Category Archives: Federal Reserve

Scott Fullwiler: QE3, Treasury Style—Go Around, Not Over the Debt Ceiling Limit

By Scott Fullwiler, Associate Professor of Economics at Wartburg College. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives

Cullen Roche’s excellent post at Pragmatic Capitalism explains—via comments from frequent MMT commentator Beowulf (see here) and several previous posts by fellow MMT blogger Joe Firestone (see the links at the end of Cullen’s post and also here and here)—that the debt ceiling debate could be ended right now given that the US Constitution bestows upon the US Treasury the authority to mint coins (particularly platinum ones). Further, this simple change would lift the veil on how current monetary operations work and thereby demonstrate clearly that a currency-issuing government under flexible exchange rates cannot be forced into default against its will and is not beholden to “vigilante” bond markets. As Beowulf explains in a later comment, “The anomaly it addresses is that the US Govt has a debt limit yet an agency of the US Govt (the Federal Reserve) does not have a debt limit. Clearly this is a structural defect.”

The following is a description of how the process would work and the implications for monetary operations:

The Sorrow and the Pity of Economists (Like DeLong) Not Learning from Their Mistakes

I hate to seem to be beating up on Brad DeLong. Seriously.

As I’ve said before, he is one of the few economists willing to admit error and not try later to minimize or recant his admission (unlike, say, Greenspan). And he seems genuinely perplexed and remorseful. This puts his heads and shoulders above a lot of his colleagues, at least the sort whose opinion carries weight in policy circles.

Even with DeLong making an earnest effort to figure out why he went wrong, his latest musings, via a Bloomberg op-ed, “Sorrow and Pity of Another Liquidity Trap,” show how hard it is for economist to unlearn what they think they know. And as the great philosopher Will Rogers warned us, “It’s not what you know that gets you in trouble. It’s what you know that ain’t so.”

So it’s important to regard DeLong as an unusually candid mainstream economist, and treat his exposition as reasonably representative if you could somehow get his peers to take a hard, jaundiced look at how wrong they have been of late.

DeLong’s mea culpa is about how he and his colleagues refused to take the idea that the US could fall into a liquidity trap seriously. As an aside, this is already a troubling admission, since many observers, including yours truly, though the Fed was in danger of creating precisely that sort of problem if if dropped the Fed funds rate below 2%. It would leave itself no wriggle room if the crisis continued and it had to lower rates further into the territory where further reductions would not motivate changes in behavior. That’s assuming we were in a “normal” environment. But the big abnormality is that we are in what Richard Koo calls a balance sheet recession. And as we will discuss below, Keynes (and Minsky) had a very keen appreciation of the resulting behavior changes, but those ideas were abandoned by Keynesians (it is key to remember that Keynesianism contains significant distortions and omissions from Keynes’ thinking.

But notice how he starts his piece:

Fed Releases More Details on Its Effort to Bail Out Lehman and Other Dealers

Bloomberg has a new story on its continuing efforts to pry more information out of the Fed on who borrowed what when in the runup to the financial crisis. The central bank had refused to provide details of what various needy financial firms had gotten under its single tranche open markets operations program, which was launched in March 2008. Lehman received a peak amount of $18 billion out of a total program size of $80 billion.

Now why does all this matter?

Are Self-Dealing Parties Settling $242 Billion of Bank of America Liabilities for Way Too Little?

A petition filed by some unhappy investors on Tuesday raises some serious challenges to the so-called Bank of America mortgage settlement. The embattled bank hopes to shed liability for alleged misrepresentations made by Countrywide on loans sold in 530 mortgage trusts with $424 billion in par value. We said it was a bad deal for investors because, among other things, it included a very broad waiver of a very valuable right, that of being able to sue over so-called chain of title issues (in very crude terms, whether the parties to the deal did all the things they promised to do to convey the loans properly to the mortgage trust).

This action raises three sets of different issues: the conflicts of interest among the parties trying to push this deal through, the process used to finalize the deal, which this pleading contends were devised to give the other investors short shrift; and the inadequate amount of the settlement, not only for parties that have tried to move their own putback litigation forward, but arguably for all parties.

Ron Paul Suggests Using Fed to End Run Debt Ceiling Impasse

The only reason to think Republicans are serious about their threat to have the Federal government default rather than raise the debt ceiling is that they have an undue fondness for apocalyptic outcomes. I suppose I should actually favor this sort of thing; I’ve long thought the only hope for getting the US freed from rule by financiers was another financial crisis, provided it came soon enough and it was big enough. This one might fit the bill on those scores.

However, with the immediate trigger being pigheaded Congressmen, the banks might look like innocent victims, when the ballooning of public debt around the world was the direct result of their recklessness and the resultant global economy near-death experience. So a debt-ceiling-row-induced great big financial dislocation would probably not produce the opportunity to break the power of banks that yours truly and many others are looking for.

As the hour of reckoning approaches, more and more creative ideas to disarm the Republican weapon are being put forward, and an intriguing one comes from, of all places, a Republican, Ron Paul.

Summer Rerun – The Empire Continues to Strike Back: Team Obama Propaganda Campaign Reaches Fever Pitch

Readers new to this site may be unfamiliar with our summer reruns, in which we reprise vintage NC posts that we think have stood the test of time pretty well.

We’ve done these more or less in chronological order (our last one was our post on the unveiling of the TARP), but we decided to skip ahead to one in 2010 because it focuses on a crucial bit of history that is too often overlooked, and were were reminded of it by a very good Frank Rich piece in New York Magazine on Obama’s failure to bring bankers to account.

Even Rich’s solid piece treats Obama more kindly that he should be. He depicts the President as too easily won over by “the best and the brightest) in the guise of folks like Robert Rubin and his protege Timothy Geithner.

We think this characterization is far too charitable. Obama had a window in time in which he could have acted, decisively, to rein the financial services in, and he and his aides chose to let it pass and throw their lot in with the banksters. That fatal decision has severely constrained their freedom of action, as we explain below.

Government: The Dominant Player in US Credit Markets?

The latest column by Gillian Tett provides further support for our pet thesis: that the role of the state in banking is so great and the subsidies so wideranging that they cannot properly be considered private companies and should be regulated as utilities.

Key extracts:

DeLong Illustrates Why We Should Be Scared of Economists

Several readers sent me links to a Brad DeLong post which they took to be a rebuttal to a takedown I did of a recent Ezra Klein piece.

Since DeLong did not link to or mention my post, I doubt his piece had anything to do with mine. But his post is noteworthy for a completely different reason: it illustrates how economists have refused to learn much, if anything, from the crisis.

What can the Fed do?

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns The Federal Reserve has released its latest statement on the state of the US economy.Its Chairman Ben Bernanke has now spoken to the press as well. The overall assessment was rather downbeat. (video below) Monetary Policy’s Impotence If you compare the Fed statement to its previous one, you will understand the […]

Ezra Klein Should Stick to Being Wrong About Health Care

A recent post by Ezra Klein, “What ‘Inside Job’ got wrong,” manages the impressive feat of being spectacularly off base, rhetorically dishonest, and embarrassingly revealing of the lack of a moral compass all at once.

Since being off base is a major part of Klein’s brand, I suppose one should not be surprised; those who’ve had the good fortune to have limited contact with his output can read Jon Walker’s “Ezra Klein: Insurance Exchanges Don’t Work and Must be Expanded Dramatically,” or Physicians for a National Health Care Program’s “Does Ezra Klein really think ‘managed care didn’t kill anyone’?” for two of many examples.

I’m going to shred this piece in some detail, first, because it will be entertaining, and second, I hope that it will encourage readers to take a cold, bloodyminded look at the excuses made for malfeasance in our elites.

Mirabile Dictu! Central Bankers Getting Concerned About Bank Capital Levels Rather Late in the Reform Game

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III. Per Bloomberg:

The ECB’s Target2 activities are not constraining German credit growth

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns Perhaps you have seen Hans-Werner Sinn’s incendiary commentary from 1 Jun on the ECB’s stealth bailout. Well, Karl Whelan who has many years’ central bank experience finds that “Professor Sinn’s analysis is incorrect and that his policy prescriptions are extremely dangerous”. He wrote a recent post at Vox, which Credit Writedowns […]

AIG Does It Again: Sale of Maiden Lane II Assets Tanking Credit Markets

Readers may recall that AIG had approached the Fed about buying the entirely of its Maiden Lane II portfolio, the off balance sheet vehicle established to hold the non-CDO assets removed from the otherwise bankrupt insurer. The logic appeared to be that the insurer would be able to liquify its equity in the vehicle. It seemed pretty obvious at the time that the Fed could not justify selling the whole book to AIG; if there were any gains in the actual book, it would be a subsidy to AIG. The bid was also thus a strategy to force the vehicle to be unwound and any gains to be realized (which would lead AIG showing a profit on its position).

The problem is the “profit” appears to have been based on optimistic accounting, something we found to be the case in the Fed off balance sheet we’ve analyzed at length, Maiden Lane III. As Jim Chanos noted by e-mail, “Real transaction prices are not good for some of the ‘marks’ in many portfolios!” Needless to say, this also calls into question the use of Blackrock as asset manager, since the valuations were based on its marks.

William Dudley on Economic Policy

Cross -posted from Credit Writedowns New York Fed Chief William Dudley gave a speech yesterday called “U.S. Economic Policy in a Global Context” (hat tip Yves Smith). Dudley’s overall aim was to show that one must regard US policy in an international context and not based on domestic factors alone. I think the whole Speech […]

Fed’s Use of $80 Billion Facility as Subsidy Vehicle Confirms Regulatory Deficiencies

Bob Ivry has done a solid job of reporting on some of the documents that Bloomberg forced the Fed to release through a Freedom of Information Act request. In short form, the Fed created a special facility called the single-tranche open- market operations. It was established in March 7, 2008, the week before the Bear meltdown, and continued through the end of December. The facility size was $80 billion and the program was limited to 20 primary dealers. Three groups, Credit Suisse, Goldman, and Royal Bank of Scotland each borrowed at least $30 billion at various points.

Why is this program now controversial?