Category Archives: Federal Reserve

Philip Pilkington: The History of Greed – An Interview with Jeff Madrick

Jeff Madrick is a journalist, economic policy consultant and analyst. He is also the editor of Challenge magazine, which seeks to give alternative views on economics issues, as well as a visiting professor of humanities at The Cooper Union, director of policy research at the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, The New School, a senior fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and the author of numerous books. His latest book, The Age of Greed, is available from Amazon.

Interview conducted by Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer based in Dublin, Ireland.

Philip Pilkington: Your book The Age of Greed is a detailed historical survey of some of the key figures that facilitated — broadly speaking — the transition away from the progressive, government-regulated economy of the post-war years and toward the finance-driven, deregulated economy in which we now live. In this interview I don’t want to focus on all the figures that crop up in the book as that is done so there in great detail. Instead I want to explore the broad sweep of this history focusing both on some of the more recognisable of these figures and on the actual cultural, political and economic shift that took place over this period.

The Fed Twists in the Breeze

Mr. Market so far is not at all impressed with the announcement today that the Fed will be changing the composition of its portfolio by selling $400 billion of near-dated Treasuries and buying the same amount of longer maturity Treasuries. Since the Fed will maintain the same Fed funds target rate, the Fed’s intent is to keep short term rates low and also reduce longer term rates.

The fallacy with the Fed approach, as our Marshall Auerback has pointed out repeatedly, is that targeting a quantity means the central bank has no idea what result it will achieve.

The Very Important and of Course Blacklisted BIS Paper About the Crisis

Admittedly, my RSS reader is hardly a definitive check, but it does cover a pretty large number of financial and economics websites, including those of academics. And from what I can tell, an extremely important paper by Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat of the BIS, “Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?” has been relegated to the netherworld. The Economist’s blog (not the magazine) mentioned it in passing, and a VoxEU post on the article then led the WSJ economics blog to take notice. But from the major economics publications and blogs, silence.

Why would that be? One might surmise that this is a case of censorship.

Richard Alford: The (Re)Education of Ben Bernanke and the FOMC

By Richard Alford, a former New York Fed economist. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

When you compare Bernanke’s “Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here” speech of 2002 with his recent Jackson Hole speech, you cannot help but notice changes in his view of the economy and the financial system as well as a significant decline in his confidence in the ability of monetary policy to insure full employment,. The changes between the speeches and the possible explanations for the changes have implication for the course of Fed policy in the near and medium terms as well as the long-run health of the US economy. They suggest that the FOMC sees less upside to further stimulative policy actions and at the same time sees possible downsides where it had not seen them before. This, in turn, suggests that the FOMC will be more tentative in adopting further nonconventional stimulative measures than past behavior would indicate.

Bank of New York: A Train Wreck Waiting to Happen?

Many readers no doubt know that the so-called $8.5 billion Bank of America mortgage settlement, which was between the Charlotte bank and the Bank of New York as trustee for 530 residential mortgage securitizations, had run into some very serious headwinds. The deal had to be approved in a so-called Section 77 hearing; a number of interested parties, including some investors, the attorneys general of New York and Delaware, and the FDIC, raised questions and objections to the deal, as well as to the use of a Section 77 hearing (which sets a very high bar for opposing an agreement). Although this saga has a quite a few more rounds to go, it looks likely that any settlement will be considerably delayed and will wind up costing Bank of America a good bit more than $8.5 billion.

What has gotten less attention is the implication of the probable derailment of this deal for the Bank of New York, and its vulnerability to mortgage litigation.

More on the European Bank Bailout

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns Overnight, a group of us were exchanging e-mails on the recent coordinated central bank action to provide European banks the funding being denied them by the markets. I haven’t been active on the e-mail chain, but I did find some of the commentary interesting. I had a few comments of note […]

Summer Rerun: A Conflict of Interest is Not a Conflict of Interest If It Involves Goldman

This post first appeared on May 4, 2009

The “all animals are created equal, but some are more equal than others” logic appears to operate in full force as far as Goldman is concerned. Violations of normal rules of conduct are not merely tolerated, but are asserted to be acceptable.

Now admittedly, the latest news tidbit, of former Goldman co-chairman Steven Friedman staying on as chairman of the New York Fed after Goldman became a bank holding company, isn’t as troubling as when current Goldman chief Lloyd Blankfein was the only Wall Street denizen to meet with Hank Paulson when the Treasury was deciding what to do about AIG. Readers may recall that Goldman had the biggest exposure to AIG and thus had the most to benefit from a course of action that would be generous to counterparties (who had chosen of their own cognizance to enter into contracts with the big insurer).

What is disturbing about the Wall Street Journal is the moral blindness of too many of the key actors, namely Friedman himself and some Fed officials.

Corrupt Obama Administration Pressuring New York Attorney General to Support Mortgage Whitewash

It is high time to describe the Obama Administration by its proper name: corrupt.

Admittedly, corruption among our elites generally and in Washington in particular has become so widespread and blatant as to fall into the “dog bites man” category. But the nauseating gap between the Administration’s propaganda and the many and varied ways it sells out average Americans on behalf of its favored backers, in this case the too big to fail banks, has become so noisome that it has become impossible to ignore the fetid smell.

The Administration has now taken to pressuring parties that are not part of the machinery reporting to the President to fall in and do his bidding. We’ve gotten so used to the US attorney general being conveniently missing in action that we have forgotten that regulators and the AG are supposed to be independent. As one correspondent noted by e-mail, “When officials allegiances are to El Supremo rather than the Constitution, you walk the path to fascism.”

The Sucking Sound of Liquidity Draining From the Eurobank Market

As much as the dot com era conditioned US individual investors to focus on stock market movements, credit markets are where the real action lies. Deterioration in the bond markets almost without exception precedes stock market declines (although debt instruments can also send out false positives). In the stone ages of my youth, the rule of thumb was a four-month lag. In 2007, that guide was not at all bad. The bond market turn began in June 2007 (yours truly took note of it then, see here for the critical development, but was not convinced it was the Big One until corroborating data came in in July). The stock market obligingly peaked in October 2007.

Now given the extraordinary degree of government interventions, turns are not as obvious, market upheavals have repeatedly been beaten back, and relationships between stock and bond market price movements are likely to be less reliable than in the past. But one thing that is a clear danger signal is liquidity leaving the banking system. It’s like the preternatural calm when the water leaves the beach, revealing much more shore than usual, before the tsunami rolls in.

For whatever reason

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns Paul Krugman has another piece up on MMT. I like this piece a lot more than the last one he wrote. I suggest you read it. Here’s the one passage I do find troubling, however: Let’s have a more or less concrete example. Suppose that at some future date — a […]

Quelle Surprise! New York Fed Director Shills for Bank of New York, Argues Against Rule of Law

Given the Federal Reserve’s abysmal regulatory record in the runup to the crisis (even the uber bank friendly Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was more aggressive in going after subprime abuses, for instance), it should be no surprise that some of its directors are utterly lacking in propriety and common sense when it comes to defending the rights of banks to profit at the expense of customers and society at large.

The only good news about the latest example is that it was so ineptly done that it appears to be backfiring.

Summer rerun: Misunderstanding Modern Monetary Theory

This is a post I wrote last summer clarifying some points that I have learned about Modern Monetary Theory. The genesis of the post was a gross mischaracterization of Modern Money Theory (MMT) by Paul Krugman in a piece called “I Would Do Anything For Stimulus, But I Won’t Do That (Wonkish)”, which Paul Krugman […]

Irony Alert: If This is 72 Hours of Central Bankers Trying to Save the World, What Would Abject Capitulation Look Like? (Updated)

Reader Valissa pointed to an article at Bloomberg which looks like an effort at hagiography gone flat. Titled “Central Bankers Worldwide Race to Save Growth in 72 Hours of Policymaking,” it tries to perpetuate the myth of the overlords of the money system as all powerful, concerned with the public good, and competent. But as we know, they are increasingly politicized, hostage to ideology, unduly concerned with the pet wishes of banks, and tend to deny the existence of problems until they are acute.

Look at this impressive list of actions: