Category Archives: Risk and risk management

On the Dubious Defenses of the Netting of $4 Trillion of US Bank CDS to the Eurozone

One of the reasons I’m not a big fan of Twitter is that I don’t see it as being useful save for communicating short updates (Raid on Zuccotti Park! Come help fast!) or a terse assessment with a tiny URL. Even more can be misconstrued (or can pretend to be misconstrued by a nay-sayer) than in longer forms of communication.

Nevertheless, I think we can safely make some conclusions re the following tweet from Economics of Contempt on the over $4 trillion notional of US bank exposure to Eurozone risks. A Reuters story recounts how the Financial Stability Oversight Council is trying to get a grip on the positions. Even the bank lobbying group the International Institute of Finance is cautious:

“As such, the potential for contagion to the U.S. financial system is not small,” the Institute of International Finance, the lobby group for major international banks, said last week.

Nevertheless, there is not much room for misinterpretation of this exchange:

Satyajit Das: In the Matter of Lehman Brothers – Part 1: Breaking Up is Hard To Do

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

In this two part paper, the issues regarding settlement of complex derivatives arrangement revealed by the failure of Lehman Brothers is outlined. Many of the failures affect new regulatory proposals such as the rapid resolution regimes under consideration. The First Part deals with terminating and settling derivative contracts.

A generation was once measured by where they were when an American President was assassinated in Dallas. A newer financial generation measure themselves by where they were when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008.

The controversial failure of Lehman has become a pivotal point in ideological debates about markets, finance and the role of government. At a more mundane level, Lehman’s bankruptcy points to deeper problems in the “plumbing” of the financial system. The policy debate so far has largely ignored these unfashionable issues.

Moron from Scam Companies “Validated Carbon Credits” and “Baron Traders Limited ” Threatens This Blog

By Richard Smith

I posted this a few days ago, about the screechingly obvious fake Gibraltar company Validated Carbon Credits, a trading name of Baron Traders Ltd and its lying “CEO” James Richards. Two comments to the post have caught my eye:

It´s obvious your posting is not only slanderous but based on pure conjecture without any circumstantial evidence whatsoever. Why is it you don´t have a “contact us” link? Did you even bother contacting the company / individuals to try and establish some facts?

This was purportedly by a lady called Karen Johnson, who guilelessly provides an email address, bubblybosun@gmail.com, which, a quick Google reveals, is a handle used by none other than James Richards, the aforementioned lying CEO. Rather than dwell on that, or on the fact that “she” evidently doesn’t understand the meanings of the words “circumstantial evidence” and “slanderous”, I responded as follows:

Validated Carbon Credits and Baron Traders Limited Have (Update: Briefly) Left the Building

The FT and a scammer respond to a Carbon Credits post at NC

Cheer Up, FTAdviser: At Least You Don’t Publish Threadbare Excuses from Scammers, Like Reuters Does

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By Richard Smith

Having hooted mildly at FTAdviser yesterday, for their somewhat skimpy fact checking, I found my eye caught today by a similar miss from Reuters (in bold):

The Italian Job

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns. Follow me on Twitter at edwardnh for more credit crisis coverage. Disclaimer: This piece on the impact of Italy’s potential insolvency on the sovereign debt crisis is not an advocacy piece. It is supposed to be an actionable prediction of what I see as likely to occur. That said, see link […]

Satyajit Das: Central Counter Party Tranquilliser Solutions

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

This four part paper deals with a key element of derivative market reform – the CCP (Central Counter Party). The first part looked at the idea behind the CCP. This second part looked at the design of the CCP. The third part looked at the risk of the CCP itself and how that is managed. The last part looks at the market effects of the effects of the CCP on the market.

In the Renaissance, popes often annulled the marriages of Catholic monarchs. The annulment preserved, theoretically, both the authority of the Papacy and the sanctity of marriage. The CCP proposal is similar. It gives the impression that regulators and legislators are reasserting control over the wild beasts of finance. In reality, the proposal may not work or materially reduce the risks it is intended to address.

Satyajit Das – Europe’s Plan To End the Debt Crisis – Putting The “Con” in “Confidence” Part 1

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

The most recent summit failed to meet even the lowest expectations.

Gene Frieda: Europe’s Dying Bank Model

Yves here. Frieda makes a very important point in this Project Syndicate column, that of the role of the banking system in the European debt crisis. On one level, it may seem trivial to say that the sovereign debt crisis is the result of financial crisis. But the Eurozone leadership has not drilled into the next layer: how did this come about? The superficial explanation, that they all ate too much US subprime debt and got really sick, is superficial and shifts attention away from the real issues. European banks have huge balance sheets with a lot of low-return investments. I did some consulting work for some European banks over a decade ago (one of the remarkable things about banking is how little things change over time) and they tended to target commodity areas of banking in the US, not simply because that was where they could break in, but also because the returns were tolerable (although they did hope to move up the food chain into more lucrative business).

Frieda argues that merely having banks raise capital ratios to the 9% level stipulated in the current version of the Eurozone rescue is inadequate. Absent more aggressive measures, “no amount of capital will restore investors’ faith in eurozone banks.”

By Gene Frieda, a global strategist for Moore Europe Capital Management. Cross posted with author permission from Project Syndicate.

Satyajit Das: Central Counter Party Risk Taming

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

This four part paper deals with a key element of derivative market reform – the CCP (Central Counter Party). The first part looked at the idea behind the CCP. This second part looked at the design of the CCP. The third part looks at the risk of the CCP itself and how that is managed.

The key element of derivative market reform is a central clearinghouse, the central counter party (“CCP”). The CCP is designed to reduce and help manage credit risk in derivative transactions – the risk that each participant takes on the other side to perform their obligations (known as “counterparty risk”). The CCP also simplifies and reduces the complex chains of risk that link market participants in derivative markets. However, the proposal relies on the ability of the CCP itself to manage risk.

Debunking the “Paid Back the TARP” Myth: Banks Should be Paying Over $300 Billion a Year in Systemic Risk Insurance

This Institute for New Economic Thinking interview with economist Ed Kane discusses how systemic risk should be measured. Kane argues that taxpayer are essentially disadvantaged bank shareholders, getting the downside and none of the bennies, like dividends or capital gains. He argues that banks should be paying taxpayers for the privilege of having them and their counterparties rescued, and that is over $300 billion a year.’

And that isn’t the only freebie banks are getting.

European summits in ivory towers

By Paul de Grauwe, Professor of international economics, University of Leuven, member of the Group of Economic Policy Analysis, advising the EU Commission President Manuel Barroso, and former member of the Belgian parliament. Cross-posted from VoxEU.

The Eurozone crisis plays on to a familiar tune. Finance ministers meet on the weekend only for markets to dismiss their efforts the following Monday. This column argues that Europe’s leaders have lost touch, that the ECB has the firepower but is not prepared to use it, and that the outcome of all this is depressingly clear: Defeat by the financial markets.

Satyajit Das: Central Counter Party Politics

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

This four part paper deals with a key element of derivative market reform – the CCP (Central Counter Party). The first part looked at the idea behind the CCP. This second part looks at the design of the CCP.

The key element of derivative market reform is a central clearinghouse, the central counter party (“CCP”). Under the proposal, standardised derivative transactions must be cleared through the CCP that will guarantee performance.

The design of the CCP provides an insight into the complex interests of different groups affected and the lobbying process shaping the regulations.

Satyajit Das: Will a Central Counter Party Tame Derivatives Market Risks?

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

This four part paper deals with a key element of derivative market reform – the CCP (Central Counter Party). The first part looks at the idea behind central clearing of OTC Derivatives.

The key element of derivative market reform is a central clearinghouse, the central counter party (“CCP”). Under the proposal, standardised derivative transactions must be cleared through the CCP that will guarantee performance.

The CCP is designed to reduce and help manage credit risk in derivative transactions – the risk that each participant takes on the other side to perform their obligations (known as “counterparty risk”). The CCP also simplifies and reduces the complex chains of risk that link market participants in derivative markets.

Fitch Installs Its Own Glass-Steagall

Yves here. Fitch tries to position itself as the “we try harder” ratings agency, taking more aggressive ratings actions relative to Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. For instance, it started issuing warnings about and then downgrading CMBS before its two larger competitors pre-crisis. The open question here is whether other bond graders will follow its lead.

By David Llewellyn-Smith, the founding publisher and former editor-in-chief of The Diplomat magazine, now the Asia Pacific’s leading geo-politics website. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.

There have been times in the last couple of years when the GFC-chastened ratings agencies appeared to be racing one another back to some position of credibility faster than the world could bear. Well, that race is surely over now, with Fitch announcing after US trading the mother of all downgrade watches on, well, everybody.