Category Archives: Risk and risk management

How Botched Derivatives Risk Taming Regulations are Again Going to Leave Taxpayers Holding the Bag

An important piece in the Financial Times by Manmohan Singh, a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund, describes persuasively how one of the central vehicles for reducing derivatives risk, that of having a central counterparty (CCP) and requiring dealers to trade with it rather than have a web of bi-lateral exposures, or rely on banks to act as clearers (making them too big to fail) has gone pear shaped. While the immediate reason for this outcome is the unwillingness of national banking regulators to cede powers to an international clearinghouse, Singh fingers an equally important cause: the reluctance to recognize that the underlying problem was and remains undercollateralized derivatives positions. His introduction to the mess:

More JP Morgan Whitewash

Via e-mail, some updates from Michael Crimmins, a bank compliance expert and member of Occupy the SEC, on the continuing failure of the media to portray the real significance of the JP Morgan London Whale losses: that it revealed glaring deficiencies in internal controls that warrant prosecution of Jamie Dimon under Sarbanes Oxley.

New York Times Profile of London Whale Boss, Ina Drew, Camouflages Dimon’s Risk Management Failures

A New York Times profile of Ina Drew, the former head of the JP Morgan Chief Investment Office, almost certainly produced high fives in the bank’s corporate communications office. This piece is the best sort of PR you can get: it treats the trading losses as yesterday’s news, of interest only as point of entre into the downfall of a heretofore unknown but once hugely successful and personally appealing trading manager.

Robert Jenkins: Puncturing Bankers’ Myths

In this speech,Robert Jenkins of the Bank of England blows apart the self-serving myths that ‘old guard’ bankers and their lobbyists have been peddling since the financial crisis ripped apart the global financial system in 2007.

On FICO’s Dubious Explanation of Why it Treats Short Sales the Same as Foreclosures

April Charney sent me a link to a post which had a condescending explanation of a recent piece by FICO that warrants further discussion. The FICO article attempted to justify its position that someone who enters into a short sale gets his credit score dinged as badly as for a foreclosure. Yes, you read that correctly. One of the reasons many borrowers go to the effort to arrange a short sale, as opposed to the faster and easier process of “jingle mail” is that they assume that the damage to their credit score will be lower.

Here is the rationale….

Quelle Surprise! Regulatory Measures to Reduce Systemic Risk Are Proving to Be Ineffective, Possibly Counterproductive

In an perverse case of synchronicity, one headline last night touted regulatory efforts to address systemic risk as another highlighted bank efforts to increase it. And the ongoing efforts of banks to expand risk creation is no accident.

Fear Gauge Loses Track

By Paul Amery. Cross posted from Index Universe

The US equity market’s main risk measure is back down to the levels we saw in 2007. But declines in volatility mask substantially different behaviour from stocks than pre-crisis.

Risk is Always With Us

By Sell on News, a global macro analyst. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

A question that has been asked, but not nearly often enough, is why did the complex risk defrayal methods fail so completely during the global financial crisis?

Defining Strategies and Tools for Reducing Systemic Risk

Yves here. Although this VoxEU is heavier on economese than may suit the tastes of most NC readers, it’s nevertheless worth your attention. It takes issue with a popular view among economists, that one of the ways to reduce systemic risk is to reduce cyclical swings in asset prices (or more accurately, to prevent banks from all following some great new lending fad and running off a cliff tout ensemble). The wee problem with that is economists were patting themselves on the back in 2007 that they had engineered a Great Moderation and the overwhelming majority were in denial about the existence of a global credit bubble. In fairness, many are thinking about how to create automatic counter-cyclical stabilizers, since as Ian MacFarlane, the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia pointed out, an asset bubble looks like increased wealth to the community, so anyone who stands in its way is going to be extremely unpopular.

This VoxEU article offers an alternate line of thinking on how to to lower systemic risk.

Cathy O’Neil: Data Science – The Problem Isn’t Statisticians, It’s Too Many Poseurs

By Cathy O’Neil, a data scientist who lives in New York City and writes at mathbabe.org

Without naming names, I’d like to characterize problematic pseudo-mathematical behavior that I witness often enough that I’m consistently riled up.

New Zealand’s Savings & Loans Companies: Not Like Any Banking Industry You’ve Ever Seen Before

Yet more gems from New Zealand’s Company Register: the companies that specialize in scamming Americans

London Whale Trade Explodes, Current Estimate of JP Morgan Losses as High as $9 Billion

So again, what did Dimon know when? Under the hot lights at the House Financial Services Committee, he repeatedly brushed off the losses on the failed Chief Investment Office trades as no biggie. Let us remind readers that the size of the CIO’s balance sheet would make it the 8th largest bank in the US and it was running half of JPM’s total risk exposures, so it’s hard to see the failure of oversight as something to be waived off. And now it turns out the losses are going to clock in at a much higher number than the $2 billion that Dimon kept repeating in the hearings.

Simon Johnson: JP Morgan at Risk if Euro Breaks Up

I’m surprised it has taken this long for Someone Serious to make the argument set forth in a new article by Simon Johnson at Bloomberg, which in short form says “You are dreaming if you think a European financial crisis stays in Europe.”

Johnson somewhat undercuts the urgency and importance of his article by working from the assumption that the eurozone dissolves back into its earlier configuration of one currency per nation. Economists and analysts have discussed other scenarios, such as a exit by Greece, which has the potential to precipitate contagion in Portugal, Spain, and Italy; an exit by Germany; a split into more economically homogeneous sub-groups (most likely north v. south). And Bloomberg refrains from putting the real sizzler in the headline: Johnson considers JP Morgan to be vulnerable and explains why.

Quants, Models, and the Blame Game

Cathy O’Neil, a quant, looks at the key question raised by a recent paper by Donald Mackenzie on the Gaussian copula model: why do flawed models become widely accepted?

Dimon Redux: Why Bank Risk-Taking = Risk Making

In case you haven’t had enough of Congresscritters lobbing softballs at Jamie Dimon, the JP Morgan CEO is appearing before the House Financial Services Committee on Tuesday. There have been a number of suitably scathing accounts of how members of the Senate Banking Committee fawned over Dimon.

As we wrote, Dimon took what is actually an indefensible position: that any bank risk taking should be permitted, so long as it will arguably do well when there is a crisis (watch for this to be broadened to merely be a bet to improve bank profits when its regular businesses are under stress). We pointed out that this logic would justify engaging in systemically destructive activities like the Magnetar trade, and that with government backstopping behind it to boot. And that is a bigger risk than it might seem at first blush.