Category Archives: Market inefficiencies

Should Elizabeth Warren Run for President?

As the manufactured debt ceiling crisis provides an unflattering window into the reckless incompetence of pretty much all of our elected officials in DC, more and more readers have been calling for Elizabeth Warren to run for President.

The idea of punishing Obama by introducing a wild card into his stacked deck is enormously appealing. The assumption that he can abuse his everyman base as badly as he wants to because they won’t vote for someone further to the right (no matter how little further to the right that really is) after the bait and switch of his campaign is still seen as a viable strategy by most political commentators.

But discomfiting Obama isn’t a very good reason for Warren to consider throwing her hat into the ring. And as we’ve observed in past posts, the Harvard professor attracts a tremendous amount of projection. It would be hard for her, or anyone, to live up to the hopes vested in her.

We’ll take a dispassionate look at the notion of having Warren run for President. The bottom line is there is a sound case to be made for the idea, and it trumps having her run for the Senate. And if she is to go this route, she should primary Obama rather than run as a third party candidate.

How Algorithms Shape Our World

I don’t know about you, but I’m suffering from debt ceiling/Eurozone mess fatigue and thought readers might enjoy a wee respite. This engaging presentation by Kevin Slavin provides some useful food for thought about how the use of algorithms are coming to literally reshape our world.

Felix Salmon Misreads AAA Bond Demand to Say “Overcaution” Caused Crisis

Lordie, I can’t believe someone who professes to understand markets has written, at length, that caution, no, “excess of overcaution,” was a major contributor to the criss. Or has Felix Salmon been spending too much time with lobbyists from ISDA and SIFMA?

I hate seeming rude, but Felix has a habit of tearing into Gretchen Morgenson for errors much less significant than the one he made in a post today. He wrote, apropos this chart, which comes from FT Alphaville:

Doug Smith: The Maximum Wage

By Douglas K. Smith, author of On Value and Values: Thinking Differently About We In An Age Of Me

We face severe and growing income inequality with negative effects on people and the economy. Yet, no surprise, the ‘can’t do’ right wing continues a scorched earth campaign against the minimum wage. These self-promoting haters actually prefer no wages and indentured servitude – for example using prisoners to replace employees and cheerfully promoting ‘internships’ for the unemployed.

They glory in income inequality and wish it to expand instead of contract. Enough of that. They are destroyers of the American Dream.

But people who seek to shrink income inequality — to insure life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all and not just some — must now focus as much on the maximum wage as the minimum wage.

So, be it proposed:

“That any enterprise receiving taxpayer funds shall not compensate that enterprise’s highest paid person in an amount greater than twenty-five times what the lowest compensated person receives.”

Mirabile Dictu! Central Bankers Getting Concerned About Bank Capital Levels Rather Late in the Reform Game

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III. Per Bloomberg:

Complexity and War or How Financial Firms Wreck Economies for Fun and Profit

There’s a great post up, “Human Complexity: The Strategic Game of ? and ?,” by Richard Bookstaber, former risk manager, author of the book A Demon of Our Own Design and currently an advisor to the Financial Stability Oversight Council. As insightful as it is, Bookstaber does not draw out some obvious implications, perhaps because they might not be well received by his current clients: that the current preferred profit path for the major capital markets firms is inherently destructive.

I suggest you read the post in its entirety. Bookstaber sets out to define what sort of complexity is relevant in financial markets:

The measurement of complexity in physics, engineering, and computer science falls into one of three camps: The amount of information content, the effect of non-linearity, and the connectedness of components.

Information theory takes the concept of “entropy” as a starting point…

Do We Need Big Banks?

Yves here. I normally let VoxEU articles stand on their own, but this topic, of whether the bank PR that bigger banks are essential stands up to scrutiny, is near and dear to my heart.

Note that the authors point to a 1990s study that finds that a $25 billion in assets bank was the optimal size. There were a fair number of studies done then of bank size versus efficiency. I’m a bit surprised that this is the one that is most often cited, since it also came up with the biggest size threshold at which a negative cost curve kicked in (meaning the bank became more costly to run). One study found that the slightly negative cost curve started at $100 million in assets (!); more typical was somewhere between $1 and $5 billion. And remember, these studies were done in the days when banks returned checks, and check processing was believed to have strong scale economies (ie, if check processing was a bigger proportion of total costs then than now, it could arguably have increased scale economies).

Some academics were frustrated with these results. I recall reading a paper where the author argued that there were theoretical cost savings to being bigger (duh) and basically contended that the empirical data had to be wrong.

Guest Post: Market Ecology

→ Rajiv Sethi

The erudite and very readable RT Leuchtkafer has posted yet another comment for the Securities and Exchange Commission to digest. This one was prompted by a paper by Andrei Kirilenko, Albert Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi and Tugkan Tuzun that provides a fascinating glimpse into the kinds of trading strategies that are common in asset markets today and the manner in which they interact to determine the dynamics of asset prices.

Why the Krugman “I See No Commodities Speculation” Analysis is Flawed

Paul Krugman correctly anticipated that I would be unable to resist taking issue with him again regarding his view that the recent increase in commodities prices are warranted by the fundamentals.

Note that I am not saying in this post that “commodities prices have increased as a result of speculation.” That takes more granular analysis of conditions in various markets; we’ll be looking at some that look suspect in the coming days and weeks.

I intend to accomplish something much simpler in this post: to dispute the logic of Krugman’s overarching argument. He professes to be empirical, but as we will show, he is looking at dangerously incomplete data, so his conclusions rest on what comes close to a garbage in, garbage out analysis. And that’s been a source of frustration given his considerable reputation and reach.

Satyajit Das: Derivatives Regulation Dance

By Satyajit Das, the author of “Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives.” Cross posted from Wilmott

A question of values …

Derivative contracts are valued on a mark-to-market (“MtM”) basis. This requires valuation of the contracts based on the current market price.

OTC derivatives trade privately. Market prices for specific transactions are not directly available. This means current valuations rely on pricing models.

There are significant differences in the complexity of the models and the ability to verify and calibrate inputs. More complex products used sophisticated financial models, often derived from science or statistical methodology. There are frequently differences in choice, exact factorisation and even numerical implementation of the models. Different dealers may use different models.

Some required inputs for the models are available from markets sources. The nature of the OTC market and the limited trading in certain instruments mean that key input parameters must frequently be “estimated” or “bootstrapped” from available data. In certain products, the limited number of active dealers means that “market” prices are sometimes no more than the dealer’s own quote being fed back after being collated and “scrubbed” by an external data provider. This is referred to prosaically as “mark-to-myself”.

Debunking the Myth That Bigger Banks are More Efficient and Necessary

A very good op ed by Thomas Hoenig in the New York Times, “Too Big to Succeed” provides a solid recap of why the business of reining in the too big too fail banks is crucial. It isn’t simply that this is yet another version of “Mission Accomplished”; the bailouts actually made industry concentration worse, […]

ECB into the breach?

Various Eurosceptics are piping up this morning, and no wonder. Unfortunately some of the interesting stuff is behind the FT’s magnificently unstable subscription firewall, which, in an attack of paranoia, or megalomania, has decided today, as it occasionally does, to deny access to everything, even the free bits, subscriber or not. It is like something […]

Hands, burnt fingers, and American mortgages

Terry Guy Hands has lost his lawsuit against Citigroup, wherein he accused Citigroup of defrauding his private equity group, Terra Firma Capital Partners, by lying about the number of competing bidders during the auction of the record company EMI, for which Terra Firma paid $6.8 Billion. This was one of those top-of the market deals […]

“Summer” Rerun: Is Liquidity All That It’s Cracked Up to Be?

This post first appeared on May 6, 2008 Steve Waldman at Interfludity did me the high compliment of picking up on an issue that is important to me and running with it: Yves Smith packs a powerful insight into an unassuming sentence: Liquidity is not a virtue in and of itself unless it produces a […]