Category Archives: Risk and risk management

Adam Davidson, the 1%’s Lord Haw-Haw, Fellates Wall Street

Although I endeavor to treat high dudgeon as an art form, it is difficult to find words adequate to convey the level of ridicule and opprobrium that Adam Davidson’s latest New York Times piece, “What Does Wall Street Do for You?” deserves. I had the vast misfortune to come across it late last week, and have gotten an unusually large volume of incredulous reader e-mails about it. Ms. G’s e-mail headline “NYT – Not a Parody” was typical:

This one is so bad, even for NYT, I’m wondering if the paper wasn’t secretly sold to Murdoch, Bloomberg & the Fed Reserve sometime in the past few days.

Philip Pilkington: Bubbles and Beauty Contests – To What Extent is Keynes Relevant to Investors?

By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer living in Dublin, Ireland

There are some strange and interesting passages in Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money – and it is these, I think, that give it its deserved status as a classic. Many of these passages are the tangential reflections of a man – who we should not hesitate to call a genius – on his subject matter. And it is these passages that truly make Keynes what he was: a wise man.

One of the most fascinating passages on the so-called Keynesian beauty contest is worth quoting here in full.

Is Management Getting Worse?

To some readers, the answer to the headline may seem obvious: Yes, American management is clearly worse than it was, say, thirty or fifty years ago, because short-termism is endemic among public companies, and short-termism leads to all sorts of bad outcomes, like underinvestment and accounting gaming.

But that analysis is simplistic. Short-termism simply shows that management has adopted good for them, bad for pretty much everyone else (save maybe their bankster allies) goals and are pursuing them aggressively.

A comment by John Kay of the Financial Times has the effect of raising much more fundamental questions about the caliber of top managers.

“Summer” Rerun: Why Big Capital Markets Players Are Unmanageable

This post first appeared on July 8, 2009

John Kay comes perilously close to nailing a key issue in his current Financial Times comment, “Our banks are beyond the control of mere mortal” in that he very clearly articulates the problem very well but then draws the wrong conclusion:

How the Public Misses Out on How Fights Over Bank Regulations Affect Them

The public keeps losing and losing and losing to big finance because financiers have made an art form of using complexity, opacity, and leverage to cover their tracks.

The last example comes in an anodyne-seeming article in the Financial Times about collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs.

Wolf Richter: CEO of Dexia – ‘Not A Bank But A Hedge Fund’

By Wolf Richter, San Francisco based executive, entrepreneur, start up specialist, and author, with extensive international work experience. Cross posted from Testosterone Pit.

Dexia SA, the Franco-Belgian mega-bank that collapsed and was bailed out in 2008 and that re-collapsed in early October, is a big deal in Belgium where it employs 10,000 people and has over 21 million bank accounts. Its assets of $715 billion dwarf Belgium’s $395 billion economy.

Journey into a Libertarian Future: Part III – Regulation

By Andrew Dittmer, who recently finished his PhD in mathematics at Harvard and is currently continuing work on his thesis topic. He also taught mathematics at a local elementary school. Andrew enjoys explaining the recent history of the financial sector to a popular audience.

Simulposted at The Distributist Review

This is the third installment of a six-part interview. For the previous parts, see Part 1 and Part 2. Red indicates exact quotes from Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s 2001 book “Democracy: The God That Failed.”

Does Anybody Who Gets It Believe Central Banks Did All That Much Yesterday?

I’m still mystified as to the market reaction on Wednesday to the coordinated central bank effort at waving a bazooka at the escalating European financial crisis. But as readers pointed out in comments, the big move was overnight, in futures, when trading is thin, and there was no follow through when markets opened. And volume was underwhelming.

Haldane/Madouros: What is the Contribution of the Financial Sector?

Yves here. Andrew Haldane is the most important thinker, bar none, on the financial services industry today. This piece by Haldane and Vasileios Madouros, a fellow member of the Financial Stability team at the Bank of England. contains a key statement that needs to be drummed into policy makers and commentators: “Bearing risk is not, by itself, a productive activity.”

By Andrew Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England and Vasileios Madouros, Economist in the Financial Stability directorate of the Bank of England. Cross posted from VoxEU

Whilst few would argue that the financial crisis has not brought the real economy down with it, there is considerably less clarity about what the positive contribution of the financial sector is during normal times. This lead commentary in the current Vox debate on the issue focuses on the value-added of risk and government subsidies in national accounting, and makes an important distinction between risk-taking and risk management.

There is no doubting the financial sector has a significant impact on the real economy. Financial crisis experience makes this only too clear. Financial recessions are both deeper and longer-lasting than normal recessions. At this stage of a normal recession, output would be about 5% above its pre-crisis level. Today, in the UK, it remains about 3.5% below. So this much is clear: Starved of the services of the financial sector, the real economy cannot recuperate quickly.

But that does not answer the question of what positive contribution finance makes in normal, non-recessionary states. This is an altogether murkier picture. Even in concept, there is little clarity about the services that banks provide to customers, much less whether statisticians are correctly measuring those services. As currently measured, however, it seems likely that the value of financial intermediation services is significantly overstated in the national accounts.

Satyajit Das: In the Matter of Lehman Brothers – Part 2: Well Structured Messes

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

In this two part paper, the issues regarding settlement of complex derivatives arrangement revealed by the failure of Lehman Brothers is outlined. Many of the failures affect new regulatory proposals such as the rapid resolution regimes under consideration. The First Part dealt with terminating and settling derivative contracts. The Second Part deals with effects of the bankruptcy on structured products and collateral.

On the Dubious Defenses of the Netting of $4 Trillion of US Bank CDS to the Eurozone

One of the reasons I’m not a big fan of Twitter is that I don’t see it as being useful save for communicating short updates (Raid on Zuccotti Park! Come help fast!) or a terse assessment with a tiny URL. Even more can be misconstrued (or can pretend to be misconstrued by a nay-sayer) than in longer forms of communication.

Nevertheless, I think we can safely make some conclusions re the following tweet from Economics of Contempt on the over $4 trillion notional of US bank exposure to Eurozone risks. A Reuters story recounts how the Financial Stability Oversight Council is trying to get a grip on the positions. Even the bank lobbying group the International Institute of Finance is cautious:

“As such, the potential for contagion to the U.S. financial system is not small,” the Institute of International Finance, the lobby group for major international banks, said last week.

Nevertheless, there is not much room for misinterpretation of this exchange:

Satyajit Das: In the Matter of Lehman Brothers – Part 1: Breaking Up is Hard To Do

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

In this two part paper, the issues regarding settlement of complex derivatives arrangement revealed by the failure of Lehman Brothers is outlined. Many of the failures affect new regulatory proposals such as the rapid resolution regimes under consideration. The First Part deals with terminating and settling derivative contracts.

A generation was once measured by where they were when an American President was assassinated in Dallas. A newer financial generation measure themselves by where they were when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008.

The controversial failure of Lehman has become a pivotal point in ideological debates about markets, finance and the role of government. At a more mundane level, Lehman’s bankruptcy points to deeper problems in the “plumbing” of the financial system. The policy debate so far has largely ignored these unfashionable issues.