Category Archives: Risk and risk management

Affordable Housing Groups Once Again Acting As Human Shields For Banksters

I’m not going to quote George Santayana tonight, as much as his famous saying verging on cliche fits. But will some people never learn?

Another useful cliche is that politics makes for odd bedfellows. But that notion is misapplied in a New York Times article tonight, which tries to convince readers that affordable housing advocates and mortgage financiers playing on the same team is a new development. Huh? Per the Times:

The weight of the mortgage crisis fell heavily on lower-income and minority communities…..That left consumer advocates and civil rights groups frequently at odds with bankers, mortgage lenders and their lobbyists during the debate over the financial regulation act last year, which aims to rein in the subprime mortgage excesses that inflated the housing bubble.

Now, as banking regulators are rewriting the rules for the mortgage market, unusual alliances have sprung up in opposition to tighter lending standards. Advocacy groups like the N.A.A.C.P. and the National Council of La Raza, a Latino civil rights organization, on the one hand, and the American Bankers Association on the other, are joining together to fight rules they say could make home loans less affordable for minority and working-class Americans…

A Better Way to Make Bankers Pay for Crises?

McKinsey once got a study from a major shipping company whose bottom line was suffering because the managers in its ports were keeping too many containers on hand. No one wanted to be short of containers and delay a shipment, so they all made sure to have enough and then some. Containers are a big cost item and management was keen to figure out how to get by with fewer.

Now the team could easily have had great fun building a big model of shipping flows and likely variability and done lots of analysis to figure out what the minimum needed level of containers was and how to have the right decision rules. Instead, the team changed the pay for port managers, so that on the one hand, they’d still be penalized if shipments were delayed, but they would be rewarded for minimizing the number of containers they had. Almost immediately, port managers were sending containers away and complaining if an influx of shipments left them holding a lot. The shipper was quickly able to reduce its stock of containers.

Since the crisis, there has been lots of debate on what to do about incentives in the financial services industry with little in the way of action.

Tough Swiss Regs Induce UBS to Consider Glass Steagall Lite Partition, So Risky Ops May Become US Problem

Switzerland has taken the sensible move of recognizing that it cannot credibly backstop banks whose assets are more than eight times the country’s GDP. It is in the process of imposing much tougher capital requirements, expected to be nearly 20% of risk-weighted assets, well above the Basel III level of 7%.

UBS apparently plans to partition the bank in a Glass-Steagall lite split, leaving the traditional banking operations in Switzerland and putting the investment bank in a separate legal entity outside Switzerland. This resembles the approach advocated in the preliminary draft of the UK’s Independent Banking Commission report, of having retail banking and commercial banking separately capitalized.

The problem is that the devil lies in the details.

On Short-Termism and the Institutionalization of Rentier Capitalism

Andrew Haldane and Richard Davies of the Bank of England have released a very useful new paper on short-termism in the investment arena. They contend that this problem real and getting worse. This may at first blush seem to be mere official confirmation of most people’s gut instinct. However, the authors take the critical step of developing some estimates of the severity of the phenomenon, since past efforts to do so are surprisingly scarce.

A short-term perspective is tantamount to applying an overly high discount rate to an investment project or similarly, requiring an excessively rapid payback. In corporate capital budgeting settings, the distortions are pronounced:

Mortgage Whistleblowers Say Servicers Foreclosed Rather Than Modify, HAMP Program Designed to Help Banks, Not Borrowers

A report at the Dylan Ratigan show confirms what we’ve argued for some time is happening: that banks are not making mods to viable borrowers because servicing is more profitable. In addition, an insider on the HAMP program says that the pressure to make trial mods to make the program look good wound up hurting […]

Guest Post: Not far enough – Recommendations of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking

By Charles A.E. Goodhart and Avinash Persaud. Cross posted from VoxEU

The UK’s Independent Commission on Banking was set up last year to consider reforms to promote financial stability and competition. This column reacts to the commission’s interim report released on 11 May 2011. It argues that the commissioners have a lot to ponder before the final report is due in September – they have not gone far enough.

Banks are not Reserve Constrained

In a fiat money system, there is not a very good correlation between base money and M1 and credit because reserves don’t create loans. In practice, the lending operations of commercial banks have no interaction with reserve operations. Lenders simply take applications from customers who seek loans and assess creditworthiness and lend accordingly. In approving […]

On Dubious Defenses of the FDIC’s Lehman Resolution Plan

EoC has written a rejoinder to our post on FDIC’s paper on how it would have wound up Lehman with its new Dodd Frank powers. Since it’s a mix of smears and broken-backed arguments, it is nowhere near the standards he can attain when he is behaving himself. But as a tell about the officialdom’s propaganda preoccupations and methods, it isn’t entirely devoid of interest.

Before turning to the meat of his post, such as it is, I wanted to point out the biggest slur in the piece: his repeated assertion that Satyajit Das and I did not read the FDIC paper in full. That’s false, and brazenly so: somehow the fact that Das and I can crank out an analysis, quickly, gets twisted into anchoring a more general effort to discredit this site. Regular readers, including EoC, have no doubt seen other occasions where we’ve produced detailed and on target assessments before most of our peers. And Das is in Australia, giving him the ability to respond to evening releases in the US during his business day (in this case, one with specific page references).

EoC’s entire post fails when you look at its and the FDIC’s three central, obtuse misconstructions:

Guest Post: Overruled

Cross posted from MacroBusiness

Ok, we all know that anyone who says “this time it is different” is to be treated at best as misinformed, at worst as a fool. “They are the five most dangerous words in the English language” etc. etc. But, to repeat my question: “Are things always the same?” Mostly, yes. Modern housing bubbles are not unlike 17th century Holland’s Tulipmania, government debt crises have not changed all that much since Henry VIII reduced the gold in coinage, greed, profligacy, irresponsible plutocracies are always with us.

But in global finance there are some things happening that are genuinely different. Dangerously so.

Commodities Tank

We’ve been sayin’ the commodities runup and the fixation on inflation looked like a rerun of spring 2008: a liquidity-fueled hunt for inflation hedges when the deflationary undertow was stronger. That observation is now looking to be accurate.

But what may prove different this time is the speed of the reversal. With investors acting as if Uncle Ben would ever and always protect their backs, markets moved into the widely discussed “risk on-risk off” trade, a degree of investment synchronization never before seen. All correlations moving to one historically was the sign of a market downdraft, not speculative froth. And as we are seeing, that means the correlation will likely be similarly high in what would normally be a reversal, and that in turn increases the odds that it can amplify quickly into something more serious.

David Miles: What is the optimal leverage for a bank?

Yves here. Please be sure to read to the end of the post, where Miles discusses what level of equity he thinks banks should carry.

By David Miles, Monetary Policy Committee Member, Bank of England. Cross posted from VoxEU.

The global crisis has called into question how banks are run and how they should be regulated. Highly leveraged banks went under, threatening to drag down the entire financial system with them. Here, David Miles of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, shares his personal views on the optimal leverage for banks. He concludes that it is much lower than is currently the norm.

Why Does Reputation Count for So Little on Wall Street?

There is a very peculiar article by Steven Davidoff up at the New York Times: “As Wall St. Firms Grow, Their Reputations Are Dying.” It asks a good question: why does reputation now matter for so little in the big end of the banking game? As we noted on the blog yesterday, a documentary team was struggling to find anyone who would go on camera and say positive things about Goldman, yet widespread public ire does not seem to have hurt its business an iota.

Some of Davidoff’s observation are useful, but his article goes wide of the mark on much of its analysis of why Wall Street has become an open cesspool of looting and chicanery (as opposed to keeping the true nature of the predatory aspects of the business under wraps as much as possible).

On Economics of Contempt’s Reliance on His Own Brand Fumes

Economics of Contempt is aptly named. While his stand alone pieces on various aspects of regulation are informative, if too often skewed towards officialdom cheerleading (he too often comes off as an unpaid PR service for Geithner), his manner of engaging with third parties leaves a lot be desired. He often resorts to the blogosphere version of a withering look rather than dealing with an argument in a fair minded manner. This then puts the target in a funny position: do you deal with these drive-by shootings which have either not engaged or misrepresented your argument, by cherry picking and selective omission? If you do, you can look overly zealous or argumentative. But if you do nothing, particularly if it’s in an important area of regulatory debate, you’ve let disinformation, at the expense of your reputation, stand.

So How Exactly Does Buffett Get Information Like This?

Reader Hubert soliders on in the lonely task of continued Lehman spadework. He highlighted this section of FCIC testimony from Warren Buffett:

I think that if Lehman had been less leveraged there would have been less problems in the way of problems. And part of that leverage arose from the use of derivatives. And part of the dislocation that took place afterwards arose from that. And there’s some interesting material if you look at, I don’t exactly what Lehman material I was looking at, but they had a netting arrangement with the Bank of America as I remember and, you know, the day before they went broke and these are very, very, very rough ﬁgures from memory, but as I remember the day before they went broke Bank of America was in a minus position of $600 million or something like that they had deposited which I think J.P. Morgan in relation to Lehman and I think that the day they went broke it reversed to a billion and a half in the other direction and those are big numbers.

Hubert muses:

At Least One Country With Big Banks is Not Afraid of Them

This development, which was cited in last week’s Eurointelligence, has not gotten the attention it warrants:

The Swiss government wants to impose capital requirements on their two internationally active big banks UBS and Credit Suisse that by far exceed what European or American regulators intend to ask their banks to do, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports.