and author, with extensive international work experience. Cross posted from Testosterone Pit.

“I’m very happy with the result,” Chancellor Angela Merkel told the cameras on Friday morning as she climbed out the limo. She talked about the start of a stability and fiscal union and didn’t want to accept any “lazy compromises.” But the vague agreement that emerged may be illegal under European Union law and may devastate weaker economies.

Eurocrisis Solutions For Whom?

This Real News Network segment was recorded before the supposed “this time we’re really gonna fix it” Eurozone deal was announced today. Nevertheless, it is a useful discussion of the political dynamics that drove the pact.

Quelle Surprise! EBA Raises Eurobank Capital Targets, Finds They Need to Raise €115 Billion

As we’ve discussed repeatedly, bank stress tests have been a confidence building exercise, an effort to talk bank CDS spreads down and bank stock prices up. That was clearly the intent of the first effort by the US Treasury in 2009 and it succeeded so well as a PR exercise that the Eurozone copied it last year, incredibly finding that obviously undercapitalized Eurobanks needed a mere €3.5 billion euros more in equity. Mere months after the release of the results, lenders were being much more stringent and shunning banks who had been given an official clean bill of health.

This pattern has continued. Earlier this year, the EBA said the Eurobanks needed €80 billion in additional capital. We hooted:

Eurobonds Are Likely To Increase The Risk Of Joint Defaults In The Eurozone

By Wolf Wagner, Professor of Economics, University of Tilburg. Cross posted from VoxEU

As government advisors and central bankers race through the different options to save the euro, this column argues that one such proposal, Eurobonds, will actually increase the risk that several Eurozone countries fail together. It shows using basic arithmetic that these bonds, sometimes labelled ‘stability bonds’, may actually be more likely to harm Eurozone stability.

Michael Olenick: Bank of America All In – Calling Moynihan’s Bluff to Bankrupt Countrywide

Yves here. As the headline indicates, the steps taken Bank of America that Michael Olenick describes in this article call into question the idea that Bank of America can shield itself by putting Countrywide into bankruptcy. Note that, some litigants, particularly AIG in its petition in opposition of the proposed $8.5 billion settlement of putback liability on 530 Countrywide trusts, made a persuasive case that Bank of America has operated Countrywide in such a way post acquisition so that it is no longer bankruptcy remote from BofA (that is, you can’t BK Countrywide and deny Countrywide creditors access to BofA assets).

Nevertheless, as attorney and former monoline executive Tom Adams noted by e-mail, the reason Bank of America might want the servicing at BofA rather than Countrywide if Countrywide is put into bankruptcy is probably to avoid a servicing termination event. If the servicer is bankrupt, the trustee or investors could, in theory, terminate them as servicer. This is really only theory, because almost no one (other than BofA) would want to be servicer for these loans, so it would be hard to see it as a driver of the changes Olenick describes.

An interesting related issue is that BofA, like other servicers in this new world of costly and lengthy foreclosures, is at risk of over advancing on mortgages. Servicers advance principal and interest even after a borrower has defaulted and reimburse themselves when the foreclosed property is sold. In theory, they can stop when a loan is clearly irrecoverable. In practice, historically many servicers have kept advancing up to the full principal balance of the loan. With loss severities rising and more borrowers fighting foreclosures, they can incur more costs than the house is worth, but on average, they still recover their advances. But with foreclosure timelines attenuating, legal costs escalating, and foreclosures grinding to a halt in states like Nevada, New York, and New Jersey, where they are now real sanctions for filing questionable foreclosure documentation, servicers face increasing doubts about their ability to recover advances from the proceeds of home sales. I hope the FDIC is watchful enough not to allow deposits to be used to fund servicer advances.

By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)

Central Banks Plan for Possible Euro Breakup as Merkel Focuses on Wrong Issues

The denial about the existential nature of the Eurozone crisis seems to be lifting. The press has featured reports of companies and banks doing contingency planning for the possibility of a Euro dissolution or exits by some member states.

In keeping, the Wall Street Journal tonight reports that even central banks are starting to contemplate what had heretofore been unthinkable:

Obama Road Tests Hopey-Changey Big Lie 2.0: He’ll Reincarnate as Teddy Roosevelt if You Are Dumb Enough to be Fooled Twice

Wow, I have to hand it to Obama’s spinmeisters. They’ve managed to find a way to resurrect his old hopium branding by calling it something completely different that still has many of the old associations.

And we have a twofer in Obama’s launch of his new branding as True Son of Teddy Roosevelt. Never mind that Teddy, unlike Obama, was accomplished in many walks of life and had meaningful political accomplishments (such as reforming the corrupt New York City police department) before becoming President at the tender age of 42. The second element of this finesse is that Obama is using the Rooseveltian imagery to claim he will pass legislation to get tough on Big Finance miscreants. That posture, is of course meant to underscore the idea that you just can’t get the perps with the present, weak set of laws.

Team Obama may have planned to wheel this new, improved image out later, with the timing accelerated by Judge Jed Rakoff’s decision against a proposed $285 million settlement between the SEC and Citigroup over a bum CDO in which Citi allegedly wielded considerable influence over its contents so it could bet against it.

Bernanke Escalates Foodfight with Bloomberg: Score Bloomberg 1, Fed 0

It’s telling that the Fed was dumb enough to try upping the ante in its ongoing fight with Bloomberg News over the central bank’s refusal to disclose many critical details about its emergency lending programs during the crisis. Any poker player will tell you you don’t raise with a weak hand when the other side is pretty certain to call your bluff.

For those who have been too preoccupied with Europe to keep track of this wee contretemps, Bloomberg last week released a news story that received a great deal of follow through in the media and the blogosphere on the latest information it extracted from the Fed under duress.

Bernanke sent a letter that is pissy by the standards of Fed discourse to Tim Johnson, Richard Shelby, Spencer Bachus, and Barney Frank (the big dogs of banking in Congress). Given that Obama had to whip personally to get Bernanke reappointed, and that antipathy towards the central bank is a rare bipartisan cause, writing an aggrieved letter to powerful Congresscritters is not an obvious way to win friends and influence people.

And particularly a letter like this one. Get a load of how it begins:

“No People, No Problem”: The Baltic Tigers’ False Prophets of Austerity

By Jeffrey Sommers, an associate professor of political economy in Africology at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and visiting faculty at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Arunas Juska, associate professor of sociology at East Carolina University and an expert on the Baltics, and Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist and a rofessor at University of Missouri, Kansas City . Cross posted from Counterpunch.

The Baltic states have discovered a new way to cut unemployment and cut budgets for social services: emigration. If enough people of working age are forced to leave to find work abroad, unemployment and social service budgets will both drop.

This simple mathematics explains what the algebra of austerity-plan advocates are applauding today as the “New Baltic Miracle” for Greece, Spain, and Italy to emulate. The reality, however, is a model predicated on economic shrinkage as a result of wage cuts.

NYT’s James Stewart Runs PR for Compromised SEC Chief Khuzami Against Judge Rakoff on Proposed $285 Million Citi CDO Settlement

Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive, provided considerable input into this post.

There is nothing more useful to people in authority than when a writer with an established brand name does their propagandizing for them.

Harvard Law graduate and Pulitzer Prize winning author James B. Stewart penned a remarkable little piece in the New York Times over the weekend. Titled “Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi,” it contends that Judge Jed Rakoff’s ruling against a proposed $285 million SEC settlement with Citigroup over a $1 billion CDO (Class V Funding III) that delivered $700 million in losses to investors and $160 million in profits to Citi is misguided. Stewart argues, based on “some reporting,” that the SEC is unlikely to do better in the trial that Rakoff has forced on the agency by nixing the settlement.

We will look at the caliber of Stewart’s “reporting” in due course, since his article reads like dictation from the SEC’s head of enforcement Robert Khuzami (the SEC’s interests are aligned with Citi’s in wanting the settlement to go through). He either did not read or chose to ignore critical information in the underlying complaints, which the Rakoff ruling cites, and he also overlooked relevant cases.

Richard Alford: The Lender of Last Resort, the Fed and the ECB

By Richard Alford, a former New York Fed economist. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

In “Lombard Street” published in 1873, Bagehot specified the purpose of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) as forestalling bank panics in fractional reserve banking systems. Bagehot also provided criteria that define LOLRs, which remain relatively unchanged. In fact, the Bagehot criteria have become something of a mantra: Lend freely at penalty rates against good collateral to illiquid but solvent banks. Given Bagehot’s purpose and definition, has the crisis of 2008 provided a test of the Fed as an LOLR? If so how well did the Fed perform? What are the ECB’s responsibilities as the LOLR in Europe in 2011?

Alan Grayson on GAO Report on the Fed

Yves here. There has been a lot of press, deservedly so, on the information that Bloomberg managed to pry out of the Fed on its emergency lending programs during the crisis. The Fed again is in crisis mode, again in a controversial and arguably compromised position in extending currency swaps to the ECB to provide dollar liquidity to European banks. They are having difficulty securing funding because US money market funds are no longer keen about parking money with them and US regulators have been discouraging banks from extending credit lines to them. As a consequence, another set of important revelations about Fed conduct, namely, the release of the results of a GAO review of crisis related Fed operations, is not getting the attention it warrants.

David Apgar: Could Germany Be Right about the Euro?

By David Apgar, co-founder of GoalScreen, a web app still in trials that lets investors test alternative price drivers of specific securities (free though the end of the year at www.goalscreen.com. He has been a manager at the Corporate Executive Board, McKinsey, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Lehman, and writes at www.goalscreen.com/blog.

What if there are good reasons for the preternatural calm of German Chancellor Merkel’s inner circle as the English-language media (based, after all, in the investor capitals of London and New York) light their collective hair on fire about the euro’s imminent immolation? Surprisingly, you can make a decent argument that the euro zone is at no risk of breakup – unless someone secretly switches its purpose from facilitating European trade to providing investors an implicit guarantee against losses.