Category Archives: Investment banks

A Straightforward Criminal Case Against Wall Street CEOs and Senior Executives

Various people who ought to know better, such as the New York Times’ Joe Nocera, haven taken to playing up the party line of the banking industry and I am told, the SEC, that we should resign ourselves to letting senior financial services industry members get away with having looted their firms and leaving the rest of us with a very large bill.

It is one thing to point out a sorry reality, that the rich and powerful often get away with abuses while ordinary citizens seldom do. It’s quite another to present it as inevitable. It would be far more productive to isolate what are the key failings in our legal, prosecutorial, and regulatory regime are and demand changes.

The fact that financial fraud cases are often difficult does not mean they are unwinnable. And a prosecutor does not need to prevail in all, or even most, to serve as an effective cop on the beat.

Contrary to prevailing propaganda, there is a fairly straightforward case that could be launched against the CEOs and CFOs of pretty much every US bank with major trading operations.

Wisconsin’s Walker Joins Government Asset Giveaway Club (and is Rahm Soon to Follow?)

Mike Konczal (thanks to ed at ginandtacos) reported earlier today on the latest release of a movie coming to states and cities all over the US, namely the sale of state and local government assets to alleviate pressures on strained budgets.

For those new to this concept, the term of art is the anodyne “infrastructure sales” and the company that more or less invented this lucrative business is Macquarie Bank of Australia (known down under as “the millionaires factory”), although US firms clearly intend to exploit the once in a lifetime opportunity presented by widespread state and municipal budget distress and downgrades.

The problem, of course, is that these deals put important public resources paid for by taxes (or even worse, financed by bonds and thus potentially not even yet fully paid for) in the hands of private investors. They then earn their returns by charging user fees of various sorts. The public must rely on the new owners for reinvestment and maintenance, and depending on how the deal is negotiated, may have ceded control as far as fee increases are concerned. This is tantamount to selling the family china only to have to rent it back in order to eat dinner.

Haldane Unto the Breach

We remarked before that attempts to nobble Mervyn King would soon bring other UK bank reformers out of the woodwork, and we have a confirming sighting today, via a puzzled tweet from @EconOfContempt: Strange op-ed by Andrew Haldane in the FT. No one is really pushing the argument that he’s trying to shoot down EoC […]

The Project Merlin Back Story

Not a bad couple of week’s work for the banks, since the “Project Merlin” publicity? Actually it’s taken a bit longer than that, and reconstruction of some of the behind-the-scenes action might be instructive. Although other banks get walk-on parts, the story is mostly about Barclays. Let’s start the timeline in September 2010, when John […]

King Dinged

Soon-to-be-unemployed sports team managers the world over know what it means when they receive an affirmation of full confidence from the club chairman. Accordingly, we know roughly what to make of this: ‘The Bank of England has credibility,’ said Osborne (pictured). ‘I have complete confidence in it.’ The chancellor will not alter the 2% inflation […]

Goldman “Partner” Hedging Circumvents Intent of Pay Reforms

While I don’t want to overdo the criticism of Wall Street pay practices (on second thought, I am not sure such a thing is possible), I’d be remiss if I neglected to highlight a very good job of analysis and reporting by Eric Dash of the New York Times (and Footnoted.org) on this topic.

The Times has been picking apart a partnership that Goldman preserved after it went public in 1999 and is the vehicle that holds stock options and shares allotted to the top producers of the firm, a 475 member group. It already holds 11.2% of the firm and its share is likely to increase as options vest.

The report published tonight reveals that members of the Goldman partnership would routinely hedge their Goldman exposures. That defeats the purpose of share grants and equity linked pay.

The Specious Logic of Wall Street Pay

It’s remarkable how Masters of the Universe, the new financial elite first identified by Tom Wolfe in 1986, remember nothing and regret nothing. And why should they? Their position remains remarkably secure 25 years later.

We see the “Who us, take responsibility for our actions?” stance in full view courtesy one of their most effective spokesman, Steve Eckhaus, an attorney who has negotiated many big ticket Wall Street compensation contracts. From the Wall Street Journal:

“It was understandable why there was anger,” says Mr. Eckhaus, but “the crisis was not caused by Wall Street fat cats. It was caused by a confluence of economic, political and historical factors.”..

In general, he said his clients are “pure as the driven snow” and doing work that supports the economy and justifies their pay….

“You have to know what the profits are” to know what someone should make, said Mr. Eckhaus, noting Wall Street’s top performers usually gobble up 80% of the bonus pool. “Those who are responsible for profits should share in the profits in a way that rewards them.””

This is the usual “heads I win, tails you lose” logic. The rationale for bulging pay packets is that the producers created it, therefore they deserved their cut. But Eckhaus says any bad events are due only to bad luck. Sorry to tell you, but only narcissists and their agents take credit for good stuff and lay the blame on everyone else. Unfortunately, we breed for that in Corporate America, it happens to be a very effective career strategy in large organizations.

FCIC Insiders Say Report Gives Wall Street a Free Pass, Simply Sought to Validate Conventional Wisdom About Crisis

From the very outset, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was set up to fail. Its leadership, particularly its chairman, Phil Angelides, was seen as insufficiently experienced in sophisticated finance. The timetable was unrealistic for a thorough investigation of a crisis this complex, let alone one international in scope. Its budget and staffing were too small. The investigations were further hampered by the requirement that subpoenas have bi-partisan approval along with Its decision to hold hearings with high profile individuals, including top Wall Street executives, before much in the way of lower-level investigation had been completed. The usual way to get meaningful disclosure from a top executive is to confront him with hard-to-defend material or actions; interrogations under bright lights, while a fun bit of theater, generally yield little in the absence of adequate prep.

So with expectations for the FCIC low, recent reports that the panel urged various prosecutors to launch criminal probes were a hopeful sign that the commission might nevertheless come out with some important findings. But correspondence from insiders in the last few days suggests otherwise. One, for instance, wrote, “I’m still in the process of getting the stink out of my clothes.”

These ideologically-neutral sources close to the investigation depict the commissioners as having pre-conceived narratives and of fitting various tidbits unearthed during the investigation into these frameworks, with the majority focusing more on the problems caused by deregulation and the failure of the authorities to use even the powers they had, while the minority assigns blame to government meddling, particularly housing-friendly policies.

These insiders see both sides as wrong, and want to encourage investigative reporters to challenge both the majority and dissenting accounts. They contend that both versions help perpetuate the myth that Wall Street was as much a victim of the crisis as anyone else.

One of these sources sent this document in an effort to question the notion that any of the reports coming out of the FCIC were the result of a fact-based investigative process…

Roger Ehrenberg’s Prescription for Robbing a Bank (the TBTF Variety)

One of the continued frustrations of the post-crisis period is the lack of discussion of looting, which as described in a seminal paper by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, is when executives find it more profitable to gamble on bankruptcy, as in lever up their companies, pull out too much in cash (usually with the help of overly flattering accounting) and leave failed businesses in their wake. Akerlof and Romer noted that businesses with explicit or implicit guarantees were particularly well suited to this sort of extractive behavior, and they argued the savings and loan crisis was a prototypical example. In ECONNED, we argued that the producers and management of major capital markets players were engaged in a looting 2.0 in the runup to the crisis.

Roger Ehrenberg, who had a long career in derivatives and now runs an early stage venture firm. He describes how easy it is to, as he puts it, “rob a bank” or loot. His formula:

“Summer” Rerun: Welcome Willem Buiter and Mohamed El-Erian to the Banana Republic Club!

The time has come to announce the formation of the Banana Republic Club. Membership is open, with the sole requirement being that nominees correctly discern behaviors in advanced economies that resemble those of corrupt developing countries, which for sake of convenience are referred to as banana republics. Members are eligible to receive a Carmen Miranda hat, although they are not required to wear it.

Brad DeLong has his Ancient and Hermetic Order of the Shrill. Why should he have all the fun?

“Summer” Rerun: CNBC Publicizes This Blog

This post first appeared on June 8, 2008

I suppose I should be pleased, since readers wrote to inform me that Charles Gasparino of CNBC made mention of us on Friday (this clip, starting at 1:30) for our coverage of Lehman. However, I would have been happier if the statements made were correct. It’s remarkable that a seasoned journalist would assert that a critic of a company was short its stock, which implies an intent to manipulate its price, with no factual basis for that view, and no effort made to verify that statement. And indeed it is untrue, for I have never been short Lehman or indeed, any stock.

It’s even more remarkable that that same journalist called me a couple of hours later to threaten litigation over the accuracy of my reporting.

Mirabile Dictu! Ernst & Young Faces Fraud Charges in Lehman Collapse

had given up on the idea that anyone associated with Lehman would be charged with fraud, even though it was blindingly obvious even before the investment bank failed that it was up to no good. So tonight’s report in the Wall Street Journal, that the New York attorney general Andrew Cuomo is about to file a lawsuit against Lehman accountants Ernst and Young, is welcome news indeed.

Another Day, Another Rating Agency Fail, This Time S&P

f you thought that the rating agencies had cleaned up their act in the wake of the crisis, think again. Our Richard Smith reported on a couple of black eyes by Moody’s, one a rather implausible 180 degree turn on its take on the US tax deal, the other a suspiciously flattering take on whether Countrywide had indeed transferred notes (retaining them, as an executive testified they did on a routine basis, would confirm our suspicions about widespread problems in the securitization industry.

Now we have a big blooper by S&P, this one in the form of mass rerating, based on an admitted faulty analysis. That is code for “big error in the model that everyone missed.”

With Friends Like Moody’s…

Good to see Moody’s rebuilding its franchise. Their aura of mystery is still reassuringly intact, two years after the subprime CDO ratings fiasco; as a bemused Firedoglake notes, in connection with two diametrically opposed, and politically charged, opinions about the tax cuts and their projected effect on the US credit rating: Can someone tell me […]